Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 85773.,SC 85773. |
| Citation | 150 S.W.3d 287 |
| Parties | Kevin S. BROWN and Melody L. Brown, Respondents, v. FIRST HORIZON HOME LOAN CORP., Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Fritzlen, Jr., Kansas City, for appellant.
James R. Tweedy, Bloomfield, for respondents.
Kevin and Melody Brown borrowed money from First Horizon Home Loan Corp. A deed of trust secured the loan. The Browns paid the loan in full. They sent a demand letter to Home Loan requesting a release of the real estate. Home Loan filed the release with the recorder of deeds. The release was recorded 32 days after Home Loan received the Browns' demand letter.
The Browns filed suit, alleging that Home Loan failed to comply with section 443.1301, which requires the release to be delivered to the person making satisfaction within 15 business days after the request. The Browns sought judgment for the statutory 10% penalty. Home Loan attacked the validity of section 443.130. The trial court sustained the Browns' motion for summary judgment. Home Loan appeals. This Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const. article V, section 3. Because the demand letter did not sufficiently track the statutory requirements of section 443.130, the judgment is reversed.
As this Court recently noted in Garr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. banc 2004): section 443.130 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Any demand letter purporting to invoke section 443.130 should closely track the language of the statute to place the mortgagee on notice that the statutory demand is being made.
While no particular language is specifically required to be included in the letter, the letter must somehow put the lender on notice that a demand is made under section 443.130. The Browns' letter has neither a reference to section 443.130 nor the 15 business days Home Loan has to respond. The person making satisfaction is not identified. No demand is made that the release be given to the person making satisfaction rather than filing the release with the recorder of deeds. As in Garr, in this case the Browns' letter as a whole does not place Home Loan on notice that demand is made under section 443.130.
The judgment is reversed.
WOLFF, STITH, PRICE and LIMBAUGH, JJ., and CALLAHAN, Sp.J., concur.
TEITELMAN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
1. All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000.
RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Section 443.130.2 requires only that a mortgagor send a demand letter to the mortgagee by certified mail, return receipt requested. The only statutory requirements for the content of the demand letter are that it "include good and sufficient evidence that the debt secured by the deed of trust was satisfied with good funds" and that the mortgagor advance funds for "the expense of filing and recording the release...." Section 443.130.2. "[N]o particular form of words is necessary for the demand; it is sufficient if it informs the mortgagee with reasonable certainty that an entry of satisfaction of the particular mortgage is requested." Martin v. STM Mortgage Co., 903 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo.App.1995); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Section 474c (1949).
In this case, the Browns' demand letter complied with all statutory requirements for a valid demand letter and reasonably informed Home Loan that the plaintiffs were requesting a deed of release under section 443.130. The Browns sent the demand letter via certified mail, return receipt requested. The Browns requested a deed of release because the debt was satisfied. As expressly required by the statute and referenced in the demand letter, they enclosed funds for the expense of filing and recording the deed of release. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that Home Loan, a large, sophisticated mortgage lender, had no notice that the Browns were invoking the Missouri statute that enforces a mortgagee's right to a deed of release upon satisfaction of the mortgage.
In support of its conclusion, the majority identifies four aspects of the demand letter that prevented Home Loan from being put on notice that the Browns were invoking section 443.130.
First, the majority notes that Browns' letter did not reference section 443.130. Section 443.130 only requires that...
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