Salsberg v. Mann

• Decision Date: 15 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 623 EDA 2019,623 EDA 2019
• Parties: Cara SALSBERG, Appellant v. Donna MANN and Drexel University
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

262 A.3d 1267

Cara SALSBERG, Appellant

v.Donna MANN and Drexel University

No. 623 EDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 2, 2021

Filed September 15, 2021

Timothy M. Kolman, Penndel, for appellant.

Charlene A. Barker, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.:

Cara Salsberg appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of Donna Mann and Drexel University. On appeal, Salsberg contends that the trial court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on her claim for intentional interference with her at-will employment contract. We affirm.

Salsberg was hired by Drexel University as a tax accountant in the Office of Tax Compliance, where she worked under the supervision of Mann. During the course of her employment, Salsberg received mostly positive performance reviews from Mann. Salsberg's performance reviews often indicated that she either met or exceeded expectations. As a result, Salsberg was promoted to tax compliance manager.

Shortly thereafter, the professional relationship between Salsberg and Mann began to deteriorate. The parties dispute the reasons for, and the circumstances of, this deterioration. Mann claims that Salsberg failed to perform like a salary exempt manager, whereas Salsberg contends that Mann's erratic workplace behavior was responsible for the breakdown in their professional relationship.

In the end, Mann and Human Resources collectively decided that terminating Salsberg was the best course of action for the University. Mann and a representative from Human Resources summoned Salsberg to a meeting. At this meeting, Salsberg was notified of Drexel's decision to terminate her employment because of deficient job performance.

Following her discharge, Salsberg filed suit against Donna Mann and Drexel University asserting three claims: (1) Mann had intentionally interfered with her contractual relations with Drexel (2) Drexel had breached an implied employment contract by firing her; and (3) both Drexel and Mann had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her through this process. Mann and Drexel University filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all counts. The trial court ultimately granted the motion in its entirety and dismissed Salsberg's complaint with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.¹

On appeal, Salsberg's only issue challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment on her intentional interference claim. See Appellant's Brief at 5.

We review the grant of summary judgment to determine whether the court erred in concluding the record indicates the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law:

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is the same as that applied by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has stated the applicable standard of review as follows: [A]n appellate court may reverse the entry of summary judgment only where it finds that the lower court erred in concluding that the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making this assessment, we review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. As our inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.

[Therefore], our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine whether the record either establishes that the material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment should be denied.

Gerber v. Piergrossi , 142 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

As an initial matter, we note that Drexel University classified Salsberg as an at-will employee. Neither party disputes this fact. The parties, however, disagree as to whether Salsberg's status as an at-will employee provides her with a claim against Mann for intentional interference with Salsberg's employment contract with Drexel.

Salsberg argues an at-will employment relationship does not defeat a claim of intentional interference with that existing employment. See Appellant's Brief at 10. She contends that a claim of intentional interference is cognizable under Pennsylvania law, even though the contract in issue is terminable at the will of the parties. See id . To support her argument, Salsberg relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 and federal district court decisions. Salsberg asserts that section 766 of the Restatement and federal case law permits an action for intentional interference with the performance of an at-will employment contract. See id ., at 13-14.

In contrast, Mann argues that Pennsylvania law does not recognize Salsberg's claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. See Appellee's Brief at 14. Salsberg had an existing at-will employment relationship with the University; therefore, Mann contends Salsberg's claim for intentional interference with a presently existing at-will relationship does not fit within the scope of this cause-of-action. See id ., at 16. Furthermore, Mann asserts that Pennsylvania courts, as well as federal courts applying Pennsylvania law, routinely reject claims based on alleged interference with an existing at-will employment relationship. See id ., at 19-20.

Our Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 in Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Epstein , 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1978). Section 766 of the Restatement defines the tort of intentional interference with existing contractual relations and provides:

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.

Rest. (2d) of Torts § 766.

To state a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:

(1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the complainant and a third party;

(2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual relationship;

(3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and

(4) the occasioning of actual damage as a result of defendant's conduct.

Phillips v. Selig , 959 A.2d 420, 429 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Rest. (2d) of Torts § 766 ).

Here, as noted above, Salsberg's argument relies primarily on § 766 of the Restatement. She claims that the Restatement "does not restrict its application to contracts of a certain kind, nor does it ever state that at-will contracts are excluded from the coverage of § 766." Appellant's Brief at 14. For that reason, Salsberg contends that there is no question that § 766 of the Restatement allows her to assert an action against Mann for intentional interference with her existing at-will employment contract. See id .

While we agree with Salsberg's assertions regarding the application of section 766 to at-will employment contracts, we also recognize that Salsberg overlooks the one crucial factor which goes to the heart of the instant appeal. That is, a section 766 claim under existing Pennsylvania law applies only to prospective at-will employment contracts, not existing ones.

This Court's decision in Hennessy v. Santiago , 708 A.2d 1269, 1279 (Pa. Super. 1998) has been recognized as the controlling precedent on the availability of a § 766 claim for an at-will employee. See Haun v. Cmty. Health Sys. , 14 A.3d 120, 125 n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2011). In Hennessy , a former at-will employee filed suit against her employer for wrongful discharge. The former employee's complaint also included a claim against a third-party for interfering with her at-will employment relationship. The Hennessy Court held that "an action for intentional interference with performance of a contract in the employment context applies only to interference with a prospective employment relationship whether at-will or not, not a presently existing at-will employment relationship." Id ., at 1279.

Pennsylvania law distinguishes between claims for intentional interference with prospective contractual relationships and existing contractual relationships. As the respective names indicate, the primary distinction between these torts lies in the first element. In distinction from a claim for interference with an existing contract, a claim for interference with a prospective contractual relationship requires merely a showing of the probability of a future contractual relationship. See Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co. 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466, 471 (1979).

Defining a prospective contractual relationship, however, is admittedly problematic because the term has an evasive quality. See Phillips , 959 A.2d at 428. Unlike an existing contractual relationship, a prospective contractual relationship "is something less than a contractual right, something more than a mere hope." Thompson Coal Co., 412 A.2d at 471. "[A]nything that is prospective in nature is necessarily uncertain." Glenn v. Point Park College , 441 Pa. 474, 272 A.2d 895, 898-99 (1971).

In this case, there was nothing prospective about Salsberg's employment relationship with Drexel. Salsberg had an existing at-will employment contract, limited by implied terms. Without...