Brown v. Blauvelt

• Decision Date: 15 December 1964
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Margaret BROWN et al. v. Roger BLAUVELT. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 773

205 A.2d 773

152 Conn. 272

Margaret BROWN et al. v. Roger BLAUVELT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1964.

William F. Gallagher, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Cyril Cole, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

William P. Aspell, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was George Muir, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, COMLEY and SHANNON, JJ.

KING, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff Margaret Brown, a minor, while a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the defendant, sustained injuries when the car went out of control and left the highway. In the first count, she sued to recover damages for her injuries, and, in the second count, her father, the plaintiff Albert Brown, sued to recover medical expenses incurred by him for Margaret's treatment. Liability was admitted, and the case was tried to the jury on the issue of damages. In their verdict, the jury awarded Margaret damages of $3000 and Albert damages of $578.84. The plaintiffs appealed, the sole assignment of error finally pursued being a ruling on evidence.

Margaret was examined, on behalf of the defendant, by a doctor, solely for the purpose of qualifying him to testify at the trial as a medical expert. He had no intention of treating Margaret, nor did he treat her. He was actually called as a witness by the plaintiffs and over the defendant's objection was allowed to testify as to Margaret's statements to him, on which his opinion was in part based, and also to give his opinion as to the nature and extent of her injuries. The following day the court reversed its ruling, struck out the doctor's opinion and his testimony as to Margaret's statements on which that opinion had been based and instructed the jury to disregard the stricken evidence.

It is the general rule that an expert's opinion is inadmissible if it is based on hearsay evidence. See cases such as Vigliotti v. Campano, 104 Conn. 464, 465, 133 A. 579. One exception to this rule, and the only one bearing on this appeal, is the exception which allows a physician to testify to his opinion even though it is based, in whole or in part, on statements made to him by a patient for the purpose of obtaining from his professional medical treatment or advice incidental thereto. And, of course, he may also testify to such statements. Wilson v. Town of Granby, 47 Conn. 59, 62, 76; Darrigan v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 52 Conn. 285, 309; Martin v. Sherwood, 74 Conn. 475, 482, 51 A. 526; Gilmore v. American Tube & Stamping Co., 79 Conn. 498, 504, 66 A. 4; see also Putney v. Lehigh Truck Equipment Corporation, 145 Conn. 731, 732, 141 A.2d 482; Lupak v. Karalekas, 147 Conn. 432, 434, 162 A.2d 180.

The exception does not apply, however, where the physician is not being consulted for purposes of advice of treatment, but merely for the purpose of enabling him to give his opinion as a witness. Darrigan v. New York & N. E. R. Co., supra; Johnson v. Toscano, 144 Conn. 582, 591, 136 A.2d 341; Zawisza v. Quality Name Plate, Inc., 149 Conn. 115, 119, 176 A.2d 578. The plaintiffs...