Brown v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:97-CV-16RG.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:97-CV-16RG.
• Citation: 1 F.Supp.2d 622
• Parties: Riva R. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. KNIGHT-RIDDER, INC., Gulf Publishing Company, inc. d/b/a The Sun Herald, and Swetman Security Services, inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

1 F.Supp.2d 622

Riva R. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. KNIGHT-RIDDER, INC., Gulf Publishing Company, inc. d/b/a The Sun Herald, and Swetman Security Services, inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:97-CV-16RG.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division.

September 15, 1997.

Paul R. Bencomo, Helen H. Babin, Bencomo and Associates, New Orleans, LA, John Max Edwards, Jr., for Plaintiff.

Dean C. Colson, Enid Duany Mendoza, Joseph M. Matthews, Colson, Hicks, Edison, Colson, Matthews, Porter, Korvick and Mendoza, Miami, FL, Henry F. Laird, Jr., Laird & Goff, Gulfport, MS, for Defendants Knight-Ridder, Inc./Gulf Publishing Co., Inc.

Ben E. Sheely, Aultman, Tyner, McNeese & Rufin, Ltd., Gulfport, MS, for Defendant Sweetman Security Services, Inc.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

RUSSELL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion, by Defendants Knight-Ridder, Inc. ("Knight-Ridder") and Gulf Publishing Company, Inc. ("The Sun Herald"), To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment. The plaintiff correspondingly has asks that her response be considered a crossmotion for summary judgment to the contrary.

Facts

There is very little dispute as to the facts which are material and dispositive to the subject motion. Briefly, these facts are as follows:

Defendant Knight-Ridder owns a chain of newspapers across the United States, including The Sun Herald, The Miami Herald and The Detroit Free Press.

Gulf Publishing, Inc. publishes The Sun Herald and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Knight-Ridder.

Knight-Ridder has established a program, called the Knight-Ridder Minority Scholarship Program, by which it awards scholarships to four outstanding minority high school graduates each year. The monetary amount of the award is $5000.00 per year for four years and is conditioned upon the student (a) maintaining a "B" average, (b) interning each summer at a Knight-Ridder company, and (c), upon graduation, working at a Knight-Ridder company for at least one year.

In 1988, a Knight-Ridder minority scholarship was awarded to Ya-Sin Shabazz, a resident of Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, who attended Yale University.

In 1989, a scholarship was offered to the plaintiff, Riva R. Brown, a resident of Picayune, Mississippi, who attended the University of Southern Mississippi.

During the summers of 1989 and 1990, both Ms. Brown and Mr. Shabazz worked as interns at The Sun Herald; however, after their graduations in 1993 and 1992 respectively, she began working for The Sun Herald and he was placed with The Miami Herald.

Mr. Shabazz's employment with The Miami Herald ceased in the fall of 1993 and even though he and Ms. Brown had previously enjoyed a friendly platonic relationship, upon returning to the coast, he became hostile towards her. Shabazz even reportedly broke into the plaintiff's apartment prior to the shooting incident; leading her to report her concerns regarding him to her employer.

On July 18, 1994, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Ms. Brown exited The Sun Herald's Biloxi, Mississippi, office building and proceeded to the said employer's parking lot which is located adjacent to said office building. Upon entering the parking lot Ms. Brown observed Mr. Shabazz sitting in a car behind hers and, notwithstanding her expressed fear of him, she walked toward his car. He initially avoided her by maneuvering his car in the parking lot, whereupon she returned her to car for the purpose of leaving the premises. Shabazz continued maneuvering his car in such a way as to prohibit her from driving away. Subsequently he exited his car and approached hers; whereupon she lowered her window to inquire about his intentions. At this time, Mr. Shabazz produced a shot gun which he fired at her; causing serious injuries to her arm and internal organs. She escaped further injury by exiting the car and running to The Sun Herald building where she received assistance from her co-workers. The incident occurred during daylight hours and at no time preceding the shooting did Ms. Brown attempt to alert security personnel of a possible problem.

Prior to the incident, Ms. Brown had been at work at The Sun Herald and had gone to the parking lot to get her automobile for the express purpose of leaving work and driving home. It is not disputed that she was off duty and was not engaged in any activity on behalf of Knight-Ridder or The Sun Herald.

Following her injury, the workers' compensation carrier for these moving defendants paid her the statutorily mandated amount in wages and paid her related medical bills. Additionally, the defendant, Sun Herald, on behalf of Knight-Ridder has paid to Ms. Brown the difference between what is allowed under the Mississippi Workers Compensation statutes and what she would have received as salary but for the incident. By her Supplemental Affidavit of September 2, 1997, the plaintiff asserts, in part, that "[a]t no time since July 18, 1994, [has] she ever made a claim for workers' compensation," and that "[f]or almost two years after the shooting, [she] continued to receive 100% of [her] pay." However, at no time has the plaintiff refused any benefits paid under workers' compensation. Neither has she offered to repay the approximately $120,000.00 in wages and medical benefits paid to her or on her behalf. Further, during oral arguments, the parties conceded that Ms. Brown continues to receive compensation for medical problems allegedly associated with the incident in question as well as her full salary. Ms. Brown is currently enrolled as a student at the University of Southern Mississippi in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.

Discussion

Recognizing that its singular position is that of an unbiased interpreter of the law in light of the undisputed material facts, the Court pushes from its conscious thought the feeling that this case gives credence to the cynical admonition that "no good deed will go unpunished." This is, after all, a simple matter of an individual who wishes to be made whole, insofar as money may obtain (or substitute for) such optimum desires. One need only read the plaintiff's article: There is a purpose for my writing and for my life, published in The Sun Herald and made Exhibit 5 to the movants' Rebuttal Memorandum, to conclude that she is a person possessed of high moral principle who strives to make the best of her opportunities.

I. Summary Judgment versus Motion to Dismiss

During oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for defendant Sun Herald engaged in some discussion as to whether this matter is subject to treatment as a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. Seemingly the parties reconciled their differences; however, the Court wishes to make it clear that as the Court has considered all exhibits placed before it as well as those matters asserted during oral argument, the matter will be considered a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit addressed the law as regards summary judgment and stated that "[t]he mere existence of a factual dispute does not by itself preclude the granting of summary judgment. `[T]he requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. [242], [248], [106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202] (1986) (emphasis in original)." (citations omitted).

The Fifth Circuit has addressed when an issue is genuine.

[A]n issue is genuine if the evidence supporting its resolution in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, together with any inferences in such party's favor that the evidence allows, would be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of that party. If, on the other hand, the evidence offered by both the moving and opposing parties would support only one conclusion and, even if all the evidence to the contrary is fully credited, a trial court would be obliged to direct a verdict in favor of the moving party, the issue is not genuine.

Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir.1986) (footnotes omitted).

The United States Supreme Court further stated in Liberty Lobby that as to materiality, "[o]nly disputes over the facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.

The Supreme Court has noted that the standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict, the main difference between the two being when they are used, as the inquiry under each is the same. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Barebones allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment because the opposing party `must counter factual allegations by the moving party with specific, factual disputes; mere general allegations are not a sufficient response.'" Howard v. Greenwood, 783 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co. v. H & M Construction Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir.1983)).

II. Was the Plaintiff entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits?

The liability of an employer for work related injuries is limited to the benefits provided for by Mississippi's Worker's Compensation Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-1, et seq. (1972) ("the Act"). Specifically, "[s]ection 71-3-9 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, provides that `the liability of an employer to pay compensation shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee,....'" Northern Electric Co. v. Phillips, 660 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Miss.1995)....