Brown v. Jordhal
| Decision Date | 31 May 1884 |
| Citation | 19 N.W. 650,32 Minn. 135 |
| Parties | H. D. Brown v. Ole J. Jordhal |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Freeborn county, as holder of the following instrument:
At the trial before Farmer, J., the plaintiff, having introduced evidence that he bought the note from Williamson for value before maturity, in good faith and without notice of any defence to it, admitted that the note was obtained from defendant by Williamson by fraud, and that as between those parties the note was without consideration and fraudulent. The court thereupon directed a verdict for defendant; a new trial was denied, and the plaintiff appealed.
Order affirmed.
D. R. P. Hibbs and John Whytock, for appellant.
The note states that it is "negotiable," which is an expressed declaration that it was intended to be a negotiable instrument, and not a specialty. Gen. St. 1878, c. 40, § 31, does not declare a "scroll or device" to be a seal, but merely gives it the effect of a seal "when used as such." Nothing in this note expresses any intention to make it a sealed instrument, and the fact that the word "[Seal]" appears printed after the maker's name and in the line below does not show that he recognized or "used" it as such. Warren v. Lynch, 5 John. 239; Bates v. Boston & N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 10 Allen 251. Unless in the body of the instrument there is to be found some recognition of a scroll or device at the end of the maker's name, the court cannot, on inspection, determine that it was used as a seal even when placed there by the signer, still less when it is done by the printer. The instrument not needing a seal, there can be no presumption of an intention to seal it; the presumption here is the other way.
"The facility with which a seal of wax or a scroll may be fraudulently affixed to the name of the party, and the character of the instrument thereby changed, affords an unanswerable argument in favor of requiring the recognition of the seal in the body of the instrument." Cromwell v. Tate, 7 Leigh, (Va.) 301; Royal Bank v. Grand Junction R. Co., 100 Mass. 144; Austin v. Whitlock, 1 Munford, (Va.) 487; Van Santwood v. Sandford, 12 John. 197; Newbold v. Lamb, 2 Southard, (N. J.) 449; Williams v. Starr, 5 Wis. 534, 549; Lee v. Adkins, 1 Ala. (Minor,) 187.
Lovely & Morgan, for respondent, upon the point that the instrument was sealed and therefore not negotiable, cited Helfer v. Alden, 3 Minn. 232, (332;) Mann v. Sutton, 4 Rand. (Va.) 253; Clegg v. Lemessurier, 15 Grat. (Va.) 108; Trasher v. Evorhart, 3 Gill. & J. (Md.) 234, 246; Warren v. Lynch, 5 John. 239; Clark v. Farmers' Mfg. Co., 15 Wend. 256; 2 Bl. Com. 305-7.
They also argued that the instrument was not negotiable, because uncertain as to time of payment, citing Jones v. Radatz, 27 Minn. 240; Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 Mich. 254, 260; Stultz v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137; Way v. Smith, 111 Mass. 523; Hubbard v. Mosely, 11 Gray 170; Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass. 121; Woodbury v. Roberts, 13 N.W. (Iowa,) 312; Miller v. Poage, 56 Iowa 96; Smith v. Van Blarcom, 45 Mich. 371; Chouteau v. Allen 70 Mo. 290, 339.
The defendant executed an instrument in the form of a negotiable promissory note, except that after and opposite the signature were brackets, and between them the word "seal," thus, "[Seal.]" The question in the case is, is this a negotiable promissory note, so as to be entitled to the peculiar privileges and immunities accorded to commercial paper? The rule that an instrument under seal though otherwise in the form of a promissory note, is not (certainly when executed by a natural person, however it may be when executed by a corporation) a negotiable note, entitled to such privileges and immunities, is universally recognized, and is not disputed in this state. But the appellant contends that merely placing upon an instrument...
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