Brown v. Commissioner of Correction

• Citation: 336 Mass. 718,147 N.E.2d 782,68 A.L.R.2d 708
• Parties: , 68 A.L.R.2d 708 Ivan W. BROWN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
• Decision Date: 05 February 1958
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 782

147 N.E.2d 782

336 Mass. 718, 68 A.L.R.2d 708

Ivan W. BROWN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 2, 1957.

Decided Feb. 5, 1958.

Edward J. Barshak, Boston, for plaintiff.

Samuel W. Gaffer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

By this bill for declaratory relief the plaintiff seeks a determination of the starting date of five concurrent sentences which he is now serving in the State prison. The case was submitted on a statement of agreed facts.

On May 13, 1952, the plaintiff was convicted in Middlesex County on three indictments and was sentenced on each to from five to seven years in the State prison, the sentences to run consecutively. (These will be referred to hereinafter as the Middlesex sentences.) On September 23, 1952, the plaintiff was convicted in Suffolk County on five indictments and was sentenced on each to from three to five years in the State prison. These sentences (referred to hereinafter as the Suffolk sentences) were concurrent and were to commence 'from and after' the expiration of the Middlesex sentences. It is the starting date of the Suffolk sentences with which we are concerned.

In 1956 the plaintiff brought a writ of error in this court to have the Middlesex convictions set aside. Pursuant to an opinion of the full court (Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476, 140 N.E.2d 461, judgment was entered on March 11, 1957, setting aside the Middlesex convictions. ¹ On April 30, 1957, the plaintiff was brought before the Superior Court in Middlesex County and pleaded guilty to two of the indictments and was placed on probation for one year on each. The third indictment was nol prossed.

In the case at bar a final decree was entered adjudicating that the plaintiff started serving his Suffolk sentences on the day they were imposed, September 23, 1952. The defendant appealed.

The defendant contends that the Suffolk sentences commenced to run on April 30, 1957, the date when the plaintiff was brought into court following our decision. The plaintiff on the other hand contends that the decree below was right and that the Suffolk sentences commenced to run on September 23, 1952, the date of imposition.

The defendant (relying on Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 448, 108 N.E.2d 922, 35 A.L.R.2d 1277) takes the position that the original Middlesex judgments were voidable and not void, and were in full force and effect until reversed by this court. Hence, it is argued, the Suffolk sentences could not start to run until the Middlesex sentences had been set aside. In support of his position the defendant cites Kite v. Commonwealth, 11 Metc. 581, and Smith v. Lovell, 146 Me. 63, 77 A.2d 575. In the Kite case it was said by Shaw, C. J., 11 Metc. at page 585, 'The court are all of opinion that it is no error in a judgment, in a criminal case, to make one term of imprisonment commence when another terminates. It is as certain as the nature of the case will admit; and there is no other mode in which a party may be sentenced on several convictions. * * * If the previous sentence is shortened by a reversal of the judgment, or a pardon, it then expires; and then, by its terms, the sentence in question takes effect, as if the previous one had expired by lapse of time. Nor will it make any difference, that the previous judgment is reversed for error. It is voidable only, and not void; and, until reversed by a judgment, it is to be deemed of full force and effect; and though erroneous and subsequently reversed on error, it is quite sufficient to fix the terms at which another sentence shall take effect'. (Emphasis supplied.)

There can be no doubt that the italicized language in the above quotation supports the defendant's position. But that portion of the opinion was dictum, for the only question before the court was whether a sentence which was to commence after the termination of a prior sentence was sufficiently certain as to its starting date. What was said as to when a 'from and after' sentence was to begin in the event the prior conviction was set aside was not necessary to the decision. But, although dictum, it comes from one of our greatest Chief Justices and is not lightly to be ignored.

In a brief per curiam opinion (Brown v. Commonwealth, 4 Rawle, 259) decided in 1833 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the starting date of a 'from and after' sentence began to run from the time of the reversal of the preceding sentence. And, it seems, this is still the law of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Claudy, 171 Pa.Super. 340, 90 A.2d 253; United States ex rel. Holly v. Keenan, D.C., 107 F.Supp. 266. The case of Smith v. Lovell, 146 Me. 63, 77 A.2d 575, cites with approval the dictum in the Kite case, and squarely holds that the term of a 'from and after' sentence commences to run as of the time when the prior judgment (which was voidable and not void) was reversed.

The plaintiff urges that Smith v. Lovell and the dictum in the Kite case ought not to be followed. A sense of fairness, he argues, requires the rule that the second sentence, where a prior sentence falls because of reversal, should be moved forward and made to run as of the date of its imposition, for otherwise a defendant will have served time for which he receives no credit. That there is force in this argument cannot be denied. Of course, it might be argued that where a judgment is set aside and a defendant is subsequently convicted on a retrial or on a plea of guilty, the judge will take into consideration on the matter of sentence the time already served. Doubtless that would ordinarily be done--and it would appear to have been done here--but a defendant cannot insist upon it as matter of right. Moreover, if the defendant is acquitted upon a retrial of the case there is no way by which he can receive credit for the time served under the erroneous conviction.

The rule for which the plaintiff contends is not without support in some of the more recent cases. See, for example, Youst v. United States, 5 Cir., 151 F.2d 666, 668; Ekberg v. United States, 1 Cir., 167 F.2d 380, 388. We think this is the better and more humane view, for only in this way can a prisoner receive credit, not as matter of grace, but as of right, for time served under an erroneous conviction.

The recent case of Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922, 35 A.L.R.2d 1277, affords an analogy. Lewis had been convicted of armed robbery on evidence which this court held would only support a conviction for larceny (Commonwealth v. Novicki, 324 Mass. 461, 87 N.E.2d 1); accordingly the judgment was reversed and the verdict was to be set aside unless the Commonwealth moved for sentence as upon a conviction for larceny. Upon remand to the Superior Court, Lewis was sentenced to not less than four and not more than five years in State prison. Five years was the maximum term provided for larceny. At the time of resentence Lewis had served nine months. Lewis contended that the second sentence for larceny was invalid because under it he might be required to serve in all five...