Brown v. Hill
| Decision Date | 20 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 14-0140 (TSC) |
| Parties | MELVIN BROWN, Plaintiff, v. SANDRA HILL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Adams, Chauvin Sealey, Bond, Parot, and Hill's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 143) and Plaintiff Melvin Brown's Second Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Defendants Chauvin Sealey and Bond (ECF No. 150). For the reasons discussed below, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion and DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
So Others Might Eat (“S.O.M.E.”) and Green Door, Inc., both community-based nonprofit organizations, provided services under contract with the District of Columbia Department of Behavioral Health (“DBH”) to District residents suffering from mental illness. See Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 99, “4th Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 19, 22, 25. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a resident of Shalom House, a facility operated by S.O.M.E., and received mental health services from Green Door.[1]
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants obtained and disclosed protected mental health information without his consent for the purpose of effecting his arrest, removal from Shalom House, and involuntary commitment. The alleged disclosures occurred when Margaret Simmons, whom Defendants identify as a Shalom House resident, see Mem. in Support of Defs. Adams, Gerlach, Chauvin, Sealey, Bond, Parot, and Hill's Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (ECF No. 143, “Defs. Mot.”) at 5, contacted DBH's Access Helpline and spoke with DBH employee David Walker, at which time Simmons “was told to contact Green Door for information concerning Plaintiff. 4th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-34. Additional disclosures of protected mental health information allegedly occurred on December 2, 2010, December 13, 2010, and December 15, 2010, during conversations between Ann Chauvin, S.O.M.E.'s Chief Medical Officer, and unidentified Green Door staff. See id. Information obtained from S.O.M.E. staff was incorporated into an “FD-12, ” the application setting forth the circumstances under which a mentally ill person is taken into custody involuntarily. See id. ¶¶ 22, 35.[2]
On January 13, 2011, three uniformed Metropolitan Police Department officers and two members of DBH's Mobile Crisis Unit arrested Plaintiff at Shalom House and transferred him to DBH's Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (“CPEP”), a crisis care facility. See Id. ¶¶ 22, 35. On January 14, 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to the Psychiatric Institute of Washington (“PIW”) and was discharged on January 19, 2011. See generally id. ¶¶ 33-43.
S.O.M.E. initiated eviction proceedings in D.C. Superior Court on February 1, 2011, and the matter was resolved without Plaintiff's eviction. Id ¶ 44.
Remaining for resolution are Count VIII (intentional infliction of emotional distress) against Ann Chauvin, Belinda Sealy, Susan Bond, John Adams, and Richard Gerlach, and Count XII (conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) against Chauvin. Plaintiff also seeks to revive Count X (substantive due process) as against Chauvin, Sealy and Bond.
“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The motion is “functionally equivalent to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Rollins v. Wackenhut Sen's., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges, 339 F.Supp.2d 26, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2004) (). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Rollins, 703 F.3d at 130 (). In other words, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
“The moving party must demonstrate its entitlement to judgment in its favor, even though the court evaluating the 12(c) motion will accept as true the allegations in the opponent's pleadings, and as false all controverted assertions of the movant.” Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 933 F.3d 751, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 2019) () (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court may not “rely on facts outside of the pleadings, must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations.” Brown v. District of Columbia, 249 F.Supp.3d 439, 442 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Maniaci v. Georgetown Univ., 510 F.Supp.2d 50, 59 (D.D.C. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court previously observed, and Defendants now argue, see Defs. Mot. at 8, that the Fourth Amended Complaint fails to state claims against Lawrence Parot, Francis Brown-McCall and Sandra Hill. Plaintiff does not contest this argument, and the court GRANTS judgment on the pleadings for Parot, Brown-McCall and Hill.
In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “falsified and embellished facts and complaints about Plaintiff to aid them in removing Plaintiff from Shalom House.” 4th Am. Compl. ¶ 93. The result of this alleged “egregious” conduct “was the intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. ¶ 94.
The parties concur that Plaintiff's IIED claim arose on January 13, 2011, the date of his arrest, removal from Shalom House, and transfer to CPEP. See Defs. Mot. at 9; Pl. Melvin Brown's Opp. To Defs. Adams, Gerlach, Chauvin, Sealey, Bond, Parot and Hill's Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (ECF No. 146, “Pl. Oppn.”) at 9. Defendants represent that Plaintiff did not name them party Defendants until he filed his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13) on November 21, 2014. See Defs. Mot. at 9; Defs. Adams, Gerlach, Chauvin, Sealey, Bond, Parot, and Hill's Reply to Pl. Opp. To Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (ECF no. 151, “Reply”) at 3. Applying a three-year statute of limitations, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's IIED claim is time-barred because the limitations period would have ended on or about January 13, 2014, several months before the First Amended Complaint was filed. Defs. Mot. at 8-9. Plaintiff responds, without argument or citation to controlling authority, that the IIED claim is timely filed because the allegations of the “Amended Complaint either relate back to or supplement the original [C]omplaint[.]” Pl. Oppn. at 9.
Defendants are mistaken in representing that none of them were named a Defendant until the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's original Complaint (ECF No. 1, “Compl.”) identifies Sandra Hill, Susan Bond, Belinda Sealey, Lawrence Parot, Ann Chauvin, Richard Gerlach and Margaret Simmons in its caption, see Compl. at 1, and most of the Complaint pertains to the release of protected mental health information without Plaintiff's consent. While Plaintiff's transfer to CPEP and eviction from Shalom House are mentioned only briefly, see id. at 4, Defendants' alleged efforts to have Plaintiff removed from Shalom House figure prominently, see id. at 4-5. That said, Defendants would not necessarily have been on notice of the IIED claim when the original Complaint was filed: summonses were not issued and served because the court dismissed the original Complaint sua sponte on January 30, 2014.
It appears that the IIED claim would be timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim . . . that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. (c)(1)(B). But whether or not the Fourth Amended Complaint is timely, the court finds that it fails to state an IIED claim upon which relief can be granted.
“In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants, which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Williams v. District of Columbia, 9 A.3d 484, 493-94 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Futrell v. Dep't of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 808 (D.C. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An IIED claim survives a motion to dismiss if a plaintiff alleges “conduct that was ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'” Id. (quoting Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991)); Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C. 1997).
To continue reading
Request your trial