Brown v. Lambe

• Decision Date: 02 February 1903
• Parties: M. L. BROWN, Guardian, Etc., AND SARAH BRAITHWAITE AND JOHN H. HAAS, Administrators, Etc., Appellees, v. J. B. LAMBE, Treasurer, Etc., AND PALO ALTO COUNTY, Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

93 N.W. 486

119 Iowa 404

M. L. BROWN, Guardian, Etc., AND SARAH BRAITHWAITE AND JOHN H. HAAS, Administrators, Etc., Appellees, v. J. B. LAMBE, Treasurer, Etc., AND PALO ALTO COUNTY, Appellants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 2, 1903

Appeal from Palo Alto District Court.--HON. A. D. BAILIE, Judge.

ACTION in equity to restrain the defendant Lambe, who is treasurer of Palo Alto county, from proceeding to enforce the collection of certain taxes. An answer was filed, consisting of three divisions, to the second and third of which a demurrer was interposed and sustained. From the ruling thereon, the defendants appeal.--Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.

E. A Morling and F. C. Davidson for appellants.

Soper Allen & Alexander and W. H. Wilson for appellees.

OPINION

BISHOP, C. J.

It is conceded that the questions raised by the second division of the answer, and the demurrer thereto, are fully determined adversely to the ruling upon the demurrer by our holding in the recent cases of Galusha v. Wendt, 114 Iowa 597, 87 N.W. 512, and Bell v. Stevens, 116 Iowa 451, 90 N.W. 87. It follows that as to such division of the answer the ruling of the court below upon the demurrer must be reversed.

II. The allegations of the petition, as far as material to an understanding of the matters alleged in the third division of the answer, are that plaintiff Brown is the guardian of the property of one Titterington, an insane person; that, as alleged, said Titterington has never been a resident or citizen of the State of Iowa but at all times has been a resident and citizen of the state of Illinois; that in August, 1900, the defendant Lambe, treasurer of said county, acting upon information furnished by tax ferrets, so called, proceeded to, and did, assess and levy taxes upon a large amount of personal property said to be owned by said Titterington, and withheld from assessment and taxation, for the years 1896 and 1897, and interest, as provided by law. It is further alleged that said Titterington was an unmarried man, that he owned real estate in Palo Alto county, and that he spent much of his time with a tenant named Moore on his farm in said county. The personal property alleged to be owned by Titterington consisted principally of moneys and credits represented by loans made to various residents of this and other states. It is the contention of appellee that the action of the treasurer was illegal and void, in that the personal property owned by Titterington could be taxed only in Illinois, the state of his legal residence. In a former division of the answer the allegation is made that for more than five years said Titterington has been a resident and citizen of Palo Alto county, and facts are pleaded from which such conclusion might be drawn.

Having said this much for a better understanding of the issue tendered, we now take up the third division of the answer. It is therein alleged that in March, 1897, Moore, the tenant of Titterington, filed an application in the district court in and for said county, setting forth that Titterington had made his home with applicant; alleging the residence of said Titterington to be in said county, and that the same had so been for more than five years; that said Titterington was of unsound mind; that he held property in said county,--and praying the appointment of a guardian to take charge of such property. It is alleged that thereupon such proceedings were had that a guardian adlitem was appointed, who filed answer and made defense; that, after a hearing upon the issues joined, it was expressly found by the court that said Titterington was a resident of Palo Alto county, and had been for several years and on which finding plaintiff Brown was appointed guardian of his person and estate; and defendants aver that the foregoing proceedings constitute the title of said plaintiff to his office as guardian, and his right to the estate of his ward. Further, in the same division, the defendants aver that in 1898, in proceedings duly had before the board of commissioners of insanity in and for said county, it was found that said Titterington was a resident and had a settlement in said county, that he was insane, and thereupon he was committed to the state hospital for the insane, where he is still confined. The demurrer filed to said division of the answer is as follows: That the facts stated do not constitute a defense to plaintiff's cause of action; that the same neither constitutes a bar to the cause of action, nor an estoppel as against plaintiff.

If it shall be said that the matters pleaded in the answer are available in a defensive way, it must be for the reason that the findings of the district court in the guardianship proceedings, and of the board of insane commissioners,--one or both,--as to the place of residence of Titterington, are conclusive, and that plaintiff, as his guardian, is estopped from now asserting or making proof to the contrary. It is sometimes said that estoppels are not favored in law, but it remains true that the doctrine is a very salutary one as applied to many cases that come before the courts for determination. It is bottomed upon the thought that one should not be permitted to deny, to the legal prejudice of others, that which he has at some time before solemnly asserted to be the truth. As applied to legal proceedings,--that is, proceedings in court,--the doctrine operates in general to forbid one of the parties from gaining an advantage by shifting to a position inconsistent with that theretofore occupied by him. And this is true not only where the rights of others are concerned, but it may have application as well where good faith and fairness to the court are involved. Accordingly it is said that a party to an action is bound by the averments of his pleadings therein, and he is bound by a ruling or judgment of the court which he obtains upon his own motion, save that he may attack the same by direct application; the prayer being for a modification or to set the same aside. 2 Herman, Estoppel, section 823.

And it is said that a party may not obtain relief, in a proceeding instituted in court by him, on one basis, and then seek a new chance to litigate the same subject-matter upon a theory contrary to that relied upon by him in the first proceeding. Sweezey v. Stetson, 67 Iowa 481, 25 N.W. 741; Belanger v. Hersey, 90 Ill. 70. So, too, it has been held repeatedly that one may not relieve himself from the natural and ordinary consequences where he has invoked the jurisdiction of a court, as having reference to his liability upon a bond given, etc. Thus where one procures a writ of attachment to issue from the court of a justice of the peace and gives bond therefor as provided by law, he cannot thereafter be heard to deny his liability upon such bond on the ground that the court, while having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, had no jurisdiction of the parties, on the ground of kinship to the party plaintiff. Harbaugh v. Albertson, 102 Ind. 69 (1 N.E. 298.) And in an action brought upon a guardian's bond, one who has procured himself to be appointed as such...