Wooden v. Rier
| Decision Date | 13 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 16-24622-Civ-GRAHAM |
| Parties | GREGORY WOODEN, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW F. RIER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
The Plaintiff, Gregory Wooden, while confined at the Metro-West Detention Center in Miami, Florida, has filed this pro se civil rights complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (DE#1). He sues the sole Defendant, his state criminal defense counsel, Andrew F. Rier, Esquire.
Plaintiff has neither filed a motion seeking to proceed in forma pauperis nor paid the Clerk's $350.00 filing fee. However, in a separate §1983 action recently filed with this court, Wooden v. Armenteros, S.D. Fla. Case No. 16-24433-Civ-Moreno, Plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") with supporting inmate account statement. Review of that motion reveals that the Plaintiff is entitled to pauper status. Under the circumstances, by separate court order, the Plaintiff has been granted IFP status here. Thus, Plaintiff is now proceeding IFP and is subject to §1915(e)(2) screening requirements.
It is only where a Plaintiff is not proceeding IFP, that his pleadings are not subject to the screening provision of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (); see also, Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed.Appx. 939, 942 (11th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted). Regardless, whether the plaintiff is proceeding IFP or not, since Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress against governmental entities, employees, or officers, his pleadings are subject to screening under 28 U.S.C §1915A, which does not distinguish between IFP plaintiffs and non-IFP plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A; Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed.Appx. 939, 942 (11th Cir. 2007)(per curiam).
It is noted that pleadings drafted by pro se litigants must be liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)(per curiam), but the Court may review plaintiff's complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any part thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
This Cause is presently before the Court for screening of the plaintiff's Complaint (DE#1), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires that the court review "as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officers or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). On review, the district court is required to "identify cognizable claim or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint," if it "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or, seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suchrelief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(A)(b)(1), (b)(2).
In essence, §1915(A) is a screening process to be applied sua sponte and at any time during the proceedings. In reviewing the complaint, the court views all allegations as true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Complaints that lack any arguable basis in law or fact, nonetheless, may be dismissed. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044 (2001). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when the legal theories are "indisputably meritless," Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; when the claims rely on factual allegations that are "clearly baseless," Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); or, when it appears that the plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349.
Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)("The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)"). Thus, a court may dismiss a complaint if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560-61, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)(abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Additionally, the court may dismiss a case when the allegations in the complaint on their face demonstrate that an affirmative defense bars recovery of the claim. Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.2001).
In order to state a §1985 or §1983 claim, a plaintiff mustdemonstrate that (1) the defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011)(quoting Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998).
Pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1979)(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). The allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11 Cir. 1997).
To determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment indetermining whether plaintiff's proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred.1
Plaintiff sues his state defense counsel, Andrew F. Rier. (DE#1). He claims counsel has failed to file a pretrial motion to dismiss, and is working with the prosecution to send him to prison for life if Plaintiff refuses to accept a state plea offer. The Plaintiff alleges he prepared a pro se motion to dismiss, and requested counsel to adopt the motion, but counsel refused to do so. Plaintiff states his defense counsel is preventing him from lodging a defense to the charges. He further argues that defense counsel is permitting the prosecutor not to disclose the identity of the CI, nor even investigate the issue surrounding whether the police "framed" him. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, together with injunctive relief.
It is well settled law that federal courts must "look behind the label" of an inmate's pro se filings and determine whether there is any framework under which his claims might be cognizable. United States v. Nickson, 521 Fed.Appx. 867, 868 (11th Cir. 2013)(quoting, United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624-25 (11th Cir. 1990).
A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is notentitled to relief. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 290, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). "Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a remedy for deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights." Almand v. DeKalb County, Ga., 103 F.3d 1510, 1512 (11th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). Further, §1983 is not meant to replace state tort law, it is only meant to provide a remedy for violations of federally protected rights. Id. at 1513 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A successful §1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." See Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
Thus, to state a viable claim for relief in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action, the conduct complained of must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Willis v. University Health Serv's, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993). The complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff cannot maintain this §1983 action to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest, his current detention, the criminal charges against him and the pending criminal prosecution, because the Complaint is barred pursuant to the doctrines set forth in Preiser and Heck.
The Supreme Court has specifically held that a civil rights action is the appropriate course of relief for an inmate "who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody." Preiser v....
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