Brown v. Crowe

• Decision Date: 11 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-6071,91-6071
• Citation: 963 F.2d 895
• Parties: 58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1308, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,560 Johnny C. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ann CROWE, Defendant, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 895

963 F.2d 895

58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1308,

59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,560

Johnny C. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ann CROWE, Defendant Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-6071.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 2, 1992.

Decided May 11, 1992.

Dorothy B. Stulberg (argued and briefed), Mostoller & Stulberg, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellant.

E.H. Rayson (argued), Kramer, Rayson, McVeigh, Leake & Rodgers, Knoxville, Tenn., Patricia L. McNutt (briefed), G. Wilson Horde, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for defendant-appellee.

John F. Suhre, E.E.O.C., Office of the Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C. (argued and briefed), for E.E.O.C., amicus curiae.

Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; MARTIN and SILER, Circuit Judges.

MERRITT, Chief Judge.

After the plaintiff in this Title VII case was first fired, then recalled and demoted by his employer, he filed a charge of race discrimination with a state human rights commission that acted in concert with the EEOC under the provisions of a worksharing agreement between the two agencies. The resulting bureaucratic morass that followed, through no fault of the plaintiff, is what we must now consider. This appeal concerns whether a plaintiff's filing of a Title VII charge with a state agency, whose subsequent actions cause that charge not to meet statutory time requirements, should be considered to have been filed with the EEOC in a timely manner. We apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and hold that the statutory period of Title VII is tolled where, through no fault of the plaintiff, the procedural errors of a state administrative agency would otherwise defeat the plaintiff's right to litigate his case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

Under Title VII's § 706(e), the general rule is that charges are to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, with one exception: where proceedings have been filed with a state or local agency first, "such charge shall be filed ... within three hundred days" of discrimination or within thirty days of the termination of state or local proceedings, "whichever is earlier." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 e-5(e) (West 1981). Under § 706(c), when a discrimination charge arises in a state which has a state or local law prohibiting the discriminatory act alleged or where a state or local authority is empowered to grant or seek relief from such an act, "no charge may be filed under subsection (b) [which provides for filing of charges with the EEOC] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated...." 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-5(c) (West 1981). Read together, if a plaintiff does not file a charge under the general 180-day rule, the 60-day deferral period of § 706(c) gives a state agency "an opportunity to combat discrimination free from federal intervention." EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110-11, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1669, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988). In light of that 60-day period, "a complainant must file a charge with the appropriate state or local agency, or have the EEOC refer the charge to that agency, within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory event in order to ensure that it may be filed with the EEOC within the 300-day limit." Id. at 111, 108 S.Ct. at 1669, citing Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 814, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2491, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980). "If the complainant does not file within 240 days, the charge may still be timely filed with the EEOC if the state or local agency terminates its proceedings before 300 days." Id. at 111-12, 108 S.Ct. at 1669.

Plaintiff Brown, an African-American male, was employed by the defendant Martin Marietta Energy Systems for fourteen years, rising from a job as a janitor to become a program finance officer and administrator. On January 14, 1988, the plaintiff was terminated from his position as a finance officer. He was recalled the next day and was told that his termination would be "converted" to a transfer and a demotion to his original job as a janitor.

179 days after his initial termination Brown contacted the EEOC's Nashville office by mail. Some two months later, the plaintiff submitted a charge of discrimination, which was received by the Tennessee Human Rights Commission ("THRC") on September 30, 1988. Under the terms of a worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the THRC, a THRC clerk assigned charge numbers for both agencies' files at that time. The THRC forwarded it to the EEOC, which received it on October 7, 1988. When the THRC forwarded the charge, it used a standardized form ¹ that contained three blocks for noting which agency planned to process initially the charge. The THRC marked one block, reading that "[p]ursuant to the work-sharing agreement, this charge is to be initially processed by the 706 Agency."

The plaintiff's charge had originated in Monroe County, a county for which the THRC bore initial processing responsibility under the worksharing agreement. But, the plaintiff also alleged ongoing discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, and under the worksharing agreement, such charges were part of a category of claims that the EEOC would initially process and that the THRC would waive its rights to handle. Moreover, 255 days had elapsed between the day he was terminated and the date the charge was filed. To be timely under Tennessee law, charges must be brought within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. Under the worksharing agreement, the THRC had agreed to "defer immediately to EEOC all charges received and determined as untimely under Tennessee law" for a failure to meet the state's 180-day filing deadline.

After conducting an initial investigation, the EEOC notified the THRC on October 17, 1988 that it would not pursue further processing of plaintiff's charge. THRC now began an investigation, issuing a notice of administrative closure on April 3, 1990. A right-to-sue notice was issued to Brown on the same day. Well over 300 days had elapsed between the termination and the state agency's closure of its proceedings.

The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on two grounds: first, that the plaintiff had not filed a charge with the EEOC within 240 days, and second, that the THRC had not terminated its inquiries within the 300-day period required by Title VII's § 706(e). The District Court did not address the effect of the worksharing agreement's waiver provisions, nor was it asked to consider whether equitable principles should operate to toll the filing requirements for the plaintiff.

II.

Plaintiff and amicus curiae EEOC urge us to resolve whether the worksharing provision's waiver sections are self-executing so that, regardless of the THRC's annotation on the transmittal form, an "automatic waiver" of its processing rights had occurred. ² We need not resolve this complex issue, however, because we believe that the doctrine of equitable tolling provides appropriate relief, although some brief analysis of Title VII's timeliness provisions is necessary to resolve the threshold issue we face. As a threshold matter, we address this court's power sua sponte to consider the equitable tolling issue, which is obviously latent in the case.

As a general rule, this court will usually decline to entertain arguments not presented in the first instance to the trial court. See, e.g., Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir.1991); Estate of Quirk v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 751, 757-59 (6th Cir.1991); Sigmon Fuel Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 754 F.2d 162, 164-65 (6th Cir.1985). See also Walters v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 855 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 1344, 103 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989) (court declining to resolve issue concerning tolling of limitations period that was first raised on appeal by plaintiff). However, as we have noted earlier, "many decisions in this circuit have expressed a willingness and found reason to take up issues raised for the first time during the process of appeal." Taft Broadcasting, 929 F.2d at 244. The court's decision to address issues first raised on appeal stems from the historical powers of equity vested in courts "to prevent manifest injustice and to promote procedural efficiency." See generally Taft Broadcasting, 929 F.2d at 244, citing United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1321 (6th Cir.1986). Thus, a federal appellate court is always empowered to resolve any issue not considered below "where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or where injustice ... might otherwise result." Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 477 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 182, 112 L.Ed.2d 145 (1990), citing Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 397 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2169, 109 L.Ed.2d 499 (1990). This power to consider an issue sua sponte is closely akin to the court's discretionary power to consider clear errors in a lower court's proceedings where the errors or omissions are obvious, unfair or undermine the integrity or public confidence of judicial proceedings. See generally Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 920-21 (6th Cir.1991), and cases cited therein.

Both bases for our limited exception to the general rule are present. The bureaucratic confusion and error, and the resulting administrative tardiness in fulfilling the statutory 300-day filing requirement, were in no way attributable to any conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Section 706(e) provides for a federal filing more than 180 days after the date of discrimination, if the charge is filed with the state agency "within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred...." 42...