Brown v. Com.

Decision Date18 January 1990
Docket NumberNo. 88-SC-579-MR,88-SC-579-MR
Citation789 S.W.2d 748
PartiesC.H. BROWN, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Henry E. Hughes, Lexington, for appellant.

Frederic J. Cowan, Atty. Gen. and Jill Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Appellate Div., Frankfort, for appellee.

COMBS, Justice.

On October 26, 1987, a Fayette County Grand Jury returned an indictment against appellant and one Johnny Edwards. Count 1 of the indictment alleged:

On or about the 14th day of April, 1984, in Fayette County, Kentucky, the above named Defendant, C.H. Brown, committed the capital offense of murder by stabbing Kevin Donica with a knife during the course of committing a first degree robbery:

Count 2 of the indictment alleged:

On or about the 14th day of April, 1984, in Fayette County, Kentucky, the Defendants committed the offense of first degree robbery when the Defendant, C.H. Brown, threatened the use of a knife with intent to accomplish a theft from Kevin Donica while aided and assisted by the Defendant, Johnny Edwards;

On May 18, 1988, Edwards, entered a guilty plea to the offense of criminal facilitation to commit robbery in the first degree. In consideration of his testimony against appellant, the Commonwealth recommended, and the court imposed, a minimal sentence of two years in the state penitentiary.

After a lengthy trial the jury returned a not guilty verdict on the murder charge. After thirteen hours of deliberation and a total of eleven handwritten questions the jury found appellant guilty of robbery.

Appellant argues as grounds for reversal that the trial court erred in not sustaining his motion for mistrial in the face of repeated references to appellant's involvement in other crimes, and that such references denied him due process and a fair trial. Secondly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment n.o.v. because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he "stole money from the decedent".

Prior to trial, counsel for the parties met and agreed that certain references to other suspected criminal activity would be deleted from a statement to be read to the jury.

The following dialogue is taken from the transcript and is part of the statement read by the police officer in response to questions by the Commonwealth:

Captain Bizzack: He mention being involved in any other types of robberies in Fayette County at all:

Mr. Bouvier: Well, he mentioned--he mentioned something about that there was two other killings that they were going to--

Mr. Hughes: Your Honor, I object. Like to approach the bench. That's exactly what we talked about.

A motion for a mistrial was denied. As the testimony proceeded, Captain Bizzack read from notes of an interview with appellant:

... Sergeant Root and I interviewed C.H. Brown at the Fayette County Detention Center. Brown was incarcerated for robbery offense that took place--

Counsel for appellant then renewed his motion for mistrial by the following dialogue at the bench:

Mr. Hughes: Comes the Defendant and moves the Court for a mistrial. This is the second mention that he was incarcerated on a robbery offense which has nothing to do with this case.

The Court: Okay, I'll put him back in jail and we'll continue it. Try it again.

Mr. Bouvier: Could--Could I--

Mr. Hughes: I don't understand the reason.

The Court: What do you mean your reason? He's threatened two witnesses according to some of the witnesses in this case.

Mr. Hughes: Threatened two witness?

The Court: That's right. According to the testimony he has. I'm not going to let him out on bond threatening two witnesses. If you want the mistrial, we'll go ahead.

Defense counsel then, in effect, withdrew the motion. After a short break the court continued its remarks:

The Court: Before we took the recess, the Court advised counsel for the Defendant that if he granted the mistrial he would have to revoke the defendant's bond and put him back in jail and I think the defendant objects to that and I want the record to reflect that that's not coercion on the part of the Court. And I've had an opportunity to think about it and I don't want the defendant to feel that it's coercion. I'm going to make a ruling on his motion for a mistrial. First of all, the Court would make a finding of fact that the Commonwealth is not intentionally attempting to get into evidence other crimes and I don't think any testimony has been prejudicial up to this point due to the fact that the jury is well aware that he's in the Detention Center for some charge because that's where they did the interviewing. There's been no objection to that. So then he's in the Detention Center and I don't think he's been prejudiced by those statements which were inadvertently made by the witness. And I'll overrule the motion for a mistrial.

The Commonwealth, in responding to appellant's argument, contends that the defense refused to accept an offered declaration of a mistrial, and further that the trial court properly overruled appellant's motion. The inconsistency of these contentions reflects the procedural and substantive anomalies present in this record. A motion for mistrial is provisionally granted; due to the proviso, the motion is withdrawn; the motion is then denied by the court.

Even assuming that the ultimate ruling of the court, when viewed in isolation, was within the parameters of sound judicial discretion, we believe that prejudicial error occurred in the events preceding that ruling. The record reveals that the court had concluded as a matter of law that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. RCr 9.58. Sound basis for this conclusion is evident in the testimony regarding other, similar crimes with which the defendant was charged, particularly in view of the...

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6 cases
  • Morgan v. Shirley, 89-5992
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • January 27, 1992
    ...of credibility, are for the jury; it is considered unnecessary for Kentucky trial courts to comment on such matters. Brown v. Commonwealth, 789 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Ky.1990); Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 S.W. 192, 193 We have not been furnished a complete transcript of the charge to the jury, but w......
  • Hix v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2002-CA-000935-MR.
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 2003
    ...a court should be mindful of the rule that "[q]uestions of credibility and weight of the evidence are for the jury." Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 789 S.W.2d 748, 749(citation omitted). See also Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219. In addition, the standard for appellate review concer......
  • Thacker v. Com.
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • September 12, 2003
    ...816 S.W.2d 186 (1991). 10. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. See also Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983). 11. Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 789 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1990). See also Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 12. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187; Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S......
  • Tuney v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2008-CA-000307-MR (Ky. App. 3/19/2010)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • March 19, 2010
    ...that evidence. The credibility of Esterhay's testimony is not before this Court, but rather was an issue for the jury. Brown v. Commonwealth, 789 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1990). Further, the evidence presented showing that Tuney changed the billing address and subsequently failed to make payments is......
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