Brown v. Dubuque Altar Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1913
• Citation: 144 N.W. 613,163 Iowa 343
• Parties: BROWN v. DUBUQUE ALTAR MFG. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

163 Iowa 343

144 N.W. 613

BROWN

v.DUBUQUE ALTAR MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Dubuque County; J. W. Kintzinger, Judge.

Action for the value of a steam engine boiler and accessories alleged to have been converted. The answer was in three divisions: A general denial, a counterclaim for rent or storage, and a plea that defendant was retaining possession because of having been garnished. A demurrer to the last division was sustained, and, on the issues raised by the others, a verdict was returned for plaintiff and judgment entered thereon. The defendant appeals. Affirmed.Hurd, Lenehan & Kiesel, of Dubuque, for appellant.

Kenline & Roedell, of Dubuque, for appellee.

LADD, J.

In February, 1907, the plaintiff leased a building one year at a rental of $15 per month and installed an engine, boiler with accessories, and other machinery. The business engaged in did not prosper, and about the middle of October of that year, through mutual agreement, the lease was surrendered. As this affected the insurance hazard on defendant's other property, it remitted past-due rent, and plaintiff was allowed to leave the engine, boiler, and accessories in the building, as he contends, until convenient to remove them, or, as claimed by defendant, until the lease would have expired in February following. About March, 1910, plaintiff proposed to remove the property, but defendant required as a condition precedent the payment of a rental or storage charge of $50, though this was later reduced to $25. Payment thereof was refused, and this action for conversion was begun.

[1] I. The evidence was in conflict as to whether the understanding was that the property might be left in the building until February, 1908, when the lease would have expired, or until it should be convenient for plaintiff to take it away. The plaintiff testified that the latter was the arrangement with defendant's superintendent under which he yielded possession of the premises, and though he addressed a letter to defendant dated October 16, 1907, proposing to surrender his lease “except for the purpose of storing my machinery, etc., until the expiration of the lease, unless such stuff be sooner disposed of,” he explained that the arrangement with the superintendent was had prior to writing the letter, and farther that he was never notified of the acceptance of his written proposition. The superintendent testified that the conversation between him and plaintiff was that the property might remain until February, 1908, and that, at his suggestion, the latter put his proposition in writing to be submitted to the defendant's board of directors.

[2] Though we may not have reached the same conclusion as did the jury, it is apparent that the issue was for that body. They might have concluded the agreement was entered into with the superintendent before the written proposition was made and that the latter was never accepted by defendant. If so, there was nothing owing the latter for rent or storage, and the refusal to allow plaintiff to remove the property on demand was without reasonable qualification, and therefore amounted to a conversion. “Any distinct act of dominion, wrongfully exerted over one's property, in denial of his right or inconsistent with it, is a conversion. The action of trover, being founded on a conjoint right of property and possession, any act of the defendant which negatives or is inconsistent with such right amounts in law to a conversion. It is not necessary to a conversion that there should be a manual taking of the thing in action by the defendant; it is not necessary that it should be shown that he has applied it to his own use. Does he exercise a dominion over it in exclusion or defiance of the plaintiff's right? If he does, that in law is a conversion, be it for his own or for another person's use.” 2 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) 859. It was said in Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296, 302, that “The word conversion by a long course of practice has acquired a technical meaning. It means detaining goods so as to deprive the person entitled to the possession of them of his dominion over them.” Of course, there is often a reasonable qualification in a refusal to deliver property on demand; but, whenever there is an unauthorized act which deprives the...