Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 6:12–CV–00009.
• Citation: 969 F.Supp.2d 433
• Parties: Thomas F. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

969 F.Supp.2d 433

Thomas F. BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 6:12–CV–00009.

United States District Court,

W.D. Virginia,

Lynchburg Division.

Aug. 22, 2013.

Charles Cooper Geraty, III, Geraty & MacQueen, PLC, Charlottesville, VA, for Plaintiff.

Stephen Mark Ball, Office of General Counsel, SSA, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON, District Judge.

This matter is before me on consideration of the following: the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (docket nos. 13 and 20); the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of United States Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou (docket no. 24); Plaintiff's objections (docket no. 25) to the Report; and the response (docket no. 26) to Plaintiff's objections, filed by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant,” or the “Commissioner”). ¹

In his Report, the magistrate judge recommends that I affirm the Commissioner's final decision denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report, obligating the court to undertake a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which proper objections were lodged. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir.1982). Having conducted such a review, I find that the objections are without merit and that the magistrate judge was correct in finding that the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence and that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing that he was disabled under the Act. In particular, my review of the record confirms that a remand to the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for further review of evidence that Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Counsel well over a year after the ALJ's decision is not warranted. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, I will overrule Plaintiff's objections and will adopt the magistrate judge's Report in toto.

I.

The Commissioner's factual findings must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.1996); see also42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted), and consists of “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.1966).

The Commissioner is responsible for evaluating the medical evidence and assessing symptoms, signs, and findings to determine the functional capacity of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527–404.1545. Any conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the Commissioner (or his designate, the ALJ), not the courts, and it is immaterial whether the evidence will permit a conclusion inconsistent with that of the ALJ. Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir.1964). The court may not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.1990). Instead, the court may only consider whether the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. However, determining whether the evidence presented by the ALJ to support his decision amounts to substantial evidence is a question of law, and therefore will be considered anew. Hicks v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1022, 1024–25 (4th Cir.1985) ( abrogated on other grounds by Lively v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 177, 180 (4th Cir.1988)). Furthermore, “ALJs have a duty to analyze ‘all of the relevant evidence’ and to provide a sufficient explanation for their ‘rationale in crediting certain evidence.’ ” Bill Branch Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 213 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 permits a party to submit objections to a magistrate judge's ruling to the district court within fourteen days of the order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); see also28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court conducts a de novo review of those portions of a magistrate's report and recommendation to which specific objections were made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 48. General objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, reiterating arguments already presented, lack the specificity required by Rule 72 and have the same effect as a failure to object. Veney v. Astrue, 539 F.Supp.2d 841, 845 (2008). Those portions of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which no objection are made will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47 (citing Webb v. Califano, 468 F.Supp. 825, 830 (E.D.Cal.1979)). The district court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition based on its de novo review of the recommendation and the objections made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).

II.

A.

The magistrate judge's Report provides the following “Social and Vocational History” for Plaintiff:

[Plaintiff] was born March 16, 1962. R. 41. He completed high school, took special education classes, and reports that he is limited in his reading ability. R. 51. [Plaintiff] has worked as a lumber stacker, which is classified as unskilled heavy work, and as an automobile mechanic.² R 55. He stopped working in 1999. R. 49. In a function report dated March 5, 2009, [Plaintiff] described his daily activities as doing errands or doing work in the house. R. 173. He further reported that he took care of his children (he reported living with his son), did light cleaning about an hour every other day, shopped for groceries once a week, watched television for several hours daily, talked with others daily, and attended church regularly. R. 174–79.

Additionally, the magistrate judge's Report includes a “Claim History,” which states that Plaintiff

filed his claim for SSI on November 28, 2008. R. 125. He initially claimed a disability onset date of September 1, 2003. R. 125. The Commissioner denied [Plaintiff's] application initially and upon reconsideration. R. 61–65, 69–70. [The ALJ] held a hearing on March 5, 2010, at which [Plaintiff], represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. R. 36–58. At the hearing, [Plaintiff] amended his alleged onset date to January 20, 2009. R. 38. The ALJ issued his decision denying [Plaintiff's] claim on June 7, 2010. R. 22–30. The ALJ found that [Plaintiff] suffered from the severe impairments of cervical degenerative disc disease, status post a C5–C7 cervical decompression and fusion in 2005, hypertension, and myofascial pain, along with a non-severe knee impairment. R. 24, 25. The ALJ found that none of these impairments, either individually or in combination, met or medically equal a listed impairment. R. 25. The ALJ further found that [Plaintiff] has retained an RFC [“residual functional capacity”] to perform simple, light work. R. 26. The ALJ found that [Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past relevant work, but that there are jobs, which exist in significant numbers in the national economy, which [Plaintiff] can perform, given his age, education, work experience, and RFC. R. 28–29. As such, the ALJ concluded that [Plaintiff] is not disabled. R. 29.

[Plaintiff] filed an appeal with the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council and included four additional exhibits in his request of review. On December 20, 2011 the Appeals Council denied [Plaintiff's] request for a review of the ALJ's decision, thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. R. 1–4. On August 30, 2011, [Plaintiff] filed his complaint in this court seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision....

The Report includes the following summary regarding “Evidence Submitted to Appeals Council” (italicized emphasis added):

[Plaintiff] seeks a remand based upon the recommendation of his neurosurgeon, Dr. William Broaddus, that he is a candidate for a cervical fusion at the C4–5 level. Dr. Broaddus, after seeing [Plaintiff] only once, stated that [Plaintiff] had a [broad] based disc bulge at C4–C5 and that a fusion at that level could provide significant improvement of his symptoms. [Plaintiff] obtained this opinion following the ALJ's decision and presented it for the first time to the Appeals Council. [Plaintiff] contends that the opinion is new and material evidence sufficient to warrant a remand. I find that the opinion is neither new nor material and thus does not warrant remand.

[Plaintiff's] primary medical issue relates to pain resulting from problems with his cervical spine. [Plaintiff] suffered from cervical stenosis and in 2005 underwent surgical decompression and fusion at C5 through C6 and C7 in 2005. See R. 226, 304, 305, 313–14 (noting [Plaintiff's] surgical history). [Plaintiff] continued to have neck pain, and in February 2009, he saw Dr. Laura Howard of Central Virginia Community Health Center for neck and lumbar pain. Dr. Howard prescribed medication for this continued pain. A CT myleogram on February 13, 2009 revealed that [Plaintiff] had neuroforaminal narrowing at C3–C4, C4–C5, and C5–C6. R. 371.

[Plaintiff] had a cervical MRI on July 30, 2009, which revealed that he had persistent moderate narrowing of the spinal canal at C4–C5 due to a broad-based disc bulge. R. 349, 369. [Plaintiff] saw Dr. John Jane, a neurosurgeon at the University of Virginia, on September 9, 2009, who found that [Plaintiff] had myelomacial in his spinal cord (softening of the cord). Dr. Jane noted that he would “at least consider surgery,” if [Plaintiff] had severe...