Brown v. Ford, 83-96

Decision Date26 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 83-96,83-96
Citation658 S.W.2d 355,280 Ark. 261
Parties, 36 UCC Rep.Serv. 1819 Idonia M. BROWN, Appellant, v. Jerry J. FORD and Alvin Ford, Jr., dba Lakeshore Motor Company, Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Legal Services of Arkansas by Gilbert L. Glover and Mary W. Cochran, Little Rock, for appellant.

James W. Haddock, Lake Village, for appellee.

ADKISSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal arises from a deficiency judgment rendered against appellant, Idonia Brown, on an installment sale contract representing the deferred purchase price of an automobile sold by appellee, Lakeshore Motor Company, hereinafter Lakeshore.

The points upon which Appellant Brown relies for reversal are that the trial court erred: (1) in ruling that Lakeshore disposed of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner; (2) in finding the notice of private sale was sufficient; (3) in granting the full amount requested for repair and maintenance expense; and (4) in failing to award appellant damages on her counterclaim under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-9-507(1) (Supp.1983). On appeal we affirm.

On July 21, 1978, Brown bought a 1978 Ford Pinto automobile from Lakeshore. Brown executed an installment sale contract for the unpaid purchase price. Subsequently, Lakeshore assigned the contract to Ford Motor Credit Company, hereinafter Ford Credit. On July 2, 1980, Ford Credit repossessed the automobile after Brown failed to make the required payments. Brown received notice from Ford Credit on July 2, 1980, that the car was on Lakeshore's lot, that it would be sold at private sale anytime after ten days from the date of notice, and that Brown would be liable for any deficiency arising from the resale of the car. On September 2, 1980, Lakeshore repurchased the contract from Ford Credit for the amount due thereon, pursuant to the repurchase agreement.

When repossessed, the car had extensive physical damage to grill, roof, hood, and doors. On repurchase, Lakeshore exhibited the car on its used car lot and tried to sell the car both at wholesale and retail in its damaged condition. After no bids were obtained, Lakeshore began necessary repairs in order to market the car. The car was eventually resold on October 31, 1981, approximately 16 months after the repossession.

Brown first argues that Lakeshore failed to sell the collateral within a commercially reasonable time. In determining the commercial reasonableness of a sale we must consider the reasonableness of method, time, place, and terms. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-9-504(3) (Supp.1983). The uncontroverted testimony was that upon repurchase the appellee immediately began trying to sell the automobile to wholesalers and individual purchasers. After being unable to interest a buyer, the appellee began repairs on the car. Apparently, Lakeshore did everything it could do to sell the vehicle as quickly as possible. Brown offered no proof as to what other steps Lakeshore could have taken to sell the car. Therefore, we must affirm the trial court in its finding that the 16 month delay in reselling the car was commercially reasonable.

Brown next argues that the notice given by Ford Credit was insufficient for a sale held by Lakeshore 16 months later. We do not agree. The secured party has only a duty to give reasonable notice of the time after which any private sale will be made. A second notice is not...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Gaynor v. Union Trust Co., 14001
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 d2 Novembro d2 1990
    ...Illinois law); Piper Acceptance Corporation v. Yarbrough, 702 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir.1983) (under Arkansas law); Brown v. Ford, 280 Ark. 261, 264, 658 S.W.2d 355 (1983); Western National Bank of Colorado Springs N.A. v. VFW Post 8103, 660 P.2d 919, 920 (Colo.App.1983); Ford Motor Credit Co.......
  • Ford & Vlahos v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 20 d1 Setembro d1 1993
    ...but this is irrelevant because Ford supported its allegations of unreasonableness with competent expert testimony. Brown v. Ford (1983) 280 Ark. 261, 658 S.W.2d 355, 357, shows that expenses may be proven by evidence on the condition of the collateral before and after the expenses were incu......
  • City Nat. Bank of Ft. Smith v. Unique Structures, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 9 d2 Abril d2 1991
    ...all of the information required by Arkansas law. More specifically, they contend that the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ford, 280 Ark. 261, 658 S.W.2d 355 (1983), established that a notice for private sale must, at a minimum, (1) advise the debtor that the collateral will be sold any ......
  • Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v. Stratton
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 16 d4 Abril d4 1987
    ...678 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo.App.1984); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc.2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1969). Cf. Brown v. Ford, 280 Ark. 261, 264, 658 S.W.2d 355 (1983) (notice from financier which stated that dealer would sell car but car could be redeemed prior to sale by paying finance......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT