Brown v. Jerding

• Decision Date: 23 September 2020
• Docket Number: S-20-0032
• Citation: 472 P.3d 1038
• Parties: Terrance W. BROWN, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Siobhan E. JERDING, Appellee (Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

472 P.3d 1038

Terrance W. BROWN, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.Siobhan E. JERDING, Appellee (Respondent).

S-20-0032

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 23, 2020

Representing Appellant: Terrance W. Brown, pro se.

Representing Appellee: Siobhan E. Jerding, pro se.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Siobhan Jerding was married when she had a child (MFJ) with Terrance Brown. The birth certificate listed Ms. Jerding's husband as the child's father. Mr. Brown later filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and to change the child's surname to "Brown." Ms. Jerding opposed any change to MFJ's surname. The district court held a trial and made findings as to Mr. Brown's paternity and other matters but requested supplemental briefing on the issue of the name change. After Ms. Jerding failed to submit her brief, the court entered an order granting Mr. Brown's motion to change the child's name to "Brown." Ms. Jerding filed a W.R.C.P. 59 motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment. The district court amended its order, requiring that MFJ's name not be changed. Mr. Brown appeals, pro se, and we reverse.

ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. Brown presents four issues on appeal. We rephrase and consider only one.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted appellee's W.R.C.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment?

FACTS

[¶3] Ms. Jerding was married to someone else when she entered into a romantic relationship with Mr. Brown in 2016.¹ Later that same year, Ms. Jerding gave birth to MFJ.

[¶4] Ms. Jerding informed Mr. Brown that he was the father, and a paternity test confirmed he was the biological father. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-705. He filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, and visitation and requested that MFJ's surname be changed to "Brown." Ms. Jerding filed a response and counterclaim admitting Mr. Brown's paternity but opposing any change of the child's name.

[¶5] At trial, Mr. Brown orally renewed his petition to change the child's name to Brown. After the trial, the court entered a Decree of Paternity but reserved its decision on the name change. It asked the parties to brief that issue—the only remaining issue. The Decree of Paternity provided "The issue of [Mr. Brown's] request to change the minor child's name will be determined by a separate order after briefing by the parties." Ms. Jerding did not brief the issue.

[¶6] On October 11, 2019, the district court entered its Order Granting Petitioner's Motion Pursuant to W.S. § 35-1-411(c) (Order Amending Birth Certificate ).² The court found that at trial Mr. Brown had requested "his name and the surname of the child ... be entered on the certificate of birth in accordance with this Court's Order establishing his paternity." (Emphasis added.) The court "reviewed the file and the applicable statute" and found that, "having advised [Ms. Jerding] to brief the issue and the brief not being submitted ... [Mr. Brown's] [m]otion should be granted." It concluded:

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Terrance W. Brown's paternity having been established to MFJ ..., the Court hereby directs that the name of the father and surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate of birth in accordance with the finding and order of the Court pursuant to W.S. § 3[5]-[1]-411(c).

[¶7] On November 8, 2019, Ms. Jerding filed a Motion for New Trial or to Alter or Amend "Order Granting Petitioner's Motion Pursuant to W.S. § 35-1-411(c)" in Accordance with W.R.C.P. 59(b) and (e) (Rule 59 Motion). She asserted that the Order Amending Birth Certificate was unclear as it pertained to MFJ's surname. She argued that changing MFJ's surname required a finding of good cause, and the district court had made no such finding.³ Ms. Jerding noted that the child was three years old and had always gone by MFJ. She requested a new trial if the Order Amending Birth Certificate was interpreted as directing the name change. In the alternative, she asked the court to "alter or amend the [Order Amending Birth Certificate ] to clarify that it only provides for the placing of [Mr. Brown's] name on the minor child's birth certificate and nothing more."

[¶8] On November 14, 2019, without hearing and before Mr. Brown submitted his response, the district court granted Ms. Jerding's Rule 59 Motion to alter or amend the judgment and entered an Order Clarifying the "Order Granting Petitioner's Motion Pursuant to W.S. § 35-1-411(c)" entered on October 11, 2019 (2019 Clarifying Order ). It found the Order Amending Birth Certificate "should be clarified" and went on to state:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the "Order [Amending Birth Certificate ]" entered is meant to provide that the proper authority issuing the original birth certificate (e.g. Wyoming Department of Health, Vital Statistics Services) shall issue a new birth certificate for the minor child, [MFJ], born [xx/xx/2016], reflecting that Petitioner, Terrance W. Brown, is the father of the minor child.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no other changes to the minor child's birth certificate are justified.

[¶9] Mr. Brown timely appealed the 2019 Clarifying Order .

DISCUSSION

[¶10] Mr. Brown argues that the Order Amending Birth Certificate should be "restored." He contends Ms. Jerding's Rule 59 Motion allowed her to relitigate issues already decided, and if she opposed the child's name change, she should have submitted a brief following trial. While he presents many additional arguments,⁴ our finding that the district court erred in granting Ms. Jerding's Rule 59 Motion is dispositive. We decline to address the remainder of Mr. Brown's claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11] The decision to alter or amend a judgment following a Rule 59(e) motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Dudley v. Franklin , 983 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Webber v. Mefford , 43 F.3d 1340, 1345 (10th Cir. 1994) ); see also Lake v. D & L Langley Trucking, Inc. , 2010 WY 75, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 589, 592 (Wyo. 2010). "Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Ianelli v. Camino , 2019 WY 67, ¶ 20, 444 P.3d 61, 66 (Wyo. 2019) (citations omitted).

"Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did[.]" Three Way, Inc. v. Burton Enters., Inc. , 2008 WY 18, ¶ 18, 177 P.3d 219, 225 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Armstrong v. Hrabal , 2004 WY 39, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wyo. 2004) ). "The burden is upon the person losing the motion to establish an abuse of discretion." Id.

ANALYSIS

[¶12] W.R.C.P. 59(e) permits a party to move to "alter or amend a judgment [within] 28 days after the entry of the [final order]." W.R.C.P. 59(e).

The purpose of a rule authorizing a motion to alter or amend is to allow a trial judge the opportunity to correct prior errors after the entry of judgment. A judgment may be amended where the amendment takes nothing from and adds nothing to the original judgment.

49 C.J.S. Judgments § 361, at 448 (2009) (footnotes omitted). However, the rule does not "confer unbridled freedom nor authorize a second review of a judgment." Id. ; In re Estate of Nielsen , 2011 WY 71, ¶ 12, 252 P.3d 958, 961 (Wyo. 2011) (finding a party may not seek "reconsideration" of the district court's prior judgment under the guise of W.R.C.P. 59(e) ), overruled on other grounds by Essex Holding, LLC v. Basic Properties, Inc. , 2018 WY 111, ¶ 34, 427 P.3d 708, 718 (Wyo. 2018). In Essex , we overruled our cases requiring a substantive review of a motion to amend or alter a judgment in order to toll the time for filing an appeal. We did not change the basis for a W.R.C.P. 59(e) motion:

[A] motion to alter or amend as a motion that rests on one of three appropriate grounds: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence not available at the time the case was originally heard; or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.

Essex , ¶ 30, 427 P.3d at 717 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). None of these grounds are present here. A motion to alter or amend a judgment is not an appropriate method to set aside what has been determined, nor to correct a judicial error or make a new adjudication. In re Marriage of Johnson , 2011 MT 255, ¶ 16, 362 Mont. 236, 262 P.3d 1105, 1108.

[¶13] "[T]he general rule is that a court may not amend a judgment in a matter of substance or in a manner involving the exercise of judicial discretion on the merits." 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 363, at 451. To determine whether an amendment is "substantive," we look to whether the motion seeks a revision which "disturbs or revises legal rights and obligations that were settled by the previous judgment." 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 636, at 14 (2017) (footnote omitted); Maxus Energy Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States , 31 F.3d 1135, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing "substantive" modifications in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ).

[¶14] The district court's final judgment granted Mr. Brown's motion to change the child's name. It specifically noted that Ms. Jerding had not filed a brief opposing the child's name change. The district court's order directed that the name of the father and the child's surname should be entered on the birth certificate in accordance with the findings of the court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-1-411(c).

[¶15] In its 2019 Clarifying Order , the district court revised the original order by ruling that MFJ's name not be changed.⁵ "[A] judgment may be amended by the court only when the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment." Tunstall v. Stierwald , 2001-1765, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02) 809 So. 2d 916, 920.

[¶16] While the court can...