Brown v. Blaine

• Decision Date: 15 October 2003
• Parties: Alton D. BROWN, Appellant, v. Conner BLAINE, Jr., Lt. R. Oddo, T.D. Jackson, Lieutenant McCombic, Charles Rossi, Sergeant Lipscomb, Officer Marshall, Officer Romano, Kerri Cross, Frank J. Zaborowski and B.E. Ansell.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

833 A.2d 1166

Alton D. BROWN, Appellant, v. Conner BLAINE, Jr., Lt. R. Oddo, T.D.

Jackson, Lieutenant McCombic,¹ Charles Rossi, Sergeant Lipscomb, Officer Marshall, Officer Romano, Kerri Cross, Frank J. Zaborowski and B.E. Ansell.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs September 12, 2003.

Decided October 15, 2003.

Alton D. Brown, petitioner, pro se.

Scott A. Bradley, Pittsburgh, for respondent.

BEFORE: PELLEGRINI, Judge, and SIMPSON, Judge, and MIRARCHI, JR., Senior Judge.

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Alton D. Brown (Brown) appeals pro se from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) sustaining the preliminary objections of a number of prison officials and guards² (collectively, "Prison Officials") employed by the Department of Corrections at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene) and dismissing Brown's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

In his complaint, Brown alleges that he is currently an inmate at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) in Pittsburgh. In July 1999, he was transferred to SCI-Greene where he was immediately placed in administrative custody and confined to that facility's Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). Brown filed grievances regarding his placement in the RHU at SCI-Greene. Thereafter, because of damage to his cell, Brown was given two misconduct charges—one for destruction of prison property and one for attempted escape. At the respective administrative hearings for each misconduct charge, the hearing examiner found Brown guilty.³ As sanctions for the misconduct, Brown was transferred to the long-term segregation unit (LTSU) at SCI-Pittsburgh where he spent 120 days in disciplinary custody.

Claiming that correction officers retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding his placement in the RHU; that they fabricated charges of attempted escape and destruction of prison property to justify their retaliation; and that the hearing examiners conducting the misconduct hearing were biased against him because they were co-conspirators in the retaliation scheme, favored prison staff over inmates, and intentionally overlooked evidence that would tend to exculpate the misconduct charges, Brown filed a three-count complaint⁴ in the trial court setting forth the following causes of action:⁵

• Count II. In this count, Brown brings two separate due process claims. First, Brown claims that his due process rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983⁶ because prison officials retaliated against him for utilizing the grievance procedures contained in 37 Pa.Code § 93.9 by filing false claims against him. Second, Brown claims that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive an impartial hearing on the misconduct charges.

• Count III. Brown claims that defendants Blaine and McCombie libeled him by falsely accusing him of damaging prison property and attempting to escape.

• Count IV. Brown raises a claim of civil conspiracy against all the prison officials in relation to these events.

In his requested relief section, Brown requested compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000 and $50,000 in punitive damages from each defendant. Brown also requested that the false reports be removed from his prison records.

Prison officials filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer contending that (1) Brown did not have a private remedy under 37 Pa.Code § 93.9 regarding the retaliation claim; (2) Brown failed to state a claim under Section 1983 because Brown had no liberty interest that would trigger due process rights under the United States Constitution; and (3) sovereign immunity barred Brown's libel and civil conspiracy claims. Agreeing that Brown did not state a claim under Section 1983 because Brown had not demonstrated any invalidity of the misconduct proceedings and sovereign immunity barred the libel and conspiracy claims, the trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed Brown's complaint. Brown filed a motion to reconsider in which he also requested leave to amend his complaint. The trial court did not rule on the motion to reconsider or the included request for leave to amend.⁷ This appeal followed.⁸

Count II: Retaliation & Due Process

Brown contends in his complaint that prison officials retaliated against him by falsely accusing him of attempted escape and damage to prison property, which ultimately led to restrictive custody and transfer to LTSU, because he filed a grievance regarding his original placement in the RHU at SCI-Greene. Brown contends that these actions violated 37 Pa. Code § 93.9, but argues that he is challenging the alleged retaliation under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution⁹ and Article I, § 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.¹⁰

In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523 (3d Cir.2003), the Third Circuit recently addressed whether a prisoner's retaliation claim sufficiently stated a claim under Section 1983 for violation of an inmate's First Amendment rights. It stated as follows:

[Prisoner's] allegation that he was falsely charged with misconduct in retaliation for filing complaints against [the Corrections] Officer ... implicates conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir.2002) ("We have ... held that falsifying misconduct reports in retaliation for an inmate's resort to legal process is a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of free access to the courts."); Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 (holding that an allegation that a prisoner was kept in administrative segregation to punish him for filing civil rights complaints stated a retaliation claim); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275-76 (7th Cir.1996) (prisoner could survive summary judgment on his claim that prison officials retaliated against him for "use of the `inmate grievance system' and previous lawsuits"). Moreover, we believe that several months in disciplinary confinement would deter a reasonably firm prisoner from exercising his First Amendment rights. Finally, we agree with [Prisoner] that the word "retaliation" in his complaint sufficiently implies a causal link between his complaints and the misconduct charges filed against him.

Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530. See also Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d 607 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002).

Prison officials contend that Brown only raised a claim under 37 Pa.Code, § 93.9 of the Pennsylvania Code, which prohibits punishment of an inmate "for the good faith use of the grievance systems." Because Section 93.9 does not create a "private remedy" under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), prison officials contend that this claim must be dismissed. However, our review indicates that in the amended complaint, Brown was not making his claim under that provision, but was claiming violations of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Accordingly, Brown has stated a cause of action for retaliation.¹¹

Brown also contends that he stated a due process claim regarding the two misconduct charges of attempted escape and damaged property because he did not receive an impartial hearing.¹² Prison officials, however, contend that Brown has failed to state a claim under Section 1983 because Brown was not deprived of any liberty interest that would trigger due process rights.¹³ Procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest. For a prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the prison "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Lesser restraints on a prisoner's freedom are deemed to fall "within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Id. If a prisoner had no protected liberty interest in remaining free of disciplinary custody, then the state owes him no process before placing him in disciplinary confinement. In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that 30 days of disciplinary segregation for resisting a strip search did not implicate a liberty interest because "disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody" in that "conditions at [the prison] involve[d] significant amounts of `lockdown time' even for inmates in the general population." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486,115 S.Ct. 2293.

In this case, Brown has not pled any facts to indicate that his liberty interests were implicated by his confinement at SCI-Greene or by the transfer to LTSU at SCI-Pittsburgh. Nothing in the complaint alleges any condition of confinement that was appreciably different from the conditions of other similarly situated inmates or that 120 days in restrictive custody could constitute an atypical scenario. See, e.g., Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997) (15 months in administrative custody not atypical). Because Brown's confinement in LTSU did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship" on Brown in relation to ordinary prison life, Brown's transfer to the LTSU did not trigger a liberty interest and no process is due even if the transfer resulted in a less favorable living situation. Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed.

Count III: Libel

Brown contends that the false reports of attempted escape and damage to prison property were libelous¹⁴ and led to his transfer to SCI-Pittsburgh. Prison officials respond by claiming sovereign immunity.

The Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from suit except where the General Assembly specifically waives immunity. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521. A commonwealth party is not liable unless (1) the alleged act of the commonwealth party is a negligent act for which damages would be recoverable under the common law or by statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), and (2) the act of the commonwealth party falls...