Brown v. Brown

• Decision Date: 13 March 2017
• Docket Number: 16-P-52
• Citation: 81 N.E.3d 824 (Table)
• Parties: William R. BROWN, Third, & others v. Stephanie BROWN.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

81 N.E.3d 824 (Table)

William R. BROWN, Third, & others¹

v.Stephanie BROWN.

16-P-52

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

Entered: March 13, 2017.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

William R. Brown, Jr. (the decedent), had three sons, plaintiffs William R. Brown, III; Devin M. Brown; and Shawn M. Brown (collectively, sons).³ Following the death of their father, the sons brought an action against their father's second wife, Stephanie Brown, claiming, among other things, that they were entitled to the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy and that Stephanie was unjustly enriched when she received those proceeds. A Superior Court jury returned a verdict in favor of the sons. In response to special questions, the jury rejected two other theories of liability, undue influence and fraud, but found that Stephanie had been unjustly enriched in the amount of $250,000.⁴ Stephanie filed a postjudgment motion (postjudgment motion) for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), or in the alternative, for remittitur or a new trial, which was denied. This appeal ensued.

Background . We draw the facts from the parties' stipulation of facts and the trial transcript. The decedent and his first wife, the mother of the plaintiffs, divorced in 1991. Pursuant to their separation agreement, the decedent agreed to maintain his life insurance policy and to name their sons as beneficiaries "until such time as all [sons] are emancipated from the Wife." The separation agreement defined emancipation, stating, in relevant part, that a child will be deemed emancipated upon the latter of turning eighteen years old or finishing high school, "except that if the child attends college, the child for purposes of support, will be considered a minor."

The decedent later married Stephanie, and they had a daughter, Christina, in 1998. From the time of his divorce until his death, the decedent maintained a close relationship with his sons. He fulfilled his obligation to maintain life insurance, designating the sons as beneficiaries until October 11, 2007, at which time Stephanie was made the primary beneficiary with the sons and Christina named as contingent beneficiaries.

In May, 2008, the decedent was diagnosed with brain cancer

. He gave his sister power of attorney and instructed her to designate his four children as beneficiaries on his life insurance policies. The sister requested information about the policies from the decedent's employer, but the information was sent to the decedent's home, whereupon Stephanie confirmed that she was the primary beneficiary. Thus, when the decedent died on November 8, 2009, Stephanie received the proceeds of the policies in the amount of $333,000. The sons then commenced this action against Stephanie and, as we have previously noted, obtained a jury verdict in their favor.

Discussion . Stephanie acknowledges that the decedent had a duty under the separation agreement to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his unemancipated sons and that the change in the designation on the decedent's policies to Stephanie in October, 2007, violated that agreement. She claims, however, that at the time the decedent died, all three sons were unambiguously emancipated under the terms of the separation agreement and, therefore, the decedent was no longer obligated to maintain the sons as beneficiaries, rendering the verdict improper. She also argues that the sons' claim of unjust enrichment necessarily required a finding of wrongdoing, and the jury found no wrongdoing by virtue of not finding her liable on the undue influence or fraud theories.

1. Emancipation . At trial, the parties stipulated that the eldest brother, William, III, was emancipated. As regards the status of the other two sons, the judge instructed the jury on the definition of "emancipation" as set forth in the separation agreement. He further instructed as follows:

"Under the law, you are also permitted to consider the conduct of the parties after the stipulation [sic ] agreement was entered into ... in determining whether or not each of the boys were or were not emancipated, for purposes of distribution of the life insurance proceeds. While you may find that in this case, the written agreement ... defines emancipation, you are also instructed that emancipation may be determined by facts proven other than the language found in the written divorce agreement between the parties.

"If you find that all of the plaintiffs were emancipated before the decedent's death on November 8, 2009, then you must return a verdict for the defendant on this issue. If you find that one or more of the plaintiffs were not emancipated as of the decedent's date of death, then you must return a verdict for each of the boys who you find are not emancipated, and to what amount you will give to them."

Stephanie did not object to the...