Brown v. Calumet River Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1888
• Citation: 125 Ill. 600,18 N.E. 283
• Parties: BROWN v. CALUMET RIVER RY. CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

125 Ill. 600

18 N.E. 283

BROWN

v.CALUMET RIVER RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 2, 1888.

Appeal from Cook county court; PENDERGAST, Judge.

Petition by the Calumet River Railway Company against John B. Brown, to condemn a right of way through defendant's land. From a verdict and judgment assessing defendant's damages at $12,900 he appeals.Osborn & Lynde

, for appellant.

Frank J. Loesch, (Chas. A. Allen, of counsel,) for appellee.

SCHOLFIELD, J.

This was a proceeding in the county court of Cook county, instituted by the Calumet River Railway Company against John Brown, to condemn for right of way a strip of land, 60 feet in width, over a tract of land belonging to him, lying on the east side of and adjoining to Calumet river, and extending from One Hundredth street on the north to One Hundred and Sixth street on the south. The quantity of land thus sought to be taken is 4.66 acres. Brown filed a cross-petition, in which he alleged, among other things, that the tract of land over which the proposed right of way is located is known as Block B, in South Chicago, of which he is the owner; that it has a river front of more than 300 feet, and a depth of more than 700 feet; that the river is navigable, and the property fronting thereon has especial value for dock and wharf purposes; that he had designed locating and constructing wharfs and docks thereon similar to those of the South Chicago Dock Company, on the opposite side of the river, with slips extending the entire depth of the block; that the property is especially valuable and available for this form of improvement, and could thus be made available as a whole; that the right of way, as located, cuts through the middle of the block, and cuts off from the river front a strip containing more than 20 acres, preventing its use for the construction of docks, and taking away the greater part of its value; and that the remainder of the block not taken will be damaged $50,000. A jury was duly impaneled, and, after hearing the evidence, they went upon the premises sought to be taken, and those claimed to be damaged but not taken; and afterwards rendered their verdict, whereby they found that Brown was entitled to $4,600 for the land actually taken, and that he sustained damages to the land not taken to the amount of $12,900. Motion for new trial was made by Brown, but overruled by the court, and the court thereupon entered judgment upon the verdict of the jury. Brown brings the case here by appeal.

The several objections urged as grounds of reversal will be considered in the order of their presentation in the argument of counsel for appellant.

1. The court below allowed the petitioner, on cross-examination of Brown, to inquire of him what he paid for the tract of land affected by the proceeding, when he bought it; and it is contended this was erroneous, because it has no tendency to establish the present value. This the court, in effect, said, in admitting the evidence; but held it admissible, as tending to test the correctness of the opinion which the witness had previously expressed of the present value of the land. We think the ruling is liable to no serious objection. The witness had stated that he bought the property in 1880, and then proceeded to state what improvements then existed in its vicinity, and what improvements had since been made there affecting its value, and what other considerations, in his opinion, affected and enhanced its present value. Certainly the petitioner might show that any fact thus claimed to enhance value was not as claimed by the witness, or that there were other modifying circumstances tending to affect the question of the value, reference to which the witness had omitted. The original cost, though not a very material circumstance, was certainly a proper one, tending, in a slight degree, to affect the question. The line of inquiry pursued by appellant assumed there had been very great appreciation in value after his purchase, and it is impossible to perceive how he could have been injured by showing precisely how great he claimed the appreciation had been.

2. On cross-examining Brown, he was asked by the petitioner: ‘Did you you not say to Mr. Amick, about a year ago, in your office, that this land was worth $300 or $400 an acre, as it lay there, and it would not pay you to improve it with docks,-this property in question?’ He answered: ‘No, sir; we were talking about the property and land on the Chittenden farm, not about this property.’ When Amick was examined by the petitioner, he was, among other things, after his stating that he had a conversation with Brown upon the subject, and at the time and place alluded to in the interrogatory to Brown, asked: ‘Concerning what property was the conversation between you and Mr. Brown?’ He answered: ‘The conversation, as I understand it, applied to the river property, generally, on the Calumet river. But in our conversation we were referring to the Anderson property. What brought...