Brown v. Brown

Decision Date10 January 1922
Docket Number2381.
Citation110 S.E. 234,152 Ga. 463
PartiesBROWN v. BROWN.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

In a suit by a husband against his wife, for divorce on the ground of cruel treatment, the wife denied the acts of cruelty alleged, and made counter charges of cruelty on the part of the husband, on the basis of which she prayed for divorce she prayed also for permanent alimony for herself and minor child, the issue of the marriage. On the first trial a verdict was returned, finding a divorce for the plaintiff and at a subsequent term a second verdict was returned finding a total divorce for the plaintiff and removing the disabilities of the wife. The verdict also provided that the husband should pay to the wife, as permanent alimony, a stated sum per month so long as she shall remain unmarried and that another stated sum be paid to a named third person for support of the child, until he shall attain the age of 18 years. Held, that so much of such second verdict as finds alimony for the wife and makes provision for the child is not contrary to law or void on the ground that the first verdict, being against the wife, was conclusive against her right to alimony. Civil Code 1910, §§ 2954, 2981; Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804 (2), 68 S.E. 594, 30 L.R.A. (N S.) 73, 20 Ann.Cas. 20.

The charge complained of in the amendment to the motion for new trial furnished no cause for reversal. If the language employed by the court was inapt on the issue as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce, the jury having found in his favor on that issue, the charge was not harmful to the plaintiff.

The amount of the allowance was not excessive, and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

Error from Superior Court, Floyd County; W. M. Henry, pro hac vice, Judge.

Suit for divorce by W. J. Brown against Hattie E. Brown. Judgment granting a divorce, but allowing alimony, etc., to the wife, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

In 1913 W. J. Brown instituted suit for divorce against Hattie E. Brown. The petition alleged cruel treatment as follows:

"Defendant has been cruel and inhumane in her conduct towards petitioner for a long time, abusing him in every way she could think of, striking him, threatening him, threatening his life, destroying and concealing his property and belongings, interfering with him in the exercise of his practice, he being a practicing physician, maligned and slandered him before his patients, and had made life just as miserable for him as possible for several years, which culminated on this date in her driving him from his home after striking and beating him with heavy sticks of wood without cause and without justification. Petitioner is unable to endure said conduct any longer; that the same has caused him great pain, great agony, and great humiliation, and entitles him to a total divorce."

The defendant filed an answer, denying the alleged grounds of cruel treatment, and by way of cross-petition set up cruel treatment upon the part of the husband, as follows:

"That during their first period of cohabitation, and a short time before they first separated, petitioner began drinking heavily, and while under the influence of intoxicants her said husband was sullen, cross, and vindictive towards her, calling her foul, vile, and slanderous names; that he often struck, kicked, and beat this defendant, and on the date of their first separation as aforesaid her said husband threw a bowl of water on this defendant and her 12 months old baby, and because of said treatment defendant was forced to leave petitioner, being unable to live longer with him. * * * On the ______ day of December, 1911, and at the earnest solicitation of petitioner, who was then sick with la grippe, defendant agreed to resume her relations with him. * * * After having gone back to petitioner * * * [[he] was reasonably considerate of his said wife for about 6 months, after which period of time he again became cross, sullen, and abusive towards her, and would go for weeks without speaking a kind word to her, and would become enraged at her when she tried to speak with and comfort him, and would grit his teeth together and strike his hands and feet in anger at her; that about four weeks before their last separation petitioner accused defendant of stealing his money, and said to her, 'You are the one who got it, you black whoring bitch;' that on another occasion he became angry with her without the slightest cause and slapped her face; that about two weeks before her baby was born petitioner became angry with defendant, who was then sick and far advanced with child; and when defendant asked her said husband, who had been out late at night, why he had not come home to her, he replied, 'It is none of your business,' and thereupon struck her in the face and on her side and knocked and shoved her backwards, causing her severe and excruciating pain and physical suffering, so much so that when her baby was born, some two weeks later, she was unable to leave her bed for six weeks, which she charges and believes was resultant of said treatment of her when in a pregnant condition. * * * On the 29th day of May, 1913, petitioner became very angry because of some fault he claimed to have found with the meals prepared for him, calling her vulgar, obscene, and foul names, which she is loath to repeat unless required to do so, which was to her great mortification, embarrassment, and anguish of defendant; that defendant's daughter, a young girl 18 years of age, said to petitioner, 'If you are not pleased with the dinner, you will have to go somewhere else and get some other person to cook it,' whereat petitioner became enraged and slapped defendant's daughter and struck her in the face. * * * Because of all of said treatment and much more that defendant cannot enumerate, she was compelled to leave her said husband, and did leave
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