Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.01-2308-DJW.,CIV.A.01-2308-DJW. |
| Citation | 245 F.Supp.2d 1175 |
| Parties | Martha D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Melanie D. Caro, Office of United States Attorney, Kansas City, KS, Robert A. Olsen Office of United States Attorney, Kansas City, KS, for Defendant.
Ross E. Stubblefield, Blue Springs, MO, for Defendant.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended. The parties have filed their consent to jurisdiction by Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 (doc. 20). Plaintiff has filed a brief (doc. 11) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner has filed a brief in opposition (doc. 16), and Plaintiff has filed a reply (doc. 21).
The Court has reviewed the administrative record and the briefs of both parties. As set forth below, the Court reverses the decision of the Commissioner and remands the case to the administrative law judge for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), a court may render "upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." The court reviews the decision of the Commissioner to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision.1 The Supreme Court has held that "substantial evidence" is "more than a mere scintilla" and is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."2 In reviewing the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, the court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner.3 Evidence is not considered substantial "if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion."4
The court also reviews the decision of the Commissioner to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.5 The Commissioner's failure to apply the proper legal standard may be sufficient grounds for reversal independent of the substantial evidence analysis.6
Accordingly, the court reviews the decision of the Commissioner to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision and to determine whether the correct legal standards were applied.7
Plaintiff filed her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits on August 26, 1998. (See Certified Transcript of the Record ("Tr.") at 12, 49, 150, doc. 8.) The Commissioner denied the claims initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 24-27, 32-35)
On February 29, 2000, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs claim. (Tr. 165-198) Plaintiff appeared in person without an attorney. (Tr. 167)
On November 22, 2000, the ALJ issued his decision, in which he concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and was therefore not entitled to receive disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. (Tr. 19) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ determined that Plaintiffs impairments did not prevent her from performing a significant range of light work and that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy she could perform, such as file clerk and appointment clerk. (Tr. 19)
On January 25, 2001, Plaintiff requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council (Tr. 8), which was denied by the Appeals Council on April 16, 2001 (Tr. 5-6). The findings of the ALJ therefore stand as the final decision of the Commissioner in this case.
Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled and eligible to receive disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits on June 2, 1998, due to carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral hearing loss, and removal of a left glomus tympanicum tumor. (Tr. 13, 50) At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff was 48 years of age. (Tr. 50, 151) Under the Social Security regulations, she is classified as a "younger" individual.8 Plaintiff has "more than a high school (or high school equivalent) education" but no other formal education or training. (Tr. 17, 19) Plaintiffs past relevant work includes working as a cook and kitchen supervisor. (Tr. 16, 91) She ceased all work activity on June 2, 1998, the alleged onset date of her disability. (Tr. 50)
In his decision of November 22, 2000, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits set forth in Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act and is insured for benefits through the date of this decision.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability.
3. The claimant has bilateral carpal tunnel syndrom and hearing loss left ear which are impairments considered "severe" based on the requirements in the Regulations 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b).
4. These medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4.
5. The undersigned finds the claimant's allegations regarding her symptoms were credible for the reasons set forth in the body of the decision.
6. The undersigned has carefully considered all of the medical opinions in the record regarding the severity of the claimant's impairment (20 CFR §§ 404.1527 and 416.927).
7. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift and/or carry 10 pounds frequently, stand, walk and sit the entire 8-hour workday; and is limited bilaterally in the upper extremities for repetitive pushing and puling [sic]. She should not climb ropes, ladders and scaffolds; is frequently limited in crawling; is occasionally limited in kneeling, crouching, balancing and other forms of climbing; is occasionally limited bilaterally for fingering and feeling; has limited hearing in left ear; should avoid exposed heights, concentrations of vibration in workplace and background noise above moderate office level, and is frequently limited for rough terrain.
8. The claimant is unable to perform any of her past relevant work (20 CFR §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).
9. The claimant is a "younger individual between the ages of 45 and 49" (20 CFR §§ 404.1563 and 416.963).
10. The claimant has "more than a high school (or high school equivalent education" (20 CFR. §§ 404.1564 and 416.964).
11. The claimant has no transferable skills from skilled work previously performed as described in the body of the decision (20 CFR §§ 404.1568 and 416.968).
12. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of light work (20 CFR § 416.967).
13. Although the claimant's exertional limitations do not allow her to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rule 202.21 as a framework for decisionmaking, there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform. Examples of such jobs include work as file clerk and appointment clerk.
14. The claimant was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)). (Tr. 18-19)
V. Analysis and Discussion
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because he failed to advise her that any fees charged by an appointed attorney would have to be approved by the Commissioner or court. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's failure to so advise her resulted in Plaintiff not being properly informed of her right to counsel and rendered her waiver of the right to counsel invalid.
The Court finds Plaintiffs argument to be without merit, for several reasons. First, the Court finds no statutory or regulatory basis for requiring the Commissioner to advise a claimant that the Social Security Administration or court must approve any fees charged by an attorney appointed to represent the claimant in the hearing or appeal process. The statute dealing with the representation of claimants before the Commissioner, 42 U.S.C. § 406, contains only one provision regarding the notification of claimants. It provides that the Commissioner 9 The pertinent regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1706, contains a similar notification provision. It states that when a claimant is not represented by an attorney and the Commissioner makes a determination subject to the administrative review process that does not grant the claimant all of the benefits sought, the Commissioner ...
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