Brown v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 29 January 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. 12–799 (RJL).
• Citation: 919 F.Supp.2d 105
• Parties: Stephanie Y. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

919 F.Supp.2d 105

Stephanie Y. BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. 12–799 (RJL).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Jan. 29, 2013.

Donald M. Temple, Donald M. Temple, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Yoora Pak, Kristi Lynette Johnson, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz & Dicker, LLP, McLean, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stephanie Yvonne Brown (“plaintiff” or “Brown”) brings this action against the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law (“DCSL”), as well as the University of the District of Columbia's Board of Trustees (the “Board”) and President Allen L. Sessoms (“President Sessoms”) (collectively, “defendants”), seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination, race and gender discrimination, negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Before the Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record therein, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Over the past twenty-five years, plaintiff has held a variety of administrative and academic positions at the University of the District of Columbia (“UDC”), the most recent of which was an associate professorship of law at DCSL. Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 6. On January 5, 2009, plaintiff applied for tenure and promotion to a full professorship position at the law school. Id. ¶ 14.

DCSL's Faculty Evaluation and Retention Committee (“FERC”) met on May 14, 2009 to discuss plaintiff's application. Id. Voting in favor of recommending tenure, FERC subsequently forwarded its approval to Katherine S. Broderick, Dean of DCSL, a few days later. Id. Dean Broderick was reluctant, at first, to endorse FERC's tenure recommendation due to plaintiff's lack of scholarship, and even suggested that FERC withdraw plaintiff's tenure application from consideration. Id. ¶¶ 17, 20. When FERC updated the application to include a newly-announced publication of one of plaintiff's articles, however, Dean Broderick changed her mind, endorsed FERC's tenure recommendation, and transmitted it to then Interim Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs Graeme Baxter (“Provost Baxter”) on December 8, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 22–24.

Eighteen months later, on June 6, 2011, Provost Baxter informed plaintiff, in writing, that her tenure application had been rejected, and that the 2011–2012 academic year would be her last as a member of DCSL's law faculty. Id. ¶ 27; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs. Mot.”), Ex. 11, ECF No. 9. Although Provost Baxter later informed plaintiff, in writing, that she had referred the tenure matter to UDC President Allen Sessoms for his review, President Sessoms agreed with Provost Baxter's decision to deny plaintiff tenure. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30. Accordingly, in October 2011, President Sessoms ratified Provost Baxter's denial of tenure, refused to forward plaintiff's application to the Board for its consideration,and notified plaintiff, in writing, of his decision. Id.

On May 2, 2012, plaintiff received a letter from Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs Ken Bain, informing her that, consistent with Provost Baxter's June 2011 letter, plaintiff's employment at DCSL would officially conclude at the end of the 2011–2012 academic year, specifically on May 15, 2012. Id. ¶ 55; Pl.'s Mot. for PI (“Pl.'s PI Mot.”), Ex. 6, ECF Nos. 1–3, 2. Seven days later, on May 9, 2012, plaintiff brought an action against defendants in the D.C. Superior Court, requesting, among other things, a TRO or preliminary injunction to thwart her dismissal, as well as to enable the Board to consider her tenure and promotion application. See Notice of Removal (“Removal Not.”), ECF No. 1; Pl.'s Mot. for TRO (“Pl.'s TRO Mot.”), ECF Nos. 1–2, 2; Pl.'s Pl Mot. On May 17, 2012, defendants removed the action to this federal court, see Removal Not. at 1, and on May 21, 2012, by agreement of the parties, defendant District of Columbia was voluntarily dismissed from the case, see Stip. of Dismissal, ECF No. 3, with prejudice.

At plaintiff's request, this Court converted plaintiff's motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction into one seeking only a preliminary injunction, and set a date to hear oral argument for a preliminary injunction. See Civ. Case No. 12–799, Minute Entry, May 22, 2012. After briefing was completed and oral argument was held, this Court found that plaintiff had failed to establish the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm to warrant a preliminary injunction and denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. See Civ. Case No. 12–799, Minute Entry, June 12, 2012; Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 888 F.Supp.2d 28, 34 (D.D.C.2012).

Defendants moved to dismiss this action on June 5, 2012. See Defs.' Mot. For the following reasons, the defendants' motion is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

The defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In evaluating the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true” and “grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[ ] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Indeed, where the court cannot infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct from the facts, “the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the court may take into consideration “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that the defendants are liable for a variety of torts, contract, and civil rights violations. See generally Am. Compl. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with defendants DCSL, the Board, and President Sessoms that plaintiff's claims against President Sessoms, in his individual and official capacity, should be dismissed and plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. Plaintiff's Claims Against President Sessoms

Plaintiff names Allen L. Sessoms, UDC President, as a defendant in this case, in both his official and individual capacities. See Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Despite a lack of clarity in the amended complaint as to which claims the plaintiff is asserting against which defendant, the Court presumes that plaintiff intends to bring claims of race and gender discrimination under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), negligent infliction of emotional distress and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against all defendants, including President Sessoms. See id. ¶¶ 73–84, 92–94.¹

Defendants argue that plaintiff's suit against President Sessoms in his official capacity is redundant of her suit against the Board. See Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”) at 15, ECF No. 9. An official capacity suit “generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Because “[i]t is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity,” an official capacity suit is, “in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against President Sessoms in his official capacity will be treated as claims against the Board.

In addition, defendants contend that plaintiff's individual capacity claims against President Sessoms should be dismissed “because he was acting within the scope of his authority and therefore has qualified immunity.” See Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Reply”) at 5–6, ECF No. 16. Due to plaintiff's failure, in her opposition, to counter any of the defendants' assertions regarding plaintiff's individual capacity claims against President Sessoms, plaintiff concedes the defendants' arguments.² Consequently, plaintiff's suit against President Sessoms in his individual capacity is also dismissed.

II. Plaintiff's Claims Against DCSL and the Boarda. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff alleges in Count 1 of her amended complaint that by allowing Provost Baxter and President Sessoms “to impede [p]laintiff's tenure review and promotion process and ultimately preclude [the] Board['s] ......