Brown v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation

• Decision Date: 24 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–cv–1292 (RCL).,10–cv–1292 (RCL).
• Parties: Timothy Demetri BROWN, pro se, Plaintiff,v.FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

793 F.Supp.2d 368

Timothy Demetri BROWN, pro se, Plaintiff,

v.FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 10–cv–1292 (RCL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 24, 2011.

Timothy Demetri Brown, Florence, CO, pro se.Sharon L. Tucker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.I. INTRODUCTION

Timothy Demetri Brown was convicted in 2002 on several charges related to his “participation in a major drug distribution conspiracy stretching from 1993 to 1999.” United States v. Brown, 86 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (5th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Brown, No. 01–cr–10012 (W.D.La. Apr. 8, 2003). Currently serving a life sentence, Brown brings this complaint against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and several other governmental agencies, raising claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (“APA”) and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”). Defendants have moved to dismiss, and there are several other motions—including plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment—before the Court. For the reasons stated below, all of plaintiff's motions will be denied, except his motion for leave to amend which will be granted in part and denied in part. His FOIA claim against the FBI, Am. Compl./Pet. Review 4, ECF No. 18, and FOIA claim against the Tax Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Second Am. Compl./Pet. Review 7, ECF No. 21–1 (“Second Am. Compl.”), remain, but all other claims and defendants will be dismissed from the case. An order will be entered requiring defendants FBI and DOJ to produce Vaughn indexes for documents and files that are the subject of plaintiff's remaining FOIA claims.

II. BACKGROUND

Timothy Brown, along with his brother Christopher Michael Brown and coconspirator Kenneth Wayne Pearson, were convicted on charges of conspiracy and distribution of crack cocaine in 2002. See generally Brown, 86 Fed.Appx. 749. Plaintiff was also convicted on money laundering charges, and the trial court ordered him to forfeit certain property belonging to him as part of the judgment. Id. at 752. Plaintiff's direct appeal and a collateral attack were both denied, id., and while Kenneth Pearson's conviction was vacated by the Supreme Court, Pearson v. United States, 543 U.S. 1116, 125 S.Ct. 1111, 160 L.Ed.2d 991 (2005) (remanding for rehearing in light of the Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005)), plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari was denied, Brown v. United States, 546 U.S. 1118, 126 S.Ct. 1088, 163 L.Ed.2d 903 (2006).

Incarcerated at Talledaga Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI–Talledaga”), after some time in the general population, plaintiff was transferred to the prison's Special Management Unit (“SMU”), a separate section used to manage inmates that “present unique security and management concerns.” Attach. 1 to Pl.'s Reply Defs.' Mem. Points and Authorities Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Leave Am. and Supplement Compl./Pet. Review 2, ECF No. 27–1 (“Attach. Pl.'s Reply”). “A multi-phase program whose mission is to teach self-discipline, pro-social values, and the ability to successfully coexist with [other inmates],” Attach. 1 Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Order Show Cause, ECF No. 29–1 (“Attach. Prelim. Inj.”), visitors to the unit have restricted privileges and limited interaction with other prisoners. Id. Although he was generally dissatisfied with the SMU's amenities, plaintiff was particularly irritated by his mandated participation in “self-study, individual, and group activities provided by Psychology Services,” id., characterizing his stay at the SMU as a “forced psychological treatment prolonged isolation regiment [sic],” Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Order Show Cause 1, ECF No. 29 (“Mot. Prelim. Inj.”). The program was apparently minimally successful, because at some point between February 23 and April 8, 2011, plaintiff was transferred out of FCI–Talledaga to the Administrative Max facility in Florence, Colorado (“ADX–GP”).

While in Talledaga, plaintiff filed suit against the FBI, asserting three claims under FOIA and one asking the government to resolve what he termed “federal questions.” Brown v. FBI, 675 F.Supp.2d 122 (D.D.C.2009). Two of the FOIA claims concerned records related to a book Mr. Brown was allegedly writing, and the other referred to plaintiff's request for FBI records on himself. Id. at 124. The federal questions, which are similar to two of the APA claims he brings here, asked the court (1) whether the government properly exercised jurisdiction over the property that plaintiff forfeited and (2) what the legal status of the statutes under which plaintiff was convicted is. Id. The court dismissed the FOIA claims for lack of administrative exhaustion, and the federal question claim was dismissed because it sought relief not available under FOIA. Id. at 123–24. Mr. Brown moved the court to reconsider and sought leave to amend, but the motions were denied because he provided no basis for reconsideration and unduly delayed seeking leave to amend. Brown v. FBI, 744 F.Supp.2d 120 (D.D.C.2010).

Prior to denial of his motion for reconsideration and to amend, plaintiff initiated this suit, asserting two APA claims against the FBI, one APA claim against the Department of Justice and one FOIA claim against the FBI. Compl./ Pet. Review, ECF 1 (“Compl.”). His first APA claim argued that the FBI's determination that 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846—the statutes under which plaintiff was convicted—were criminal laws was in error and sought an order correcting that erroneous determination. The second suggested that the government had improperly asserted jurisdiction over the property that he forfeited in the original case, United States v. Brown, No. 01–cr–10012 (W.D.La. Apr. 8, 2003), and his third concerned the DOJ's refusal to respond to a petition he sent asking them to promulgate clear and concise rules for United States Attorney's Offices (“USAO”) to determine when it is proper to prosecute someone under the Controlled Substances Act. Compl. The only FOIA claim plaintiff brought at that time was related to recordings of an FBI buy-bust that plaintiff alleges he was subject to, recordings which plaintiff claims would show that he was not part of the drug trade. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the APA claims; that some of his claims were barred by claim preclusion; that defendant failed to state a claim under the APA; and that plaintiff could not impliedly invalidate his criminal conviction through civil suit. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Nov. 8, 2010, ECF No. 11 (“Mot. Dismiss”). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the FOIA claim, Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 15 (“Part. Summ. J.”), a motion to strike the motion to dismiss, and a motion for more definite statement for that motion, Mot. Strike and Mot. More Definite Statement, ECF No. 16 (“Mot. Strike”).

On November 30, 2010 plaintiff amended his complaint, adding a FOIA claim against the Bureau of Prisons for failing to provide administrative records for Program Statement 5217.01, which describes the rules and aims of the SMUs. Am. Compl. 5. Mr. Brown also included an APA claim against BOP for failing to respond to his petition to repeal Program Statement 5217.01. Id. Two weeks later plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint in which he sought to add seven additional FOIA claims against a variety of agencies. Second Am. Compl. 5–7. Defendant Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) moved to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint on December 20, Def. Federal Bureau of Prisons' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 22 (“BOP Mot. Dismiss”), and opposed his motion to amend on January 3, 2011. Plaintiff then filed a motion for preliminary injunction on Feb. 10, 2011, asking the Court to enjoin BOP from including plaintiff in the SMU, which Brown claimed constituted torture and forced psychological treatment, Mot. Prelim. Inj.

III. DISCUSSION

Before the Court are defendants' Motion(s) to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 11, 22, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike/Motion for a More Definite Statement, ECF No. 16, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend, ECF No. 21, and Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction/Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 29. For the reasons set out below, the Court will deny all of plaintiff's motions excepting his motion for leave to amend, which will be granted as to Claim XII against the Tax Division of the DOJ. The Court will grant defendants their motions to dismiss, although not insofar as they request that defendant FBI be dismissed from the case.

A. Plaintiff's Standing to Assert APA Claims

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), and a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for dismissal presents a threshold challenge to a court's jurisdiction. Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987). In evaluating such a motion, the Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Wilson v. District of Columbia, 269 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.D.C.2010) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993)), and should review the complaint liberally while accepting all inferences favorable to the plaintiff. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C.Cir.2004). At the same time, the Court may consider relevant materials outside the pleadings, Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1107 (D.C.Cir.2005), and must remain cognizant that “the plaintiff's factual allegations in the complaint will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state...