Brown v. Chapman, 15–3158.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–3158.,15–3158. |
| Parties | Shirley BROWN, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Rodney Brown, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael CHAPMAN, et al., Defendants, Richard Rusnak; John Sattler; James Merritt; City of Cleveland, Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED:John P. Bacevice, Jr., City of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Gerhardstein & Branch, CO, LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:John P. Bacevice, Jr., City of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Gerhardstein & Branch, CO, LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE
, Circuit Judge.
Rodney Brown died after police officers tasered him, physically subdued him, and placed him in a patrol car. His mother, Shirley Brown, filed a lawsuit against the police officers and the City of Cleveland, alleging excessive force and various state-law claims. She also accused the officers of being deliberately indifferent to his safety. Defendants moved for summary judgment. In addition to disputing their liability, they asked the district court not to treat plaintiff's accusation of deliberate indifference as a properly pleaded legal claim. The district court denied their request, and granted in part and denied in part the remainder of their motion.
Richard Rusnak, John Sattler, James Merritt, and the City of Cleveland appeal the district court's recognition of plaintiff's deliberate-indifference claim and the district court's denial of summary judgment on that claim. We AFFIRM in part and DISMISS in part because we have limited jurisdiction over appeals from denials of summary judgment.
On December 31, 2010, at 8:45 P.M., police officers Michael Chapman and Belal Ilain signaled for Rodney Brown to pull over. R. 27–15 (Synopsis at 1) (Page ID # 927). The officers claim that they saw Brown driving without headlights on, id., though eyewitnesses dispute this, R. 33–8 (Ellston Decl. ¶ 4) (Page ID # 1144); R. 33–9 (Vaughn Decl. ¶ 4) (Page ID # 1146).
The officers walked up to Brown's vehicle and asked for his license and registration. R. 25–2 (Chapman Dep. at 13) (Page ID # 150); R. 25–3 (Ilain Dep. at 10) (Page ID # 286). Before Brown could retrieve the documents, the officers ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. R. 25–3 (Ilain Dep. at 10–13) (Page ID # 286–89); see also R. 27–15 (Synopsis at 1) (Page ID # 927). Brown complied, and the officers told him to walk to the back of the vehicle. R. 25–2 (Chapman Dep. at 14) (Page ID # 151). While the officers were patting him down, Chapman hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. R. 33–8 (Ellston Decl. ¶¶ 7–8) (Page ID # 1144); R. 33–9 (Vaughn Decl. ¶ 7) (Page ID # 1146). Brown wrestled free of the officers' grip. R. 25–2 (Chapman Dep. at 14–15) (Page ID # 151–52); R. 25–3 (Ilain Dep. at 14) (Page ID # 290). The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, see R. 25–2 (Chapman Dep. at 15) (Page ID # 152); R. 25–3 (Ilain Dep. at 14) (Page ID # 290), but eyewitnesses say that Brown was simply trying to protect himself, see R. 33–8 (Ellston Decl. ¶ 8) (Page ID # 1144); R. 33–9 (Vaughn Decl. ¶ 8) (Page ID # 1146). Chapman then turned toward Brown and discharged his taser at Brown's chest. R. 25–2 (Chapman Dep. at 15) (Page ID # 152); R. 25–17 (Chapman Taser Information) (Page ID # 851). Brown ran, and the two officers followed. R. 27–15 (Synopsis at 1) (Page ID # 927).
Chapman and Ilain caught up to Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him to subdue him. Id. at 1–2 (Page ID # 927–28); see also R. 25–17 (Chapman Taser Information) (Page ID # 851): R. 25–18 (Ilain Taser Information) (Page ID # 852). Ilain requested backup, and additional officers arrived soon after. R. 25–1 (Radio Event Chronology) (Page ID # 130); R. 2715 (Synopsis at 2) (Page ID # 928). The officers notified dispatch that they had successfully handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after Chapman and Ilain first pulled Brown over. R. 4 (Tr. of Dispatch Audio at 2) (Page ID # 13).
Immediately after they handcuffed him, Brown told the officers he was having trouble breathing:
Id. at 2–3 (Page ID # 13–14). Rusnak, Merritt, Erik Melendez ), and a fourth officer escorted Brown to Rusnak and Merritt's patrol car. R. 25–8 (Rusnak Dep. at 23–24) (Page ID # 573–74); see also R. 25–5 (Melendez Dep. at 37) (Page ID # 464). Brown went limp before he reached it, and the officers had to go around to the other side of the car and drag Brown onto the back seat. R. 2715 (Synopsis at 2) (Page ID # 928); R. 25–7 (Merritt Dep. at 13) (Page ID # 525). Once Brown was inside, the officers closed the patrol car's doors. R. 25–7 (Merritt Dep. at 13) (Page ID # 525).
Rusnak used his radio to request EMS at 8:55 P.M., and told the dispatcher that officers had tasered Brown but that he was conscious and breathing. R. 28–8 (Rusnak Dep. at 32–34) (Page ID # 582–84). In his deposition, Rusnak explained that this was department policy, and that he did not request EMS in response to any physical symptoms Brown exhibited. Id. at 32 (Page ID # 582). EMS was not notified until 9:00 P.M. R. 25–1 (Radio Event Chronology at 2) (Page ID # 131).
Rusnak and Merritt stayed by their patrol car for the remainder of the night, where they watched Brown's condition deteriorate. R. 25–7 (Merritt Dep. at 15–18) (Page ID # 527–30); R. 25–8 (Rusnak Dep. at 34–36) (Page ID # 584–86). At one point, Merritt heard Brown say he was having trouble breathing, so Merritt rolled down the back windows halfway. R. 25–7 (Merritt Dep. at 14) (Page ID # 526). Rusnak shined his flashlight into Brown's eyes, and Brown's pupils did not constrict.1 R. 25–8 (Rusnak Dep. at 29) (Page ID # 579). Rusnak also asked Brown questions in an attempt to engage him, but Brown gave unintelligible answers. Id. at 29–30 (Page ID # 579–80). Sattler, a sergeant, testified that when he arrived he saw Brown sitting in the back of the patrol car, slumped over and unresponsive. R. 25–15 (Sattler Dep. at 12–13) (Page ID # 830–31).
EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., seven minutes after they were notified and twelve minutes after Rusnak first requested medical aid over the radio. R. 27–14 (EMS Report at 1) (Page ID # 923). EMS found Brown "propped up" on the curb, leaning against the leg of one of the officers. R. 25–12 (Fletcher Dep. at 19–20) (Page ID # 757–58). Brown had no pulse, and EMS was unable to resuscitate him. R. 27–14 (EMS Report at 1) (Page ID # 923).
Brown's mother filed a complaint against named and unnamed officers, alleging excessive force, assault and battery, and wrongful death. R. 1 (Compl.¶¶ 25–27) (Page ID # 45). She also stated that the officers did not have probable cause to stop Brown's vehicle and that they were deliberately indifferent to Brown's safety, though she did not formally plead either claim. Id. ¶¶ 16, 21, 22 (Page ID # 3–4). She amended her complaint once, identifying some of the unnamed officers and adding the City of Cleveland as a defendant. R. 15
(First Am. Compl. at 1–2) (Page ID # 58–59).
Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on all claims. R. 25 (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J.) (Page ID # 92). The officers asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity, and the City asserted that plaintiff could not establish municipal liability. Id. at 1 (Page ID # 97). Defendants also asked the district court not to treat plaintiff's accusation of deliberate indifference as a properly pleaded legal claim (though they did not make the same request with respect to her accusation that the officers did not have probable cause to stop Brown). Id. at 1213, 19–22 (Page ID # 108–09, # 115–18). Still, because they thought plaintiff would likely pursue it, defendants responded to the merits of plaintiff's deliberate-indifference accusation. Id. at 2022 (Page ID # 116–18). In their reply brief, defendants took a harder line, asking the district court to "dismiss" the claim because recognizing it would unfairly prejudice them. R. 35 (Reply Br. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at 15) (Page ID # 1168).
The district court allowed plaintiff to proceed with her deliberate-indifference claim (as well as with her probable-cause claim). R. 38 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 18–19 n. 3) (Page ID # 1238–39). The district court then granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. As is relevant here, the district court denied summary judgment to Rusnak, Merritt, Sattler, and the City of Cleveland on plaintiff's deliberate-indifference claim. Id. at 27–29 (Page ID # 1247–49). The district court granted summary judgment to Melendez, however, concluding that he could not have known that Brown was struggling to breathe. Id. at 23–24 (Page ID # 1243–44). Rusnak, Merritt, Sattler, and the City timely appealed. R. 41 (Defs. Notice of Appeal) (Page ID # 1256). Plaintiff also appealed, but her arguments are considered in a separate opinion in No. 15–3506
.
We review a district court's decision to allow an amendment of a pleading for an abuse of discretion.2 Dillon v. Cobra Power Corp., 560 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir.2009)
. In this context, an abuse of discretion occurs when a district court "fails to state the basis for its [decision] or fails to consider the competing interests of the parties and likelihood of prejudice...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Johnson v. City of Saginaw
...that ‘finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.’ " Brown v. Chapman , 814 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) ). Although we have inter......
-
Rafferty v. Trumbull Cnty.
...). A district court order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Brown v. Chapman , 814 F.3d 436, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526–529, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ). But this jurisdiction is ......
-
B.L. v. Schuhmann
...S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The Sixth Circuit has explained that Rule 15 reflects a "liberal amendment policy." Brown v. Chapman , 814 F.3d 436, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Morse v. McWhorter , 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002) ). "The thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principl......
-
Love v. Franklin Cnty.
...(forfeited objective test at magistrate stage); Bays v. Montmorency Cnty. , 874 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 2017) (same); Brown v. Chapman , 814 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2016) (same); Baynes v. Cleland , 799 F.3d 600, 618 (6th Cir. 2015) (same). In none of these cases was Kingsley directly addre......
-
Review Proceedings
...immediately appealable for 3 plaintiffs because fact issues remained as to their roles in local prosecutor’s office); Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2016) (denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity not immediately appealable because only questions of fact raised);......