Mallory v. Stanitis
| Decision Date | 05 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 365 C.D. 2014,365 C.D. 2014 |
| Parties | Barry Mallory, Appellant v. C. Stanitis, Culinary Manager 1, John Kerestes, Superintendent, Deputy Bickle, Deputy Superintendent, John Doe, Captain-Shift Commander, Tritt, Deputy Superintendent, John E. Wetzel, Secretary of Correction |
| Court | Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania |
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Barry Mallory (Appellant) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County sustaining the Preliminary Objections of Appellees C. Stanitis, Robert C. Yarnell, John Kerestes, Deputy Bickle, Captain-Shift Commander John Doe, Deputy Superintendent Tritt and Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel, and dismissing Appellant's Complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Appellant, who has been at all times relevant to this action an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections (Department) at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy (SCI Mahanoy), alleged as follows:
On November 18, 2010, Appellant requested to leave his job detail in the culinary department of SCI Mahanoy to attend the Islamic Eid feast being held in the facility; Appellant's supervisor "Sarge" denied the request. (Complaint ¶21.) The following day, November 19, 2010, Appellant requested to leave his job detail for Islamic Jumah services, but Sarge again refused to let him leave his duties. (Id. ¶23.) Appellant filed grievances related to the denial of the requests to attend the Eid feast and Jumah services that were finally denied by Appellee Wetzel, the Secretary of the Department, on January 28, 2011 and March 15, 2011, respectively. (Id. ¶¶22, 24.)
At the time of the requests to attend the religious services, Appellant had been assigned to "a prestigious job detail" cleaning pots, pans and utensils with pay between 24 and 28 cents per hour. (Id. ¶¶11, 25.) Shortly after he filed the grievances, however, Appellant was reassigned from the cleaning position to a food service line position within the culinary department which paid 19 cents per hour. (Id. ¶25.) On February 17, 2011, while working in the food service line and while one of his grievance appeals was still pending, Appellant was confronted by Appellee Stanitis, Culinary Manager 1, because his pant legs were rolled up above the top of his state-issued boots. (Id. ¶¶13, 26.) Appellant informed Stanitis that it was a religious practice, and Stanitis asked the food service line supervisor to dismiss Appellant from his job detail. (Id. ¶¶14, 26.)
After being dismissed from his job detail and while being escorted back to his housing unit, Appellant spoke to Appellee Bickle, the Deputy Superintendent at SCI Mahanoy, who informed Appellant that he "cared less" upon being told by Appellant what had transpired. (Id. ¶15.) As a result of this incident, Appellant was issued a misconduct report on March 2, 2011 for refusing to obey an order and using abusive, obscene or inappropriate language to or about an employee. (Id. ¶27.) Appellant received 30 days of solitary confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit and was dismissed from the food service line position. (Id.) Appellant filed a grievance relating to this incident on March 4, 2011, which was dismissed by the Facility Grievance Coordinator. (Id. ¶¶16, 17.) Appellant appealed the dismissal of his grievance, which was affirmed by Appellee Kerestes, Superintendent at SCI Mahanoy. (Id. ¶18.) Appellant's final appeal was denied by Appellee Wetzel on June 6, 2011. (Id. ¶¶19, 20.)
Appellant filed the Complaint in the trial court on May 17, 2013 asserting that the March 2, 2011 misconduct report related to his rolled-up pant legs was fabricated in retaliation for his November 2010 grievances concerning the refusal to allow him to attend the Eid feast and Jumah services. (Id. ¶¶15, 26, 28.) Appellant alleges that the misconduct report was flawed because it did not list the names of the staff members who were present when Appellee Stanitis dismissed Appellant from his job detail because his pant legs were rolled up. (Id. ¶28.) Appellant further alleges that he was denied the ability to engage in the religious practice of rolling up his pant legs and was discriminated against as a result of Appellees' conduct. (Id.)
Appellant asserted the following claims in the Complaint against each of the Appellees in their individual and official capacities: (i) retaliation against Appellant for exercising his constitutional rights based upon Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) a violation of Appellant's rights under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (iii) a violation of Appellant's rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5; and (iv) discrimination against Appellant contrary to the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.1
Appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to the claims brought by Appellant, which the trial court sustained. Regarding the retaliation claim, the trial court concluded that while Appellant may have been exercising his constitutional right by participating in the grievance process, Appellant did not sufficiently plead that the earlier grievances were a substantial or motivating factor for the subsequent misconduct report for disobeying an order to roll down his pant legs and use of offensive or abusive language. To the extent Appellant alleged that the misconduct report was retaliation for Appellant's rolling up of his pant legs, the trial court determined that such a claim would effectively be an appeal of his grievance concerning the misconduct, which does not sufficiently state a retaliation claim under Section 1983. The trial court further concluded that Appellant's dismissal from his cleaning job detail and reassignmentto a food service job detail did not constitute retaliation because Appellant had no right to any particular prison job.
The trial court next dismissed Appellant's claim for the violation of his rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, concluding that while Appellant may have a sincere religious belief that he should not wear garments lower than the middle of his shins based on his faith in Islam, Appellant did not allege that Appellees had engaged in conduct that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. The trial court determined that the Department had a clear interest in monitoring the uniforms of inmates and that Appellant had not alleged that he had requested an accommodation from the uniform requirements for his religious beliefs. The trial court further concluded that the assertion that the misconduct report was based on Appellant's religious conduct was not supported by the facts alleged by Appellant; instead, the Complaint showed that the misconduct was based on Appellant disobeying an order and using abusive language after being approached regarding his pant legs.
The trial court determined that Appellant had insufficiently pled a RLUIPA claim because Appellant had simply alleged a violation of the Department's uniform policy and not alleged that he had requested and been denied an accommodation for his religious practice. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that RLUIPA does not support damages against Appellees in their individual capacities and that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars damages against Appellees acting in their official capacities.
Finally, the trial court dismissed Appellant's claim premised on a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment becauseAppellant had not alleged that he was discriminated against as a member of a class.2 Following the dismissal of the Complaint, Appellant appealed to this Court.
In determining whether preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were properly sustained, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Luke v. Cataldi, 932 A.2d 45, 49 n.3 (Pa. 2007); Feldman v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821, 826 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). For the purpose of determining the legal sufficiency of a complaint, we must accept the facts alleged and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts as true. Mazur v. Trinity Area School District, 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008); Feldman, 107 A.3d at 826 n.7. Preliminary objections may be sustained only where, based on the facts pleaded, it is clear and free from doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief. Mazur, 961 A.2d at 101; Feldman, 107 A.3d at 826 n.7. Upon review, we agree with the trial court that, even taken as true, the factual allegations contained in the Complaint were insufficient to support the claims alleged and we accordingly affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the Complaint.
Where an inmate alleges that he was retaliated against for the exercise of constitutional rights in violation of Section 1983, the complaint must contain allegations that (i) the inmate engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (ii)prison officials took adverse action; (iii) the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the action; and (iv) the retaliatory action did not further a legitimate penological interest. Yount v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 966 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2009); Richardson v. Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
Here, we conclude that Appellant has satisfactorily pled the first two elements of a retaliation claim. Appellant alleges that he engaged in two incidents of constitutionally protected conduct: filing of grievances in November 2010 related to not being able to attend the Eid feast and...
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