Brown v. Johnson

Decision Date18 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-14158.,03-14158.
PartiesJohn Ruddin BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa JOHNSON, Doctor Presnell, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Job J. Milfort (Court-Appointed), Matthew M. Scoggins, III, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Beverly P. Downing, State Law Dept., Aaron Bradford Mason, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents two issues of first impression in this circuit regarding the Prison Litigation Reform Act: first, whether a prisoner, who seeks to file a complaint in forma pauperis, is barred by the PLRA from amending his complaint before either a responsive pleading or an order of dismissal has been filed; and, second, whether a prisoner who suffers from human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and hepatitis and alleges both withdrawal of treatment in deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and "imminent danger of serious physical injury" is barred, under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(g), from proceeding in forma pauperis because he has filed three or more frivolous lawsuits. Because nothing in the PLRA precludes a prisoner from amending his complaint before the filing of a responsive pleading, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), and the amended complaint, taken in the light most favorable to the prisoner, alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury, we reverse the dismissal of the amended complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

John Ruddin Brown entered the Georgia State Prison on November 8, 2001. His medical records showed that he had HIV and hepatitis. On September 5, 2002, Brown was examined by Dr. Walton, who noticed a decline in Brown's health and prescribed medication for HIV and hepatitis. On October 30, 2002, Brown was seen by defendant Dr. Presnell, who stopped the prescribed medication.

On June 2, 2003, Brown filed an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Lisa Johnson, Medical Administrator for the Georgia State Prison, and Dr. Presnell. Brown alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment. Brown alleged that, as a result of the withdrawal of the prescribed medications, he is suffering from prolonged skin infections, severe pain in his eyes, vision problems, fatigue, and prolonged stomach pains. Brown requested preliminary and permanent injunctions that the defendants provide him with "adequate medical care for his serious medical needs." Brown also filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis.

On July 7, 2003, the magistrate judge recommended that the petition to proceed in forma pauperis be denied and that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice because Brown had at least three strikes under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(g) for filing meritless lawsuits and had not "shown how he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint." Brown filed timely objections to the recommendation of the magistrate judge and a motion to amend his complaint. Brown argued that he suffered and continues to suffer serious injuries as a result of the complete withdrawal of treatment. He objected to the recommendation because the magistrate judge failed to construe his complaint liberally. In his amended complaint, Brown alleged that his health would deteriorate and he would die sooner because of the withdrawal of his treatment. He alleged that he is "exposed to opportunistic infections, such as pneumonia, esophageal candidiasis, salmonella,... wasting syndrome," "cirrhosis, [and] liver cancer."

On July 15, 2003, the district court denied Brown's motion to amend his complaint because Brown's complaint was subject to dismissal under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. section 1915. No responsive pleading had been filed. On August 4, 2003, the district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissed Brown's complaint without prejudice. Brown filed this appeal, and the district court granted Brown permission to proceed in forma pauperis.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1080 (11th Cir.2003). We review the interpretation of the filing fee provision of the PLRA de novo. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002). The sua sponte dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim is also reviewed de novo, and we must view the allegations in the complaint as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

The resolution of this appeal hinges on Brown's status as a prisoner, who has filed three or more frivolous lawsuits and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis; his status triggers three separate provisions of the PLRA. The first provision, 28 U.S.C. section 1915(g), bars a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis after he has filed three meritless lawsuits, unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury:

[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The second provision, 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), directs the district court to dismiss the complaint of any plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines that the complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The third provision, 28 U.S.C. section 1915A, directs the district court to dismiss the complaint of a prisoner if it fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The district court invoked two of these provisions in the dismissal of Brown's complaint. The district court ruled that section 1915 barred Brown from amending his complaint, and the district court ruled that, based on the "three strikes" rule of section 1915(g), Brown could not proceed in forma pauperis. Both conclusions were in error, and we address each in turn.

A. Whether the PLRA Bars a Prisoner From Amending His Complaint Under Rule 15(a).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend a complaint "once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). On July 9, 2003, before any responsive pleadings had been filed, but after the magistrate judge filed his report and recommendation, Brown filed a motion to amend his complaint. The motion was denied on the ground that the original complaint was subject to dismissal under section 1915.

This Court has previously determined that "[s]ection 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) does not allow the district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint without allowing leave to amend when required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15." Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 n. 5 (11th Cir.2002). The defendants correctly explain that Troville did not involve a prisoner, but that distinction is immaterial. Troville involved the dismissal of a suit by the district court, sua sponte, for failure to state a claim. Nothing in the language of sections 1915(g) and 1915A differs from section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) such that the court should not allow prisoners the same benefit of Rule 15(a) as any other litigant. The defendants cannot explain how the PLRA applies a different rule for prisoners who file in forma pauperis.

Several of our sister circuits have held that the screening provisions of the PLRA neither repeal Rule 15(a) nor preclude a court from granting leave to amend. In Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc), a California prisoner filed a complaint and then an amended complaint. After the prisoner filed his amended complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted without granting the prisoner leave to amend his complaint. After a panel affirmed, the en banc court vacated that decision and reversed the district court. The en banc court held that the "PLRA does not preclude leave to amend." Id. at 1126. Likewise, in Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794 (2d Cir.1999), the Second Circuit vacated the sua sponte dismissal of a claim by the district court because the plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis was denied an opportunity to amend his complaint. The court concluded "that a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis should be afforded the same opportunity as a pro se fee-paid plaintiff to amend his complaint prior to its dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless the court can rule out any possibility ... that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim." Id. at 796. In Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit applied the same rule and reversed a district court that had, sua sponte, dismissed a prisoner's complaint without affording him an opportunity to amend. See also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir.2002); Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 377 (D.C.Cir.2000); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir.1999). Only the Sixth Circuit has held otherwise that, "[u]nder the Prison Litigation Reform Act, courts have no discretion in permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal." McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir.1997).

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