Brown v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1879
• Citation: 51 Iowa 235,1 N.W. 487
• Parties: J. W. BROWN, APPELLEE. v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

51 Iowa 235

1 N.W. 487

J. W. BROWN, APPELLEE.

v.THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed June 4, 1879.

Appeal from Louisa circuit court.

This is an action to recover injuries which the plaintiff alleges he sustained by being forcibly ejected from the defendant's passenger train, at a point about one mile distant from a station. There was a jury trial, and a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, for one thousand dollars. The defendant appeals.Cook & Richman, for appellant.

Caldwell & Walters and Hall & Baldwin, for appellee.

DAY, J.

--I. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: “ The evidence offered by plaintiff upon the question of the manner in which he received his injuries, is entirely and only by his own testimony as a witness. Formerly, the rules of evidence would not have permitted plaintiff to testify as a witness in an action of this character, and he would have been compelled to make out his case entirely by the testimony of other witnesses; but the statute of Iowa has changed this rule, and in most civil cases permits a party to an action to testify in his own behalf. Yet the same statute, allowing parties to testify, permits the interest of the witness as a party to be considered as affecting his credibility as a witness. And in this case it is your duty, in considering the weight to be given to plaintiff's testimony, to consider the interest which he necessarily must have in the result of this action. In weighing his testimony, you should also consider whether or not his statements are probable, in view of all the circumstances of the case; whether or not his statements are consistent with themselves, and whether or not they conflict with any statements or declarations which he may have made at any previous time, when in possession of his reason and mental faculties. If you should believe that plaintiff has wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in the case, that would authorize you to reject all his testimony.” The court modified this instruction by omitting all that portion which we have indicated in italics, and by adding to the end of the instruction, the following words: “unless corroborated by other credible evidence,” and gave the instruction as so modified. The defendant excepted to the refusal to give the instruction as asked, and assigns the modification of it as error--

1. That the plaintiff offered no evidence as to the manner in which he received his injuries, except his own testimony, was a fact which the trial disclosed, and about which the jury knew just as much as the court. It was not at all necessary that the court should instruct respecting it, if indeed it was proper to do so. The refusal of the court to give the instruction asked, worked the defendant no prejudice.

2. Whilst the modification by addition might have been made more specific and certain, yet we feel satisfied that it was not likely to be so understood by the jury as to prejudice the defendant. The instruction, as modified, reads as follows: “If you should believe that plaintiff has wilfully testified as to any material fact in the case, that would authorize you to reject all the testimony, unless corroborated by other credible evidence.”

The defendant insists that the...