Brown v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company
| Decision Date | 14 May 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,175 - (100) |
| Citation | 152 N.W. 729,129 Minn. 347 |
| Parties | JOHANNA C. BROWN v. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action by the administratrix of the estate of Edward M. Brown deceased, in the district court for Blue Earth county, to recover $30,000, for the death of her intestate. The case was tried before Pfau, J., who denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action, and a jury which returned a verdict of $7,000. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Death by wrongful act -- Iowa statute.
1. A cause of action for death by wrongful act survives under the laws of Iowa, belongs to the estate of the person killed, and the administrator of his estate may maintain an action to recover thereon.
Death by wrongful act -- action in Minnesota.
2. Having the right of action in that state, the administrator duly appointed under the laws thereof, may maintain the action in this state.
Certified copies of foreign records.
3. Section 8423, G.S. 1913, relating to the admission in evidence of certified copies of records and proceedings when certified as therein required, has no application to foreign records and documents when authenticated and certified in accordance with the act of Congress. Merz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 86 Minn. 33, distinguished.
Accident at highway crossing -- verdict sustained by evidence.
4. Evidence held to support the verdict to the effect that the death of plaintiff's intestate was caused by the negligence of defendant in operating a train over and across a public highway without warning or signal of its approach, and also to the effect that decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Charge to jury.
5. The record contains no error in the instructions or refusals to instruct the jury.
Brown, Abbott & Somsen, for appellant.
Thomas G. Schall, B. C. Thayer and T. D. Sheehan, for respondent.
Action to recover for the death of plaintiff's intestate, caused by the alleged negligence of defendant. Plaintiff had a verdict and defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.
Decedent was driving his horse and buggy along a public highway which extended over and across the railroad tracks of defendant. Upon reaching the railroad track he was struck and killed by a passenger train operated by defendant. The accident happened near the city of Marshalltown, in the state of Iowa. Plaintiff, his widow, was duly appointed administratrix of his estate by the proper court in that state. She thereafter filed a certified copy of her letters of appointment in the office of the clerk of the district court of Blue Earth county, this state; and brought this action in the district court of that county to recover for the death of decedent, alleging generally in her complaint that it was caused by the negligence of defendant. The answer of defendant put in issue the negligence charged, and other allegations of the complaint in respect to the statutory law of the state of Iowa, upon which the right of recovery is predicated.
1. The first assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show a right of action in plaintiff, as administratrix. The contention as stated by counsel is, that there is no allegation in the complaint, and there was no evidence on the trial, of any statute of the state of Iowa authorizing an administrator to maintain an action of this kind, and no allegation of proof as to the law of distribution in that state. Myers v. Chicago, St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co. 69 Minn. 476, 72 N.W. 694, 65 Am. St. 579, and Stewart v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 103 Minn. 156, 114 N.W. 953, 123 Am. St. 318, are cited in support of the point. We are of the opinion and so hold that the contention is not sound. The cases cited are not in point.
In the case at bar certain statutes of the state of Iowa were pleaded and offered in evidence which provide (1): That "all causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same" (section 3443, Iowa Code 1897); and (2) that "when a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, but if the deceased leaves a husband, wife, child or parent, it shall not be liable for the payment of the debts." [Section 3313] But there was no evidence of any express statutory authority in an administrator to maintain such an action, and herein lies the basis of defendant's contention. We are clear, in view of the provisions of the Iowa statutes, that such express authorization is not necessary. The statutory provisions referred to declare that the right of action survives, and that a recovery shall belong to the estate of the decedent. It constitutes a chose in action, belonging to the estate of the person killed and his duly constituted administrator may reduce it to possession precisely as he may reduce to possession other claims belonging to the estate. In fact the statutes of Iowa have been construed by the supreme court of the state as vesting the right of action in the administrator. Morris v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. 65 Iowa 727, 23 N.W. 143, 54 Am. Rep. 39. In the Myers case, supra, the cause of action arose in Wisconsin, but the complaint contained no allegation of statutory authority in the administrator to maintain the action, or that the recovery therein belonged to the estate of decedent. The same situation was presented in the Stewart case, supra. Neither case is therefore in point.
2. Plaintiff offered in evidence on the trial a copy of her letters of administration, and they were received over the objection of defendant that they were not properly certified and authenticated. The letters were exemplified and authenticated as required by the act of Congress on the subject and the ruling of the court was correct. The case of Merz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 86 Minn. 33, 90 N.W. 7, cited and relied upon by defendant, is not in point. The documents there held not properly certified, namely, a judgment roll in an action in the state of Iowa, were not authenticated under the act of Congress, but solely by a certificate of the clerk of court in whose office the judgment roll was a record, and as pointed out in the opinion the certification was not in the form required by section 5725, G.S. 1894, under which it was offered in evidence. That statute, now section 8423, G.S. 1913, has no application to documents authenticated and certified as required by the act of Congress. The document here in question being properly certified...
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