Brown v. Manning

Decision Date01 January 1859
Citation3 Minn. 13
PartiesA. VANCE BROWN vs. JAMES MANNING.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
(3 Minn. R. p. 35.)

When no fraud, deceit, or mistake appears, and the contract is executed by the delivery and acceptance of a deed, the vendee cannot sue for the recovery of the purchase money on failure of title in an action for money had and received, or otherwise; but he will be left to the covenants in his deed, and if he have omitted to take covenants, he will be without remedy. 2 Kent Com. 471-6; 2 Johns. Ch. 519; 5 Paige, 300; 1 Dana (Ky.), 305; 21 Wend. 132; 25 Wend. 107. The contract, being executed, will not be rescinded. 25 Wend. 115, and authorities therein cited.

Points and authorities for defendant in error: —

1. In a case like this, a party may rescind the contract on the ground of fraud, and sue on the quantum meruit. Rickard v. Stanton, 16 Wend. 25; 6 Johns. 110; 8 Johns. 79. The whole contract, by the ingredient of fraud, is made void, and a vendee (if it were chattels) would get no title, and when it is labor, cannot claim that the labor is paid for. 1 Hill, 311; id. 302; 2 Kent Com. 469; Powell on Cont. 246; 5 T. R. 716; 12 Johns. 247; 2 Mass. 415.

2. But, fraud or no fraud, the pleadings show a total want of consideration for plaintiff's agreement to take the lot in pay for his work. The defendant agreed to give a lot he did not own as his own, and gave a lot he did not own as his own, thus seeking to pay his debts with another's property. There being then no consideration for the plaintiff's agreement to take the lot for his work, the agreement is void, and the plaintiff may recover on his quantum meruit. It is an action in analogy to the equitable one of money had and received. 2 Denio, 139.

D. C. Cooley, for plaintiff in error.

Gorman & Peckham, for defendant in error.

FLANDRAU, J.

The doctrine that where, in the absence of fraud, the grantee in a conveyance of land with covenants, &c., has obtained any benefit by the conveyance, or acquired any estate or interest whatever in the premises, he cannot set up defects, or want of title in his grantor, in defense of an action for the purchase money, nor rescind the contract and recover back what he has paid, but must rely upon his covenants, is too well settled to be now disputed; because, as Chancellor Walworth says in Tallmadge v. Wallis, 25 Wend. 115, "It is a well known fact that land is frequently conveyed with general warranty, which is warranty against eviction only, when both parties to the sale perfectly understand that the title is doubtful, or that there is some outstanding contingent interest which may, perhaps, at a future period, be the means of evicting the purchaser; and to protect the purchaser, and enable him to recover against the vendor in case of eviction, the covenant of warranty is inserted in the deed." These covenants are inserted in deeds on the supposition that there may be some outstanding title which may defeat that of the purchaser, and as his reliance and protection in such an event. See, also, 21 Wend. 131; 5 Paige, 299; 2 Johns. Ch. 519. It is also equally well...

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1 cases
  • Westman v. Krumweide
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 19, 1883
    ...First Nat. Bank v. Nat. Marine Bank, 20 Minn. 49, (63;) Barnard v. Gaslin, 23 Minn. 192; Hone v. Woodruff, 1 Minn. 303, (418;) Brown v. Manning, 3 Minn. 13, (35;) Catlin v. Fletcher, 9 Minn. 75, (85;) Moss v. Riddle, 5 Cranch, 351; Badcock v. Steadman, 1 Root, (Conn.) 87; Foley v. Cowgill, ......

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