Brown v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1897
• Citation: 28 S.E. 634,101 Ga. 80
• Parties: BROWN v. GEORGIA, C. & N. RY. CO. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

28 S.E. 634

101 Ga. 80

BROWN v. GEORGIA, C. & N. RY. CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 7, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

The mere engagement by a prospective suitor of an attorney at law upon a contingent fee does not give rise to a lien for fees in favor of the latter upon the cause of action respecting which he is employed; but, upon the filing of a suit by him a lien attaches in his favor upon such suit, in such manner as that the plaintiff and defendant are not at liberty to settle the same so as to defeat his claim for fees. If however, pending the suit, the plaintiff and defendant do in fact compromise and settle their differences, and upon the trial a nonsuit is awarded, the suit thus commenced is thereby ended; and, if another action upon the same cause be thereafter brought, the defendant may plead such settlement in bar of the renewed suit, and as well in bar of the right of plaintiff's counsel to prosecute the same for the recovery of contingent fees alleged to be due. His right to prosecute depends upon the existence of a lien in his favor. The lien being extinguished by the nonsuit, whatever would bar the plaintiff's right bars his.

Error from superior court, Clarke county; N. L. Hutchins, Judge.

Action by Samuel Brown against the Georgia, Carolina & Northern Railway Company and others to recover for personal injuries in which plaintiff's attorneys seek to enforce a lien for fees. From an order setting aside a verdict for plaintiff and granting defendants a new trial, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

E. T. Brown and S. J. Tribble, for plaintiff in error.

Erwin & Erwin, for defendants in error.

ATKINSON J.

The official report states the facts. Unless the plaintiffs in error were entitled, under paragraph 2 of section 2814 of the Civil Code, to a lien upon the original cause of action which was the basis of the suit instituted by them in the first instance, they were not authorized, in their own names, to prosecute the second action, which they instituted subsequent to the compromise effected by their client upon his own behalf with the defendant. That paragraph of the section above quoted provides that, upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such suit, judgment, or decree until the lien of claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied; and attorneys at law...