Brown v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-02-00851-CV.,14-02-00851-CV. |
| Parties | Charles BROWN, L.L.P. d/b/a the Charles Brown Law Firm, Appellant, v. LANIER WORLDWIDE, INC. and Cam Edwards, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
T. Michael Neville, Houston, for appellants.
Gary R. Maze, Joseph Robert Larsen, Houston, Christen Carey, East Amherst, for appellees.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, SEYMORE and EVA M. GUZMAN.
In this suit to enforce a foreign judgment, Charles Brown, L.L.P. d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm ("Brown L.L.P."), appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, Lanier Worldwide, Inc. ("Lanier") and Cam Edwards. We affirm.
The dispute between the parties centers around an arbitration award rendered in October 1999 in favor of Lanier. The award was confirmed in a Georgia court, against Charles Brown, P.L.L.P. d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm ("Brown P.L.L.P.").1 Lanier sought to enforce the Georgia judgment in a Texas district court where Brown L.L.P. had previously filed suit against Lanier. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Lanier against Brown L.L.P and denied Brown L.L.P.'s summary judgment motion.
The parties' long and protracted legal dispute relates to an Order Agreement (the "Agreement") between the Charles Brown Law Firm and Lanier to place a copy machine in the offices of The Charles Brown Law Firm.2 On December 12, 1995, Jerry Dodson, an employee of the Charles Brown Law Firm, and Cam Edwards, a Lanier representative, negotiated the Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the parties were required to resolve any disputes through arbitration in Atlanta, Georgia.
The Charles Brown Law Firm used the copy machine for approximately three years, before Lanier removed it in early 1999.3 In June of that year, Lanier filed a written demand for arbitration in Georgia claiming the respondents, listed in Lanier's Statement of Claims as "The Charles Brown Law Firm," "Charles W.R. Brown," and Dodson, failed to make required payments under the Agreement. In response, on June 29, 1999, Brown L.L.P. filed suit against Lanier in a Texas county court (hereinafter "county court action"), asserting claims for fraud and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"). Relative to the arbitration, Brown L.L.P.'s petition stated:
Defendant has threaten (sic) and has taken steps to have this matter submitted to arbitration in Georgia, which has forced Plaintiff to file this suit.... Plaintiff requests that the Court declare that the arbitration clause be declared void and unenforceable.
Brown L.L.P. also requested a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction.4 Attached to the application was an affidavit executed by Charles Brown, averring (1) he had not signed the agreement consenting to arbitration; (2) he was the only person authorized to sign on behalf of Brown L.L.P.; and (3) if the injunction did not issue, "Charles Brown Law Firm, L.L.P. will be required to go to great expense to appear in Georgia." The temporary restraining order was granted ex parte.
On July 13, 1999, a temporary injunction hearing was conducted in the county court action on Brown L.L.P.'s application. The court held a full evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the application, including Brown's argument that, because he had not signed the Agreement, he had not agreed to arbitration.5 Following the hearing, the injunction was denied and Lanier's motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration was granted.
In an attempt to once again halt the arbitration, on August 4, 1999, Charles Brown ("Brown"), appearing pro se, filed a lawsuit virtually identical to the county court suit in the 281st District Court of Harris County (the "district court action") against Lanier. Brown alleged fraud, fraudulent inducement, and violations of the DTPA. The petition contained, in part, the following:
The Defendant is in the business of selling and leasing copy equipment and contacted an employee of Charles Brown, P.L.L.P.,6 d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm, Plaintiff, for the purpose of placing a machine in Charles Brown, P.L.L.P. d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm office....
* * *
Defendant never attempted to obtain the signature of Plaintiff either in his individual capacity or as an authorized representative of Charles Brown, P.L.L.C., the managing partner of Charles Brown, P.L.L.P. d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm....
* * *
The Defendant secured the signature of an employee of Charles Brown, P.L.L.P. on an agreement the lease or rental of a Copier, at copy of which is attached hereto (sic). The employee, Jerry Dodson, is not an employee of the Plaintiff and is not authorized to sign any agreements on behalf of the Plaintiff.
* * *
Defendant has taken steps to have this matter submitted to arbitration in Georgia, which has forced Plaintiff to file this suit.... Plaintiff requests that the Court declare that the arbitration clause be declared void and unenforceable.
(emphasis in original). Brown also requested a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction in the district court. Attached to these documents was an affidavit signed by Jerry Dodson, stating he did not have the authority to bind "Charles Brown, P.L.L.P., d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm or Charles Brown, Individually to a contract." Charles Brown also furnished an affidavit, stating in part: "Charles Brown, P.L.L.P., The Charles Brown Law Firm, d/b/a Charles Brown P.L.L.P. is a limited liability partnership, and I am the President of the managing partner Charles Brown P.L.L.C." Brown's request for a temporary restraining order and injunction was denied.7
On August 6, 1999, Charles W.R. Brown8 signed and sent to the American Arbitration Association a response to Lanier's Statement of Claims ("Response"). The initial paragraph of the Response states: (sic). Throughout the document, "Charles Brown, P.L.L.P." is identified as the business entity responding to Lanier's arbitration demand and is referenced as the correct legal entity to be named in the matter.9
The arbitration took place on October 4, 1999. In addition to Lanier, the Charles Brown Law Firm, Charles W.R. Brown, P.L.L.P., Brown L.L.P., and Charles Brown himself attended the arbitration,10 all appearing under protest. The resulting arbitration award, dated October 13, 1999, awarded $29,639.18 to Lanier for accelerated payments and attorney's fees, as well as prejudgment and postjudgment interest. The award contained the following finding: "LANIER WORLDWIDE, INC. and CHARLES BROWN, P.L.L.P. d/b/a CHARLES BROWN LAW FIRM did enter into and execute the Order Agreement and are therefore bound by that agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising therefrom."11
In early 2000, Brown L.L.P. sought relief from the arbitration award in the district court action and filed a petition and motion to vacate the award. Also, at that time, Lanier filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in a Georgia court. In response, The Charles Brown Law Firm, Charles W.R. Brown, P.L.L.P., Charles Brown, L.L.P. d/b/a The Charles Brown Law Firm, Charles Brown, P.C., Charles W. Brown, P.L.L.C., and Dodson filed a Special Appearance, stating in part:
The Brown Law Firm and Brown, PLLP are not legal entities and therefore are not subject to 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. In addition, Brown PLLP was not named in the "Statement of Claims" as a party in the underlying arbitration upon which Plaintiff relies for this Petition, nor was it named in the Award of the Arbitrator.
Brown, LLP denies that 9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. is applicable to it. In addition, Brown, LLP was not named in the "Statement of Claims" as a party in the underlying arbitration, upon which the Plaintiff relies for this Petition, nor was it named in the Award of the Arbitrator.12
On September 5, 2000, a hearing to confirm the arbitration award was held in the Georgia court.13 At the hearing, Lanier presented its arguments for confirmation, while the Brown entities raised those issues argued in prior proceedings. Important to this appeal, the following discourse occurred between Brown's counsel, David Davenport, and the court concerning the various names of the law firm:
(emphasis added). Lanier's counsel noted that all of the Brown entities had been served and requested judgment...
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