Brown v. Durham
Decision Date | 04 May 1893 |
Citation | 22 S.W. 868 |
Parties | BROWN et al. v. DURHAM. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Gregg county court; F. J. McCord, Judge.
Action by D. D. Durham against Brown & Flewellen and A. L. C. Hurst. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.
Davis & Terry, for appellants.
This was an action for damages for libel, commenced in the district court by appellee against appellants. Appellant Hurst was the general manager of an organization called the "Texas Retail Merchants' Protection Association," whose place of business was at Waco. The plan and purposes of the association will appear from the following circular, which was distributed with a view to securing subscribers and extending its membership:
As indicated in this document, members of the organization were allowed to send claims to the manager for collection. Upon receipt of a claim a circular letter (such as that set out below, addressed to appellee) would be sent to the debtor, and upon his failure to reply within the time specified his name would be entered in a book called the "Reference Book," and notices were sent out periodically to all of the subscribers, containing lists of names added after the last publication of such book. The effect intended to be given to the recording of a name in the book, and entering it upon the list, can be gathered from the foregoing paper, as well as from those which follow.
Appellants Brown & Flewellen, a firm of merchants doing business at Longview, Tex., became members of the association, and sent to it, to be dealt with in accordance with its established custom, a claim against appellee for $954.88, which grew out of the following facts: Brown & Flewellen furnished to appellee, who was a tie contractor, supplies and money, and received from the railroad company, and credited upon his account, moneys to which he was entitled in payment for ties furnished to it. These transactions ceased, but there had been no settlement, and no itemized account had been furnished to appellee, showing the state of his account, though a statement had been presented to him, showing the balance claimed by Brown & Flewellen. There was evidence that appellee owed Brown & Flewellen a balance of a less amount than the claim placed in the hands of Hurst. Appellee did not deny that he owed a balance, but claimed at the trial that he had not had an opportunity of ascertaining how the account stood before the alleged libel was published. When Hurst, the manager, received the claim from Brown & Flewellen he addressed to appellee the following communication:
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Baten v. Houston Oil Co.
...this proposition. Sanders v. Hall, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 282, 55 S. W. 594; Holt v. Parsons, 23 Tex. 9, 76 Am. Dec. 49; Brown v. Durham, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 244, 22 S. W. 868; Fleming v. Mattinson, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 476, 114 S. W. 650; Wallis v. Walker, 73 Tex. 8, 11 S. W. 123; Walker v. Publishin......
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Brown v. Durham
...appeals at Galveston in 1893. The nature of the alleged libel being fully stated in the opinion of that court (reported in 3 Tex. Civ. App. 245, 22 S. W. 868), it is not necessary that we should again set it forth. We conclude, in view of the verdict, that the publication upon which the act......
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Marshall v. United Finance & Thrift Corp. of Dallas County, 15830
...statement, attributed to defendant's manager goes quite beyond the rule of qualified privilege. In the early case of Brown v. Durham, 3 Tex.Civ.App. 244, 22 S.W. 868, 871, discussing defamatory statements, the court said in part: 'While, as before stated, they had the privilege, on account ......