Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710, IAFF

• Decision Date: 13 November 1990
• Citation: 408 Mass. 1003,562 N.E.2d 87
• Parties: Melvin A. BROWN v. CHICOPEE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1710, IAFF.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 87

562 N.E.2d 87

408 Mass. 1003

Melvin A. BROWN v. CHICOPEE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1710, IAFF.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 4, 1990.

Decided Nov. 13, 1990.

Melvin A. Brown, pro se.

Done Rosencrance, Wilbraham, for defendant.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS and GREANEY, JJ.

RESCRIPT.

The appellant, Melvin A. Brown, appeals from a denial by a single justice of this court of his petition for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3. ¹ He claims that the single justice erred in refusing to vacate a summary judgment order allowed in the small claims jury session of the Springfield District Court. There was no error.

On June 9, 1989, Brown filed a claim against the appellee, Chicopee Fire Fighters Association, Local 1710, IAFF (local), in the small claims court pursuant to G.L. c. 218, § 21 (1988 ed.). After hearing, the small claims court awarded Brown a judgment of $1,389.86, representing his damages and costs. The local thereafter claimed its right to a trial by a jury of six in the District Court pursuant to G.L. c. 218, § 23. On November 9, 1989, the local filed a motion for summary judgment, which was heard by the small claims department of the Springfield District Court on November 17, 1989. The court granted the motion, ² holding that the small claims court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Brown's claim. Brown subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, an application for a report, and a motion to vacate the decision, all of which were denied. On March 1, 1990, Brown filed a petition pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, to a single justice. On April 4, 1990, the petition was denied. Brown appeals that denial.

Brown had an available appellate remedy. General Laws c. 218, § 23, provides that the "[t]rial by jury of six in the district court department shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of law applicable to trials by jury in the superior court department." General Laws c. 211A, § 10, provides appellate jurisdiction to the Appeals Court over decisions of both the Superior Court and of "the district court department in jury session." Taken together, these two provisions indicate that there is an appellate remedy from small claims jury sessions under G.L. c. 218, § 23, to the Appeals Court. ³ Hence, a petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3, is inappropriate.

The single justice's denial of Brown's G.L. c. 211, § 3, claim was in accordance with our practice of not exercising our extraordinary powers under that provision unless appellate review is otherwise unavailable. See Hahn v. Planning Bd. of Stoughton, 403 Mass. 332, 335, 529 N.E.2d 1334 (1988). The appropriate method for Brown to challenge the allowance of the local's motion for summary judgment was by way of appeal, not by way of a petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3. See Roullett v. Quincy Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 1008, 480 N.E.2d 1033 (1985). ⁴

The judgment of the single justice is affirmed.

So ordered.

1 The plaintiff's complaint also asked the single justice to transfer his case to this court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 4A. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the denial of the request for transfer is affirmed.

2 Brown claims that the court violated the plain language of Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), by hearing the local's motion for summary judgment less than ten days after it was...