Brown v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1975
• Citation: 531 S.W.2d 488
• Parties: Myrtle BROWN, Appellant, v. BANKERS THE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 488

531 S.W.2d 488

Myrtle BROWN, Appellant, v. BANKERS THE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. 19, 1975.

G. E. Reams, Harlan, for appellant.

Gayle G. Huff, Rice & Huff, Harlan, for appellee.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

This appeal is from a judgment on the pleadings by the circuit court in favor of the appellee, Bankers Life and Casualty Company, in an action by the appellant, Myrtle Brown, as the named beneficiary of a $10,000 personal accident policy of insurance issued by the appellee to George Brown, the appellant's husband, who was fatally injured while operating a pick-up truck. The salient issue on appeal is whether the language 'any private passenger automobile of pleasure design' as used within the policy excludes a 'pick-up truck' from policy coverage. Our conclusion is that it does.

The rules regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy in this state have long included one that allows phrases or words that are ambiguous, doubtful, or equivocal to be construed 'most strongly against the insurer and most liberally in favor of the insured, so that the purpose for which the insurance was obtained may be effectuated. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Limited v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.W. 1031, L.R.A.1917D, 682, 952 (1917). On the other hand, this court has held repeatedly that the language of an insurance contract which is clear and unambiguous cannot be construed or interpreted most strongly against the insurer, disregarding a plain, easily understood clause exempting the insurer from liability. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n of Des Moines, Iowa v. Atkinson, 165 Ky. 532, 177 S.W. 254, L.R.A.1915E, 656 (1915). Another rule of interpretation frequently applied to words in an insurance policy is that they should be given their 'ordinary and usual' meaning. Buckingham Life Insurance Company v. Winstead, Ky., 454 S.W.2d 696, 697 (1970).

In construing the language of the policy in the instant case we have given consideration to the decisions of courts of other states, some of which are annotated in 38 A.L.R.2d at pages 867 to 886, involving wording substantially similar to that here in question and similar fact situations. Those cases, and the policy language, are as hereinafter noted. Lloyd v. Columbus Mutual Life, 200 N.C. 722, 158 S.E. 386 (1931) 'private automobile of the pleasure car type'; Dirst v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 232 Iowa 910, 5 N.W.2d 185 (1942) 'passenger automobile of the pleasure car type'; Spence v. Washington National Insurance, 320 Ill.App. 149, 50 N.E.2d 128 (1943) 'private passenger type automobile of the exclusively pleasure type'; Pennell v. United Insurance Co., 150 Tex. 541, 243 S.W.2d 572 (1951) 'private passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type'; La Fon v. Continental Casualty Co., 241 Mo.App. 802 259 S.W.2d 425 (1953) 'private pleasure type automobile'; Marshall v. Washington National Insurance Co., 246 N.C. 447, 98 S.E.2d 345 (1957) 'private passenger automobile of the pleasure type'; Gray v. North American Company for Life, Accident and Health Insurance, La.App., 128 So.2d 223 (1961) 'private automobile of exclusively pleasure type'; Laraway v. Heart of America Life Insurance Co., 153 W.Va. 70, 167 S.E.2d 749 (1969) 'private automobile of the private passenger design designed...