Brown v. Gaydos
| Decision Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1132 WDA 2021 |
| Parties | JOHN BROWN Appellant v. GEORGE GAYDOS, AN INDIVIDUAL, T/D/B/A GAYDOS CONSTRUCTION |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Before this Court is the appeal of John Brown ("Plaintiff") from the April 16, 2021 order granting George Gaydos's ("Defendant") motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's action against Defendant on the grounds that it was barred by the employer and co-employee immunity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA"). See 77 P.S. § 72, 481(a). We agree with the trial court that Defendant is immune from suit as Plaintiff's co-employee, and therefore we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
The facts underlying this matter are not in dispute. For approximately 8 years prior to Plaintiff's workplace injury that forms the basis of this suit, Defendant had worked in the contracting field through a sole proprietorship, Gaydos Construction. Defendant never hired employees through Gaydos Construction and therefore never obtained workers' compensation insurance. During the period when Defendant was operating his sole proprietorship, he purchased a John Deere skid loader-a piece of equipment that resembles a small bulldozer-and used the skid loader on Gaydos Construction jobs.
In April 2016, Defendant and his cousin, Mark Raymond, entered into a partnership agreement and formed American Concrete Solutions, LLC ("ACS"). In addition to Defendant and Raymond, ACS hired additional employees and maintained a workers' compensation insurance policy. While Defendant had performed various kinds of contracting work, including heating, air conditioning, and masonry through his sole proprietorship, ACS focused exclusively on concrete and paving jobs.
On September 1, 2016, Plaintiff was employed by ACS and working on an ACS paving project at a building in Pittsburgh. Defendant had brought the skid loader to the job site with the understanding that he was the only individual who was permitted to use it for the job. On the date of the incident, Defendant was at the job site first thing in the morning and then left to pay a vendor for materials. During Defendant's absence, Plaintiff attempted to enter the skid loader in order to use it for the paving project, but the arm of the skid loader activated, crushing him between the bucket and the top of the cab.
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries, and he subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. On September 12, 2016, ACS issued a notice of temporary compensation payable, accepted Plaintiff's injuries as compensable under the WCA, and began paying indemnity and medical benefits to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 31, 2018 by filing a complaint alleging that Defendant was negligent by improperly maintaining the skid loader and failing to supervise or train Plaintiff to use the piece of equipment.[1]On October 3, 2018, Defendant filed an answer and new matter, in which he asserted that he was immune from suit under the WCA. After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following oral argument, the trial court initially entered an order denying both motions. Defendant moved for reconsideration, and on April 16, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal.[2]
Appellant presents two issues for our review:
Plaintiff's Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
The issue of whether the record supports the grant of summary judgment is a question of law as to which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. In re Risperdal Litigation, 223 A.3d 633, 639 (Pa. 2019); Salsberg v. Mann, 262 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). Accordingly, we need not defer to the determinations made by the trial court. Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).
"[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Risperdal Litigation, 223 A.3d at 639 (citation omitted). In addressing a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Salsberg, 262 A.3d at 1269. "If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment should be denied." Id. (citation omitted).
In this matter, the trial court ruled that Defendant was immune from Plaintiff's common-law claims on two grounds. First, the court concluded that Plaintiff's action was barred by the employer immunity provision of the WCA, 77 P.S. § 481(a), which provides that the WCA shall be the exclusive remedy to seek compensation from an employer for workplace injuries. Trial Court Opinion, 7/13/21, at 3-5. While recognizing that ACS was required to pay Plaintiff workers' compensation benefits, the court found that Defendant, as an owner of ACS, was also an employer under the WCA because Defendant was authorized to make decisions regarding the management and operation of ACS and Defendant determined the equipment needed for ACS jobs, as well as the manner of the equipment's use. Id. at 3-4. The trial court further determined that the "dual capacity" exception to employer immunity is not applicable because it is nearly impossible to separate Defendant's role as Plaintiff's boss from Defendant's role as the owner of the skid loader, the piece of equipment on which Plaintiff was injured. Id. at 4-5.
In the alternative, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff's suit was barred pursuant to the co-employee immunity provision of the WCA, 77 P.S. § 72. Trial Court Opinion, 7/13/21, at 5-6. The trial court observed that co-employee immunity applies to managerial employees and that Defendant brought the skid loader to the job site in his role as a manager of ACS. Id. at 6. Moreover, there was no allegation that Defendant committed an intentional wrong, which would render co-employee immunity inapplicable. Id.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant was entitled to immunity under the WCA as Plaintiff's employer or as his co-employee. With respect to employer immunity, Plaintiff notes that he was employed by and received his paychecks from ACS, "which is a legal entity distinct and separate from" Defendant. Plaintiff's Brief at 17. Furthermore, as a partial owner of that limited liability company ("LLC"), Defendant was not personally responsible for ACS's debts and liabilities or for procuring workers' compensation insurance for ACS's employees. Therefore, as Defendant was not Plaintiff's employer, Plaintiff contends that the dual capacity doctrine is irrelevant to this action as it only stands as an exception to the general rule of employer immunity under the WCA.[3]
Rather than suing Defendant as an owner or manager of ACS, Plaintiff asserts that his claims were instead brought against Defendant in his role as the owner of the skid loader that proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff maintains that the skid loader was an asset of Defendant's sole proprietorship, Gaydos Construction, and Defendant loaned the piece of equipment from Gaydos Construction to ACS for Defendant's exclusive use on the job site. According to Plaintiff, "the loaned instrumentality was essentially provided by an independent contractor that owed a duty of care to properly maintain it and to supervise its use and operation." Id. at 18. "Indeed, as the owner and insurer of the skid loader, Defendant was, individually, the guarantor of its safety and fitness for use-not ACS or its member/owners." Id.
Plaintiff further argues that the co-employee immunity provision of the WCA is inapplicable here. Plaintiff asserts that he is not suing Defendant as his ACS co-employee but rather as the owner of the skid loader and the operator of his separate sole proprietorship. Plaintiff contends that, by virtue of the fact that Defendant brought the skid loader to the ACS work site and instructed the other ACS workers that only he was permitted to use the equipment, Defendant was individually liable for harms caused by the skid loader separate and apart from his responsibilities through ACS.
As a threshold matter, we must first address the issue of whether Defendant falls within the definition of an employer under the WCA. Section 303(a) of the WCA provides that the statutory scheme provided therein is the exclusive remedy by an injured worker:
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