Brown v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1943
• Docket Number: No. 3177-PH.,3177-PH.
• Citation: 52 F. Supp. 913
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: BROWN, Price Adm'r, v. GLICK BROS. LUMBER CO. et al.

52 F. Supp. 913

BROWN, Price Adm'r, v. GLICK BROS. LUMBER CO. et al.

No. 3177-PH.

District Court, S. D. California, Central Division.

December 2, 1943.

Myer Symonds, of San Francisco, Cal., and John J. Ford, H. Eugene Breitenbach, and Joseph K. Coady, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Morris Lavine, of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

HALL, District Judge.

The motion to suppress and return the evidence in the Glick case is granted.

I had hoped to have time to write an extended written opinion and set forth all of my reasons; but the press of other matters will not permit it, and the parties are anxious, of course, that this matter shall get on its way.

I am mindful of the arguments that were made by the Government of the necessity for maintaining all of the guards against inflation; but at the same time I cannot escape the thought that the Bill of Rights was written into the Constitution of the United States by men who had just fought a war. They themselves had completed fighting the War of the Revolution, and drafted the Constitution and wrote the Bill of Rights. I think that they were just as conscious of the necessity for winning wars as we are today. Moreover, I think that they had actual experience in winning one, and saw the necessity for preserving the rights which they delineated in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and still have the capacity to win wars without destroying those rights.

I think the OPA has no right, either in a civil case or a criminal case — that is to say, in anticipation of either one or the other¹ — to go into a man's place of business, or his home, and there examine or take from him records of his business or his personal records. In granting this motion to suppress the evidence we are not cutting off the hands of the OPA from enforcing the law. They can still enforce the law. They can enforce it in the way Congress said they could enforce it. They can get the evidence by subpœna. They can get it in the way that every other case has to be prosecuted by the Government when it is prosecuted under the terms and limits of the Constitution. So that in making this ruling there is no striking down of the OPA, or the efforts of the Government to prevent inflation, or the declared policy of Congress. On the contrary, it is my belief that I am carrying out the express will of Congress and the determination of the whole people that the rights which are part of our liberties and freedom shall be preserved against any and every agency of the Government.

The motion to dismiss is granted.

With particular relation to this matter, I would like to have had the time to extend my reasons. However, in reading the statute I get a different notion of Paragraph (e) than apparently either the Government or the defendant. That is, Paragraph 205 (e), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e). And in granting this motion to dismiss, I am not, again, cutting off the hands of the Government, because the way I view the Act the suit can still be brought for treble damages or for thrice the amount, whatever it is, in the appropriate case.

It is clear that the Administrator may bring the action for treble damages only if the buyer is not entitled to bring the suit.

The query is then to find out when the buyer can or cannot bring the suit. And the difficulty in ascertaining that revolves around the following phrase: "* * * the person who buys such commodity other than in the course of trade or business may bring an action for $50 or for treble the amount * * *"

It is the contention of the defendant that this provision imposes a penalty, and that it is not clear from its language just when or to whom a person becomes liable for the penalty of treble damages, and that hence the Section (section 205(e) violates the constitutional right to have a penalty defined in clear and unmistakable terms, and that the provision by virtue of its lack of clarity is void.

That the imposition of treble damages is a penalty there can be no doubt. The OPA Attorney contended that a penalty can only be imposed in a criminal action. But to hold with this contention is to defy most respectable precedent. Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal.2d ___, 142 P.2d 297, 308, and authorities there cited. And it would be an affront to reason for me to hold that $5,000 collected as a fine (because a man made an overcharge) was penal because the proceeding was labelled "criminal" but that $34,695.18 collected from the defendants for the identical conduct is not penal, because the proceeding is labelled "civil". It is surely, in each instance, the compulsory payment of an arbitrary sum, in the latter case fixed by Congress, and in the former by the Court under a limit, which sum is not intended to recoup any actual damage, but is intended to punish as a deterrent.

The provision permitting the judgment for treble amounts, or $50, whichever is greater, is therefore penal in nature so far as defendants are concerned, although it may be remedial so far as the Administrator is concerned. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123; Esposti v. Rives Bros., 207 Cal. 570, 279 P. 423. But it does not necessarily follow that Section 205(e) being penal is void for uncertainty, even though there is lack of clarity.

This is so because of some well recognized rules of statutory construction; the first of which is that statutes must be interpreted if possible so as to preserve their constitutionality. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 7 L.Ed. 732; United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 9 L.Ed. 1004; New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 29 S.Ct. 304, 53 L.Ed. 613. And every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297.

The second cardinal rule is that a remedial statute must be construed with reference to the purpose of its enactments, the evils which exist, the remedy prescribed, the objects to be accomplished, and the intention of the law makers. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 20 L.Ed. 176. And even though a remedial statute imposes a penalty or forfeiture, it must be construed liberally. Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 23 L.Ed. 196, sustained Section 30 of the Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. 99, which permitted forfeiture of all interest where there was usury and recovery back of double interest paid.

Statutory construction is the drawing of conclusions which lie beyond the direct expression of the text. United States v. Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226, 27 S.Ct. 629, 51 L.Ed. 1036. And in addition to the rules above mentioned, there are others which must be kept in mind. The ones here pertinent have been stated as follows: "Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust and absurd conclusion." In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 680, 41 L.Ed. 1154. "General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486, 74 U.S. 482, 19 L.Ed. 278. "When the requisitions prescribed are intended for the protection of the citizen, and to prevent a sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of which his rights might be and generally would be injuriously affected, they are not directory but mandatory." French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 511, 80 U.S. 506, 20 L.Ed. 702. "Statutes are not to be so literally construed as to defeat the purpose of the Legislature." United States, to Use of Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U.S. 197, 26 S.Ct. 168, 170, 50 L.Ed. 437. "Where the language of the act is not clear, and is of doubtful construction, a court may well look at every part of the statute: At its title, and the mischief intended to be remedied in carrying it into effect." Denn et al. v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524, 527, 35 U.S. 524, 9 L.Ed. 519. Debates on the floor of the house of Congress (Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320, 54 S.Ct. 385, 78 L.Ed. 824 Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, at page 351, 54 S.Ct. 379, 78 L.Ed. 836), and the heading of the Statute may be considered. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 20 S.Ct. 747, 44 L.Ed. 969, see also United States Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., v. P. De Ronde & Co., 3 Cir., 7 F.2d 981.

A concise general statement of the rules of statutory construction is found in Re Sekuguchi, 123 Cal.App. 537, at page 538, 11 P.2d 655, as follows: "Every statute and Code section should be construed with reference to its purpose and the objects intended to be accomplished by it. The language will be so interpreted, if possible, as to aid the design and intent of the Legislature and to effectuate the evident objects and purposes of the law. * * *...