Guyandotte Valley Ry. Co. v. Buskirk (State Report Title: Guyandot Valley R'y Co. v. Buskirk)

• Decision Date: 21 March 1905
• Parties: GUYANDOTTE VALLEY RY. CO. v. BUSKIRK et al.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

50 S.E. 521

57 W.Va. 417

GUYANDOTTE VALLEY RY. CO. v. BUSKIRK et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

March 21, 1905

Submitted February 22, 1905.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In a condemnation proceeding by a railroad company to take the whole of a lot of land for the purposes of its roadbed and station buildings, the compensation to be allowed the defendant for such land is, ordinarily, its market value at the time of its appropriation, without any deduction for benefits or appreciation in value, general and common to the community in which the land is, shared in by all property along the line of the road, and due to the prospect of its construction.

2. The market value in such case is the price for which the land could be sold in the market by a person desirous of selling to a person wishing to buy, both freely exercising prudence and intelligent judgment as to its value and unaffected by compulsion of any kind.

3. Such value is to be determined by the same considerations that enter into a sale between private parties, namely, the availability of the land for all valuable uses to which it is adapted, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future.

4. What is termed the market value of property in the law of eminent domain is not a value fixed by consensus of opinion in the community in which the land is, or among business men or dealers in real estate who are familiar with it, but is a value to be fixed by the jury, upon consideration of all the evidence in the case, including the knowledge of the property which they have acquired by their view of it.

5. The opinions of persons residing near the property, and who have known it for a considerable period of time, though not dealers in real estate, nor specially informed as to prices are admissible evidence on the question of its value.

6. The price paid for the land by the defendant is admissible evidence of its value, provided the purchase was not remote from the appropriation in point of time.

7. A trial court may, in its discretion, refuse to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial, when the application is based only on the desire of the parties to have another trial.

Error to Circuit Court, Logan County; E. S. Doolittle, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the Guyandotte Valley Railway Company against George R. Buskirk and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

McComas & Northcott, for plaintiffs in error.

Simms & Enslow and J. B. Wilkinson, for defendant in error.

POFFENBARGER J.

Charging error in the rulings of the court as to the admission and rejection of evidence and the giving and refusing of instructions concerning the measure and amount of compensation in a proceeding for the condemnation of real estate for railroad purposes, the defendants complain of a judgment of the circuit court of Logan county awarding them $3,000 as just and full compensation for two adjoining lots owned by them and wholly taken for the purposes of the applicant's right of way for the road and station buildings. These lots had been purchased by the defendant George R. Buskirk at a judicial sale a few days before the 5th day of May, 1903, for the sum of $1,825. Pursuant to notice, the petition of the Guyandotte Valley Railway Company for the condemnation of the property was filed, and commissioners appointed, on the 27th day of July, 1903, and the commissioners fixed the amount of the compensation at $3,500, and returned their report on the 28th day of July 1903. Thereupon the applicant paid said sum into court and excepted to the report, and, together with the defendants, demanded that the amount of compensation be ascertained by a jury. At the jury trial, which occurred on the 24th day of November, 1903, numerous witnesses were introduced and examined in support of the contentions of both the applicant and the defendants.

Two inconsistent theories respecting the measure of compensation and the methods of applying the standard were presented to the court in the offerings of and objections made to evidence, and in the requests for and objections made to instructions--one by the applicant, and the other by the defendants. That of the applicant was adopted and applied. As all the rulings complained of spring out of this proposition or theory, the application of a few general principles of law will suffice to dispose of all the assignments of error. All the instructions requested by the defendants were refused. They read as follows: "(1) The court instructs the jury that if they find, from all the evidence, facts and circumstances before them in this proceeding, that the land mentioned and described in the notice, application, and commissioners' report herein sought to be taken in this proceeding is within the corporate limits of the town of Aracoma, and at the time of the proposed taking thereof by the applicant had a market value, then such market value, together with the view of the premises, would be the proper measure of compensation to be allowed by the jury to the defendants for the same. (2) The court further instructs the jury that, in ascertaining what would be a just compensation to the defendants for the land proposed to be taken by the applicant, the Guyandotte Valley Railway Company, as set forth in the notice, application, and commissioners' report in this proceeding, such general and intangible benefits as have accrued to this property in common with all other property in the community where it is situate, by reason of the proposed building by the Guyandotte Valley Railway Company of its road into said community, cannot be deducted from its fair market value, if they find it had such value, at the time same was proposed to be taken by said railway company. (3) The court further instructs the jury that if they find, from all the evidence, facts, and circumstances in this proceeding before them, that the property described in the notice, application, and commissioners' report in this proceeding, proposed to be taken by the Guyandotte Valley Railway Company, had, at the time of the proposed taking thereof by said company, a market value, then it would be improper for them to take into consideration, in ascertaining a just compensation to be paid for said property, the price paid therefor by the defendants George R. Buskirk and U. B. Buskirk." The different theory of the applicant was embodied in two instructions, given over the objection of the defendants, which read as follows: "(1) The court instructs the jury that, in ascertaining what would be a just compensation to the owners for the land taken by the railway company in this proceeding for the uses and purposes of its road, they must ascertain, from all the evidence in this case as well as of their view of the land, the actual value of the land at the time when taken, without reference to any increased or enhanced value to said land and common to other landowners along the line of the road, by reason of the prospective construction of the railway company's road through such land. (2) The court further instructs the jury that, although the owners of the land taken by the railway company in this case are entitled to recover as a just compensation therefor the actual market value of the land at the time it was taken by the railway company, yet, in ascertaining what the actual market value was at the time the land was so taken, the jury cannot include in their verdict any increased or enhanced value to said land common to other landowners along the line of the road, by reason of the prospective construction of the railway company's road through such lands, and, in ascertaining the market value of said land so taken, the jury must take into consideration their view of the land, together with all the facts and circumstances now in evidence in the case."

As the whole of the property is taken by the applicant, leaving no residue to be damaged or benefited, the principles governing the ascertainment of damages, as contradistinguished from the value of the land actually taken, have no application and are not to be considered, except by way of elaboration in the discussion of the rules and principles which govern the ascertainment of the value of land taken, to the end that no inconsistent position may be assumed. Benefits, whether general and common to all property affected by the work of improvement, or peculiar to it, when material, can obviously be considered for but one purpose, namely, deduction from the damages to the property. It would be absurd to say they can be added either to the value of the land taken or to the damages to the residue. The landowner is not entitled to recover for benefits conferred upon him. He cannot assert as the basis of a claim for damages that which is a benefit conferred upon him. They are to be separately considered only for the purpose of deduction from the amount he would otherwise be entitled to recover. Therefore, when benefits are excluded from the consideration of the jury in estimating the damages, it is because the landowner is entitled to them and not required to give them up by suffering an abatement of their amount from his damages. Railroad Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 173, 66 Am.Dec. 148; Railroad Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290; Packard v. Railroad Co., 54 N. J. Law, 553, 25 A. 506; State v. Miller, 23 N. J. Law, 383; Williamson v. Amwell, 28 N. J. Law, 270; Swayze v. Railroad Co., 36 N. J. Law, 295. Our decisions import that in estimating damages to land not taken the owner is to be charged with all benefits. They say, if the market value of the residue after the taking is equal to or greater than its value before the taking, there is...