Brown v. City of Memphis

• Decision Date: 07 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-2419 DP.,05-2419 DP.
• Citation: 440 F.Supp.2d 868
• Parties: Reginald BROWN and Nicholas Biles, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS and Arthur Sease IV, individually and as a member of the City of Memphis Police Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

440 F.Supp.2d 868

Reginald BROWN and Nicholas Biles, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS and Arthur Sease IV, individually and as a member of the City of Memphis Police Department, Defendants.

No. 05-2419 DP.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

July 7, 2006.

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John Houser Parker, II, Morton & Germany, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiffs.

Barbaralette G. Davis, City Attorney's Office, Henry L. Klein, Apperson Crump & Maxwell, PLC, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

DONALD, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a cognizable legal claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On April 14, 2005, Plaintiffs brought an action in the Court of General Sessions of Shelby County, Tennessee asserting various constitutional and common law claims against Defendants in connection with their alleged unlawful detention, search and seizure, and robbery by Defendant Sease, a Memphis police officer. Defendants subsequently removed the matter to federal court. Upon review of the facts, relevant statutory and case law, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On the afternoon of April 10, 2004², Plaintiffs Reggie Brown and Nicholas Biles were traveling eastbound on James Road in Memphis, Tennessee, with Brown at the wheel of a 1999 Chevrolet van. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 10). The van carrying Plaintiffs was stopped by Defendant, Officer Arthur Sease IV, near the intersection of James Road and Austin Peay Highway. Id. at 11. At the time Sease made the traffic stop, he was driving a Memphis Police Department patrol car and was dressed in his Memphis Police Department uniform, complete with badge, and was armed with a service pistol. Id. at 11, 13.

Sease approached Plaintiffs' vehicle and asked to see Brown's license and registration. Id. at 14. When Brown was unable to produce the registration, Sease ordered him out of the van and searched him, finding and confiscating $400 in cash in the process. Id. Sease placed Brown in the back of the squad car and proceeded to search Plaintiff Niles, removing from his pockets and confiscating $800 in cash. Id. at 15. Sease then placed Niles in the back of the squad car and proceeded to search Plaintiffs' van, confiscating Brown's lock-box containing $31,400. Id. at 15, 18.

Sease then ordered Plaintiffs to leave immediately, threatening them by placing his hand on his service weapon. Id. at 19. Plaintiffs left the scene and later reported the incident to the Memphis Police Department. Id. Officer Sease was subsequently arrested and charged with robbery and official oppression in connection with the incident. Id. at 23.

On April 14, 2005, Plaintiffs brought suit in the Court of General Sessions of Shelby County, Tennessee asserting various constitutional and common law claims against Defendants in connection with the alleged unlawful detention, search and seizure, and robbery by Defendant Sease. Plaintiffs allege, as causes of action, substantive due process and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; negligence and gross negligence; and negligence per se.

On June 7, 2005, Defendants removed this case to this district court, based on federal question and supplemental jurisdiction grounds. Defendant has now moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the case for failure to state a cognizable legal claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may bring a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). This motion only tests whether the plaintiff has pleaded a cognizable claim. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). Essentially, it allows the court to dismiss meritless cases which would otherwise waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery. See, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

The Supreme Court has held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827; Lewis v. ACB Bus. Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir.1997). Thus, the standard to be applied when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is liberal in favor of the party opposing the motion. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976). Even if the plaintiffs chances of success appear remote or unlikely, a motion to dismiss should be denied.

To determine whether a motion to dismiss should be granted, the court must first examine the complaint. The complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a). The complaint must provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99; Westlake, 537 F.2d at 858. The plaintiff has an obligation to allege the essential material facts of the case. Scheid, 859 F.2d at 436-37.

In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1983). Where there are conflicting interpretations of the facts, they must be construed in the plaintiffs favor. Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (6th Cir.1991). However, legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences should not be accepted as true. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405-06.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Federal Claims: § 1983

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges rights created by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 suits may be maintained against a defendant in both an official and an individual capacity. Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.1992). Individual capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions taken under color of state law, whereas official-capacity suits merely represent an alternative means of pleading an action against a government entity. Id.

The style of Plaintiffs' second amended complaint makes clear that Plaintiffs are suing Defendant Sease in both his individual and official capacities. By bringing suit against Sease in his official capacity as a member of the Memphis Police Department, Plaintiffs are in effect suing his employer, the City of Memphis. In a harmless redundancy, the complaint also lists the City of Memphis separately as a defendant.

1. Claim against Defendant Sease

To state a cognizable § 1983 claim against Defendant Sease in his individual capacity, Plaintiffs must allege 1) that Sease deprived them of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to them by the United States Constitution or federal law; and 2) that Sease caused the deprivation while acting under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiffs allege that Sease stopped their car without probable cause, searched the car and their persons without warrant or probable cause, illegally detained them in the back of a squad car, and robbed them of a considerable amount of cash. They allege that these offenses, conducted by a police officer acting as a police officer, violated their Fourth Amendment right to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures and their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The facts as alleged support a plausible claim that Sease deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourth Amendment and Due Process rights. There appears to be no dispute that Defendant Sease acted under color of the laws of the State of Tennessee in the incident at issue. Since Plaintiffs have made out a viable, prima facie case against Defendant Sease, motion to dismiss the § 1983 complaint against Sease is denied.

2. Claim against Defendant City of Memphis

Municipalities are not immune from suit under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). However, to sustain a § 1983 cause of action against the City, Plaintiffs must do more than simply establish that they were injured by a City police officer. A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees. Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir.2000). For the City to be held liable, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the City, through the execution of a government policy or custom, inflicted the alleged injury. Id. Such policy or custom must represent official policy, whether made by the government's lawmakers or other decision makers. Id. Even if the employee's act in question had no formal approval, it may subject the municipality to liability if the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Finally, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government's conduct was causally connected to the deprivation of constitutional rights, the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. Id. See also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

Plaintiffs do not fault the written policies and procedures of the City of Memphis and its police department. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 32). They strongly imply, in fact, that Sease's conduct was contrary to those stated policies and procedures....