Brown v. Benefield

Decision Date29 September 2010
Docket NumberCase No. 2:09–cv–901–MEF.
Citation757 F.Supp.2d 1165
PartiesAngela BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Ronnie BENEFIELD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Anthony B. Bush, Elizabeth Peyton Faulk, Joseph Brady Lewis, Lewis, Bush & Faulk, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs.Fred Lee Clements, Jr., Gary Lee Willford, Jr., Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, James Hillary Pike, Shealy, Crum & Pike, P.C., Dothan, AL, Thomas Kirven Brantley, Brantley and Haywood, Dothan, AL, John Robert Faulk, McDowell, Faulk & McDowell, Prattville, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

MARK E. FULLER, Chief Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 53). Plaintiffs Angela Brown, Marcus Brown, and two minors T.B., and Z.W. (collectively, the Plaintiffs) sued Defendants Ronnie Benefield, R.C. Covington, Eddie Ingram, and Corey Mason (collectively, the Defendants) alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as supplemental state law claims of trespass, assault and battery, and invasion of privacy. The Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, and the Defendants filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. # 14; # 50; # 53). After careful consideration of the record, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case is about a search and seizure conducted at the Plaintiffs' residence by members of the Barbour County Sheriff's Office. The complaint contains detailed factual allegations regarding the actual search and seizure at the Plaintiffs' residence. In addition, the complaint refers to portions of the search warrant and supporting affidavit. (Doc. # 53, 4, 5, 8). Ordinarily, because the warrant and affidavit were not attached to the complaint, they would not be considered for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because “the analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto.” Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam). In this case, however, the Court is free to consider the supporting affidavit and warrant, even in the context of a motion to dismiss, because the Plaintiffs refer to these documents in the complaint and these documents are central to their claims.1 Id. at 1369. Consequently, the Court will consider these documents when deciding this motion to dismiss.

The following facts are taken from the complaint, the warrant, and the supporting affidavit. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the Defendants were deputies in the Barbour County Sheriff's Office. On December 5, 2008, Deputy Mason presented Barbour County Circuit Judge Burt Smithart with a signed affidavit for a search warrant.

In the affidavit, Deputy Mason stated that he had “probable cause for believing and does believe that marihuana and cocaine ... is now being kept” at a residence on Doster Spur Road in Barbour County. (Doc. # 60–2, 1). The affidavit describes the residence to be searched as “possibly” Adrian Johnson's and “possibly, 127 Doster Spur Road, Ariton, Barbour County, AL.” ( Id.). It then describes the residence as the “last trailer on the right as you travel on Doster Spur Road” after turning onto Doster Spur Road from Doster Road. ( Id.). The residence is further described in the affidavit as a:

... single wide trailer, white or off white in color. The trailer faces back towards Doster Road. There is a set of wooden steps that lead to the front door. There is a storm door in front of the front door. There is a window air conditioning unit in the last window to the left as you face the front door of the trailer. There is white skirting on the bottom of the trailer. There is skirting missing from the back left portion of the trailer if you are looking at the front door of the trailer. There is a propane gas tank to the left rear of the residence as well. To the left of the trailer as you face the front door there is a satellite dish on a wooden pole.

( Id.). The affidavit then sets out Deputy Mason's reasons for requesting the warrant. It states that in November 2008, Deputy Mason conducted an undercover investigation and learned of the possibility of purchasing large quantities of marihuana in the Clio, Alabama area. ( Id.). That investigation led to the arrest of Kevin Gardner. After his arrest, Gardner agreed to accompany Deputy Mason to the residence described in the affidavit to show Deputy Mason where he could purchase drugs. ( Id.). They went to the residence together on November 30, 2008. On December 3, 2008, Deputy Mason and Deputy Covington conducted surveillance on the residence described in the affidavit and observed several individuals enter the residence for a brief time (between 30 and 120 seconds), exit the residence, and then drive away. ( Id. at 2). Deputy Mason, relying on his eight years of narcotics work, stated in the affidavit that such activity was consistent with drug transactions. ( Id.).

Deputy Mason's affidavit also states that in the two days after conducting the surveillance, he spoke separately with two confidential informants who had previously provided information that led to the recovery of narcotics and several arrests for drug offenses. ( Id.). The first informant “told Deputy Mason that he is familiar with that trailer and that there are large quantities of drugs being sold from that location.” ( Id.). The second informant accompanied Deputy Mason to the residence described in the affidavit. This informant “advised Deputy Mason that he was familiar with that subject, whom he identified as Adrian Johnson, and that Johnson sold large quantities of marihuana and cocaine from that residence.” ( Id.).

On December 5, 2008, Judge Smithart issued a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of drugs and drug-related materials at the residence described in the affidavit. (Doc. # 60–1). On or around December 5, 2008, Deputies Mason, Covington, Ingram, and Benefield executed the warrant. There is no allegation that any deputy other than Deputy Mason applied for or otherwise possessed the warrant. After arriving at the residence, and without knocking on the door, the officers conducted a “dynamic entry” in which they forced their way into the Plaintiffs' residence. (Doc. # 50, 6).

Plaintiffs Angela Brown, Marcus Brown, T.B., and Z.W. were at home when the deputies entered. After entering, the deputies physically forced the Plaintiffs to the floor with firearms drawn, handcuffed them, and arrested them. ( Id. at 7). The Plaintiffs allege that they were treated “roughly” while being seized and handcuffed. ( Id.). As this was happening, Marcus and Angela Brown told the deputies they were in the wrong residence (presumably after the deputies showed them the warrant). ( Id. at 6). According to the Plaintiffs, the residence the deputies had entered was number 20 Doster Spur Road—not number 127 as indicated in the warrant. ( Id. at 6). The deputies told Angela Brown to telephone Adrian Johnson—Angela Brown's brother who also lived on Doster Spur Road—so that he would come to the Plaintiffs' residence. ( Id. at 7). Johnson was handcuffed when he arrived. (Doc. # 50, 7).

The deputies then searched the residence. They searched the kitchen cabinets, refrigerator, freezer, television encasement, and other rooms in the residence. ( Id. at 6). The deputies also seized items from the home including a four-wheeler vehicle, computer, printer, paper shredder, and other personal items. ( Id.). The Plaintiffs allege that they suffered extensive property damage as a result of the deputies' actions. ( Id. at 8).

After the search, Plaintiffs Angela and Marcus Brown were arrested and charged with crimes that are not specified in the complaint. After being charged, Angela Brown was imprisoned from December 5, 2008 until January 7, 2009. ( Id. at 7). Marcus Brown was imprisoned from December 5, 2008 until February 12, 2009. ( Id.). The charges against both Angela and Marcus were dismissed. (Doc. # 50 at 7).

On September 22, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. # 50). The complaint contains seven counts. Counts one through four allege civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts five through seven allege violations of Alabama law. The Plaintiffs seek a variety of remedies, including: (1) a declaratory judgment that the policies and practices of the deputies are unlawful and violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) an injunction against further violations of the Plaintiffs' rights by the Defendants; (3) compensatory damages; (4) punitive damages; and (5) costs, including attorneys' fees and other relief that the Court may deem just and proper. ( Id. at 14). After the Plaintiffs filed two amended complaints, the Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss all of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. # 53). The motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is appropriate in this district because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this judicial district.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a defendant's motion to dismiss, a district court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in...

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    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • February 29, 2012
    ...that he acted with malice. Am. Compl. ¶ 218. Moreover, malice may be inferred from an absence of probable cause. Brown v. Benefield, 757 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1181 (M.D.Ala.2010). Because the Court has already established that Caravella has adequately plead that Defendants Pierson, Guess, Mantest......
  • Spadaro v. City of Miramar
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    • January 29, 2012
    ...that he acted with malice. Am. Compl. ¶ 218. Moreover, malice may be inferred from an absence of probable cause. Brown v. Benefield, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1181 (M.D. Ala. 2010). Because the Court has already established that Caravella has adequately plead that Defendants Pierson, Guess, Man......
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    ...As discussed previously under Count Seven, Higginbotham has done so. See discussion supra at 44-45; see also Brown v. Benefield, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1181-82 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (finding that, for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action, malice may be inferred for want ofprobable cause......
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    ...cause, the Court will allow a jury to resolve the issue of whether the City Defendants acted with malice. See Brown v. Benefield, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1181 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Williams, 297 F. App'x at 947. Finally, the City Defendants assert summary judgment is appropriate to the extent tha......
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