Brown v. Little, A95A0428

Decision Date05 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. A95A0428,A95A0428
Citation217 Ga.App. 632,458 S.E.2d 669
PartiesBROWN v. LITTLE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Paul S. Liston, Fayetteville, for appellant.

M. Byron Morgan, Jonesboro, for appellee.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff Debbie L. Brown brought this contract action against defendant Richard E. Little, alleging that on March 1, 1990, she had loaned defendant $20,000 and defendant offered to pay interest at the rate of $200 per month; that defendant had promised he would repay the loan at any time plaintiff demanded; and that on September 1, 1990, plaintiff requested that defendant repay the money but that defendant "stated he did not have the money and could not do so." The complaint also alleged that defendant had paid back "$2,300.00 out of the $7,800.00 that he should have paid to Plaintiff as interest...." Defendant denied the material allegations and subsequently amended his answer to plead the Statute of Frauds, OCGA § 13-5-30, contending that the alleged agreement "was not required to be performed within one year of its alleged making, and was based upon an alleged lending of money[.]"

The case was tried before the Superior Court of Fayette County without a jury. Plaintiff testified that she received an inheritance and that on March 1, 1990, she gave defendant (at that time her brother-in-law) her personal check for $20,000 in order to help him start a day-care center. Defendant was to repay her whenever she "asked for it back." Plaintiff expressly denied that she accepted defendant's proposition: "I'll pay you back when I can, when I have the money[.]" She "asked for a portion of the money in October of [1990,]" but acknowledged receiving only two payments totaling $2,300. In opposition, defendant acknowledged receipt of the loan but testified that his understanding of the repayment term was: "when my day care and I got in financial shape where I could pay her back, ... I'd pay her back as I could." However, on cross-examination, defendant clarified that payment "wasn't whenever [he] felt like it. It was when ... she needed money, ... if I could get a--if I could get it, even if I had to borrow it or whatever, I would give it to her." Consistent with plaintiff's testimony that she made a demand for payment in October 1990, defendant testified that he gave her $200 in cash. Defendant explained that check number 475 drawn on the account of Little Peoples Complete Day Care, Inc., while made out by defendant to himself on October 16, 1990, had been endorsed over to plaintiff. This check was negotiated under plaintiff's signature and deposited in account number 1 101 50 331.

Defendant also claimed that he repaid his loan by giving money to plaintiff's then-husband, Ray Little, who is also defendant's brother. Defendant introduced three other checks which he claimed were repayments on the loan. Defendant's personal check number 6239 was dated November 30, 1990, and made out to defendant's brother, Ray Little, in the amount of $5,000. This was negotiated under the signature of Ray Little but was not deposited in the same account into which plaintiff deposited the acknowledged $2,100 payment. Rather, it appears to have been presented for cash. A second check in the amount of $5,000 was made out to Ray Little on March 23, 1991. This was check number 880, drawn on the account of Little Peoples Complete Day Care, Inc. This check was not deposited into plaintiff's account. The third check made out to Ray Little, in the amount of $1,515.78, was drawn on defendant's personal account as of July 12, 1991. This was negotiated under the signature of Ray Little but was not deposited in the plaintiff's account. Defendant further testified that he made other payments on behalf of plaintiff, in the nature of set off. Specifically, he claimed that he "paid off one loan that they[, i.e., plaintiff and her husband,] had at the bank because they was fixing to repossess her car." According to defendant's reckoning: "I figure I still owe her around $6,000.00."

The trial court found as a matter of fact and of law that the contract alleged in the complaint was governed by the Statute of Frauds, and that no enforceable contract exists. From the judgment for defendant rendered after this bench trial, plaintiff appeals.

Held:

1. In related enumerations, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in concluding that the Statute of Frauds barred the enforcement of the oral contract. We agree.

OCGA § 13-5-30(5) requires a writing signed by the party to be charged in order to make binding on the promisor "[a]ny agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof[.]" In the case sub judice, plaintiff tendered her check (the loan money) which defendant negotiated on...

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3 cases
  • Brown v. Little
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 21 July 1997
    ...was subsequently appealed to this Court, which reversed the decision and remanded the case back to the trial court. Brown v. Little, 217 Ga.App. 632, 458 S.E.2d 669 (1995). In lieu of a new trial, both parties agreed to re-submit the case to the trial court based on the transcript from the ......
  • Bibb Distributing Co. v. Stewart, A99A0426.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 26 May 1999
    ...the one year period. This possibility was sufficient to remove the agreement from operation of the Statute. Brown v. Little, 217 Ga.App. 632, 634(1), 458 S.E.2d 669 (1995). In addition, the trustee fully performed her part of the agreement by allowing Bibb to decide whether to opt in or out......
  • Metro Atlanta Trucking Co., Inc. v. Kyzer, A95A0196
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 20 June 1995

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