Brown v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 08 June 1875
• Citation: 32 Mich. 146
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Kezia A Barnes v. James H. Brown

32 Mich. 146

Kezia A Barnes v. James H. Brown

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 8, 1875

Heard April 29, 1875

Appeal in Chancery from Allegan Circuit.

Decree reversed, and a decree entered in this court for the complainant, with costs of both courts.

Littlejohn & Hart, for complainant.

J. W & O. C. Ransom and Jacob Ferris, for defendant.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

Complainant filed her bill to obtain the rescission of a deed made June 19, 1868, to defendant, without consideration. The facts are so directly contradictory that there is some difficulty in getting at the truth. There are some facts undisputed, and some on which there is a radical disagreement.

The case on which complainant relies is substantially this: In October, 1867, she gave defendant a mortgage for one thousand dollars on her farm, occupied by herself and husband. This mortgage ran for eight years, payable in small yearly installments.

In the spring of 1868, her husband bought an interest for Allegan county in a patent-right for a hay-fork, and gave his note for four hundred dollars. She was induced afterwards, but probably about the same time, and perhaps the same day, to sign the note with him. Not long afterward, defendant advised complainant she was likely to lose by it, and that it was probably a fraud.

In June, 1868, complainant visited Grand Rapids (which was twenty-four miles from her home), to dispose of some wool. During that visit she conveyed the farm to defendant by warranty deed, subject to the mortgage, for a consideration named therein of one thousand dollars. She says that the first suggestion came from him at that time; that she was stopping at his house, and that he introduced the subject of the patent-right note, and told her she ought to fix her property so that she need not have to pay it; that he asked if she could not convey it to one of her children, but on her answering in the negative, he proposed, after some talk about its value, that she should convey it to him at a nominal price of two thousand dollars, and that he should openly pay the amount beyond the mortgage, and she should privately return it to him, and he would hold the property until the patent-right difficulty should be disposed of, and then re-convey; that a deed was drawn by Mr. Sinclair, a justice of the peace, and the sum of nine hundred dollars paid over to complainant in his office, and restored to defendant after returning to his house, where he also went through the form of pointing out a lot of clothing, for the remaining one hundred dollars, without any selection or delivery.

Complainant claims that this ended the arrangement. No change was made in the occupation of the property, until, just before the bill was filed, in the spring of 1873, he served a notice to quit, in general terms, and specifying no cause. In his answer he claims it was for default in rent. In the next year after the purchase, the dwelling was burned, and rebuilt, and there is a conflict as to the part taken by defendant in regard to rebuilding it.

The defendant's version of the transaction is, that in the spring of 1868, while he was on a passing business visit at complainant's house, a bargain was made to sell it to him for two thousand dollars, including the sum secured by his mortgage, of which he was to pay one hundred dollars in clothing, and the balance in money. He further states that complainant was to come to Grand Rapids, and that the deed was made to carry out that bargain when she came, and the payments were made, and not returned; and that the complainant and her husband (until he sold) were to retain possession as lessees at two hundred dollars a year and taxes, he being at liberty to sell when he might chose to do so.

There are many collateral facts put in evidence, but their only value is in the bearing they have on the main issue.

It is impossible to be entirely sure concerning the true state of the case. There are inconsistencies in the stories of both parties, and in their testimony. But we are compelled to form a judgment upon the facts, which are all in the form of depositions, and to decide according to what we regard as the probabilities, as shown by a preponderance of evidence.

The complainant and her husband appear to be persons of about the usual business knowledge of those who have started in poverty, and, after reaching the time of declining years, are still struggling, with a farm of moderate value, and encumbered to what defendant claims was half its value, and what was at any rate between a third and a half of it. The defendant is a business man of more than average sharpness, who had dealt for several years with complainant's husband, and advised him in his affairs, and had been known to both, and frequently visited them on his business journeys, and had lent them, or otherwise furnished the sum for which he held the mortgage. From the name he goes by, of "Jockey" Brown or "Dicker" Brown, it would seem that his business was somewhat miscellaneous, and that he was not wanting in shrewdness at a bargain, and his age and surroundings indicate a wide experience. These things are to be regarded in considering the conduct of the parties, where their habits and business ways may explain their acts. And in the clashing of proofs it becomes very necessary to scrutinize the motives and acts of all.

The first inquiry naturally presenting itself is, what reason was there for selling the farm. It appears that complainant was industrious, and had been gaining steadily, though slowly, in her means of livelihood, and that the household depended more on her than on her husband. There is nothing to indicate that any change of residence had been thought of. The value of the farm, according to defendant's method of purchasing, was at least two thousand dollars in cash, and was much more than this according to other witnesses; and the land must at any rate have been worth considerably more on time. There had been no attempt to sell the farm before, and no consultation with defendant or any one else about its value. The sale whether we accept the statements of complainant or those of defendant, was made very suddenly,--made without any attempt to find purchasers on better terms, and without any occasion for money, or any avowed plan for removing elsewhere. And it was made for less than its admitted cash value, to the extent of the portion payable in...