EX PARTE ALABAMA DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVICES

• Citation: 880 So.2d 393
• Parties: Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES and J. Walter Wood, Jr. (In re Jane Doe 1, a minor child who sues by her grandmother D.M. as her next friend, and Jane Doe 2, a minor child who sues by her mother M.T. as her next friend v. Alabama Department Of Youth Services et al.)
• Decision Date: 10 October 2003
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

880 So.2d 393

Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES and J. Walter Wood, Jr.

(In re Jane Doe 1, a minor child who sues by her grandmother D.M. as her next friend, and Jane Doe 2, a minor child who sues by her mother M.T. as her next friend v. Alabama Department Of Youth Services et al.)

1020480.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

October 10, 2003.

Kenneth L. Thomas, H. Lewis Gillis, Valerie L. Acoff, James L. Richey, and Tamica C. Richard of Thomas, Means, Gillis & Seay, P.C., Birmingham; and William J. Samford, Alabama Department of Youth Services, Mount Meigs, for petitioners.

Karen Sampson Rodgers and Kenneth Shinbaum of McPhillips, Shinbaum & Gill, LLP, Montgomery, for respondents.

JOHNSTONE, Justice.

The Alabama Department of Youth Services ("DYS") and J. Walter Wood, Jr., petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Tracy S. McCooey to grant their Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss the claims against them. We grant the petition in part and deny the petition in part.

Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, by and through their respective next friends ("Doe plaintiffs"), sued DYS employees Jimmie Jenkins, John Zeigler, and Kenneth Green for committing various sexual assaults on the Doe plaintiffs and for sexually harassing them while the Doe plaintiffs were in the custody of DYS at its Chalkville campus. Jenkins, Zeigler, and Green are not parties to this petition.

The Doe plaintiffs sued DYS for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by failing "to respond and/or their inadequate response to" a "sexually hostile education environment and sexual abuse and harassment." Against DYS, the Doe plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.

The Doe plaintiffs sued executive director of DYS J. Walter Wood, Jr.,¹ under various legal theories. All were based on Wood's, and certain other supervisory defendants', being "entrusted with the security of elementary students like the minor plaintiffs who are placed by operation of law into their charge." The Doe plaintiffs alleged a claim against Wood under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to their "right[s] to personal safety, security and privacy, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment" while Wood was "acting under color of state law." The Doe plaintiffs alleged that Wood "failed to develop, implement or administer procedures or policies reasonably designed to provide protection for the minor Plaintiffs from sexual harassment and abuse"; failed "to prevent male employees of DYS from sexually abusing and harassing them"; failed "to investigate prior complaints" against Green, Jenkins, and Zeigler; and failed "to protect the Plaintiffs from harm and from further harm after [Wood] received notice of the sexual harassment and abuse and the potential for sexual harassment of" them. The Doe plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, "equitable relief," attorneys' fees, and costs. The prayer for relief does not specifically seek an injunction.

The Doe plaintiffs also alleged state-law claims against Wood, in his individual and official capacities, for "intentionally and recklessly caus[ing] them to suffer extreme emotional distress by [his] outrageous misconduct" and for negligently or wantonly hiring, supervising, investigating, and monitoring Green, Jenkins, Zeigler, and their supervisor, the principal of the school. The Doe plaintiffs alleged that Wood's acts or omissions in the torts alleged in these two claims were "malicious and intended to injure." The Doe plaintiffs also claimed against Wood in his individual and official capacities for "willfully, recklessly, and/or mistakenly represent[ing] to Plaintiffs a material existing fact, which the Plaintiffs relied on said false representation that caused damage to the Plaintiff[s] as a proximate result." The Doe plaintiffs asked for compensatory and punitive damages and costs for all of these claims.

DYS and Wood moved to dismiss the Doe plaintiffs' claims against them. DYS asserted that the claims against it should be dismissed on the ground that DYS is an agency of the State of Alabama entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901. Wood asserted that he is entitled to a dismissal of the claims against him in his official capacity on the ground of sovereign immunity under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, and that he is entitled to a dismissal of the claims against him in his individual capacity on the grounds of federal qualified immunity and state-agent immunity. Both DYS and Wood asserted that they are entitled to dismissal of the federal § 1983 claims against them on the ground that § 1983 precludes respondeat superior liability. The Doe plaintiffs responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by DYS and Wood.

Inasmuch as the issue before us is whether the trial court correctly denied a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss, "[t]his Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true." Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala.2002). Moreover, as the defendants sought only a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without resort to facts supplied by affidavit or other evidentiary material outside the allegations of the complaint, and as the trial court accordingly treated the motion only as what it was, a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment with evidentiary materials outside the allegations of the complaint, those allegations themselves are the only potential source of factual support for the defendants' claims of immunity. Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Mooneyham v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So.2d 200 (Ala.2001); Garris v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 584 So.2d 791 (Ala.1991); Hales v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 380 So.2d 797 (Ala.1980).

"`Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala.1995).... Our review is further limited to those facts that were before the trial court. Ex parte American Resources Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 932, 936 (Ala.1995)."

Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala.1998).

"The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail. We note a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993) (citations omitted). Accord Cook v. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 825 So.2d 83, 89 (Ala.2001),

and C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So.2d 98, 104 (Ala.1995). "We construe all doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff." Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala.2003). "[A] motion to dismiss is typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert [federal] qualified immunity or State-agent immunity and ... normally the determination as to the existence of such a defense should be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following appropriate discovery." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 813-14 (Ala.2002).

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

DYS contends that, because it is an agency of the State of Alabama, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and to the dismissal of all claims against it. The complaint shows, and the Doe plaintiffs concede, that the only claim against DYS is a Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., claim.

Title IX provides, in pertinent part: "No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a), provides:

"(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of ... title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.] ....

"(2) In a suit against a State for violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State."

Eleventh Amendment immunity from a Title IX claim is governed by federal substantive law. Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1299 n. 2 (S.D.Ala.2000), and Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432 (Ala. 2001). DYS is a state agency entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity available to the State of Alabama. See Jones v. Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1985)

.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have extended the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to suits by citizens against...