Brown v. Durepo
| Decision Date | 29 March 1922 |
| Citation | 116 A. 451 |
| Parties | BROWN v. DUREPO. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
On Motion for New Trial from Supreme Judicial Court, Aroostook County, at Law.
Action by Roy N. L. Brown against Levi G. Durepo. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial. Motion sustained.
Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, MORRILL, and WILSON, JJ.
O. L. Keyes, of Caribou, for plaintiff.
Powers & Guild, of Ft. Fairfield, for defendant.
An action of assumpsit to recover for certain merchandise consisting of wearing apparel and material therefor delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant's wife. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the case comes before this court on the defendant's motion for a new trial on the usual grounds.
The defendant was married in July, 1918, and two weeks thereafter went with his wife to live with his aunt with whom he and his orphaned brother and sister had made their home prior to his marriage.
The defendant became of draft age and subject to the draft of 1918, and by arrangement with the proper officials he enlisted and was transferred to the Students' Army Training Corps at Tufts College. He left home to take up this work September 13, 1918, leaving his wife at his aunt's, with the understanding that she was to remain there and have a home, and receive for assisting in the housework her board, clothing, and the sum of $5 per week. Later she received from the government the regular allotment from her husband's pay, viz. $15 per month.
At the end of a week after his departure, dissatisfied as she says, with her treatment, but without notifying her husband, she left the aunt's and went to her sister's home in another town to live. The first of the goods sued for in this action were purchased by her within a few days after leaving the home her husband had provided.
The jury under instructions of the court to which, no exceptions were taken must have found that the defendant's wife was warranted in leaving the home he had provided for her during his absence. Otherwise she would not take with her the right to pledge his credit even for necessaries. Steinfeld v. Girrard, 103 Me. 151, 68 Atl. 630. The jury must also have found that it was her intent when she purchased the goods to obtain them on his credit, and not on her own.
We have grave doubts as to whether there is sufficient evidence in favor of the plaintiff on the first point on which the verdict may rest. The period during which this liability was incurred was one requiring great personal sacrifices, not only by the husbands who were called to service, but by the wives who were left at home. The defendant's wife when she married knew his financial condition and his family relations, and that his country might at any time demand his services, in which case the amount she would receive from his pay would be small. The arrangements for her support made by the husband when he left appear to have been suitable and adequate.
The seemingly slight differences between her and the aunt, and the slurs and insults, which may have been more imagined than real, and born of a desire on her part to be free of the restraint she felt in the new home and under the new responsibilities, were, even if her testimony be taken at its full value, insufficient we think to justify her leaving the home the husband had provided without notifying him. But even if a verdict founded upon the testimony on this branch of the case were not so manifestly wrong as to justify this court in interfering, and she must be held to have taken with her the right to pledge her husband's credit, it is clear from her testimony and that of the plaintiff that she did not undertake to exercise that right when she purchased the goods sued for, but purchased them on her own credit, which under the statutes...
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