Brown v. Metropolitan School Dist. of Lawrence Tp.
| Decision Date | 23 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. IP 95-0047-C-H/G.,IP 95-0047-C-H/G. |
| Citation | 945 F.Supp. 1202 |
| Parties | In the Matter of James and Celeste BROWN, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LAWRENCE TOWNSHIP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Thomas E. Wheeler, II, Kightlinger & Gray, Indianapolis, IN, for Lawrence Township, School Dist.
ADOPTION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT OF JUDGMENT
The Magistrate Judge having submitted his Report of Review and Recommendation, which reads as follows:
[H.I.]
and counsel having been afforded due opportunity pursuant to statute and the Rules of this Court to file objections thereto, the Court having considered the Magistrate Judge's Report and any objections thereto, and being duly advised, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation are hereby approved and adopted by the Court.
IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NOTICE OF FILING OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT OF REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION, AND PROPOSED ENTRY THEREON
You are hereby notified that the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge has this date filed the attached Magistrate Judge's Report of Review and Recommendation with the Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States District Judge, pursuant to the Order of Reference in said case.
Counsel shall have ten (10) days from the date of filing of the Report to file objections thereto. Failure to file objections will result in the waiver of the right to appeal the judgment generally or a waiver of appeal as to specific alleged errors to which objection is not made. Provident Bank v. Manor Steel Corp., 882 F.2d 258 (7th Cir.1989).
DATED THIS 4th day of January, 1996.
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Answer thereto, and Defendant's Reply Brief to Plaintiffs' Answer. Having considered the foregoing and being duly advised, the Court hereby recommends that Defendant's Motion be GRANTED.
Construing the pleadings and motions in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the facts of this case are as follows:
On September 19, 1994, while on a field trip with her fourth grade class, Sarah Brown informed her teacher that she felt ill. Ms. Brown suffers from childhood diabetes (of which her school knew) and her blood sugar tested that morning at a low level of 28 mg/dL. The teacher told Ms. Brown to eat a piece of fruit, which she did. A later blood sugar reading showed that Ms. Brown's blood sugar level had risen to 66 mg/dL.
While on the way back from the field trip, Ms. Brown began filing her fingernails with an instrument which contained a nail file, a bottle opener, and a knife with a one and one-half inch blade. Ms. Brown became upset with two students who had been harassing her during the bus ride and threatened to harm them with the instrument if they did not stop. One student told his mother, an assistant helping on the field trip, about the incident, and the parent asked for and was given the knife.
The next day, Ms. Brown's principal suspended her for five days with a recommendation of expulsion for "knowingly possessing, handling, or transmitting a knife" at a school activity. Plaintiffs were not notified of Sarah's low blood sugar reading before the incident. At Plaintiffs' request, an expulsion hearing was held on September 17, 1994. Dennis Watts, who was employed by Defendant, served as hearing examiner. Mr. Watts found that Ms. Brown should be expelled until October 31, 1994, under Ind.Code §§ 20-8.1-5-4(b)(1) and 4(b)(6), which provide for expulsion for threatening or intimidating other students and for "knowingly possessing, handling, or transmitting a knife or any other object that can reasonably be considered a weapon" at school, respectively. The school superintendent concurred with this recommendation. School personnel did not notify Mr. Watts about Ms. Brown's record of diabetes or her low blood sugar reading prior to the incident.
Sometime later, Plaintiffs found out about Sarah's low blood sugar before the incident. Plaintiffs then appealed the superintendent's decision to the Board of Education of the Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township ("the Board"), arguing that Ms. Brown's diabetes had caused her actions. Among the evidence on this claim was a letter from Sarah's endocrinologist, Dr. Meacham, which stated, in pertinent part:
At times when [Ms. Brown's] blood sugar is low, I would say below 55 mg/dL, she is likely to have some unusual behavior. Her behavior may range from lethargy or sleepiness to belligerent or obtrusive. Additionally, if blood sugars are found to be substantially low; I would say less than 40 mg/dL, a child may actually become unconscious from such a reading.
Administrative Record at 86 ("Admin.R.").
Despite Plaintiffs' claim, the Board upheld the expulsion, finding that Ms. Brown violated her school's code of conduct "by her possession of an object that could reasonably considered a weapon and by her use of that object to intimidate other students." As for the effect of Ms. Brown's diabetes on her actions, the Board found that:
[t]he evidence does not fully support Sarah's contention that her behavior was caused by her low blood sugar reading. Although the reading had been low prior to Sarah's boarding the school bus, at the time of the incident itself, her reading had risen above the 55 mg/dL level indicated by her doctor as likely to result in unusual behavior.
Defendant's Notice of Removal, exhibit B at 2. The Board also found that a hearing should be held to decide whether Ms. Brown was entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. That hearing was held on October 31. On November 21, 1994 plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of Marion County, Indiana, and Defendants subsequently removed the action to this United States District Court.
Plaintiffs appear to make five claims in their Complaint and their Preliminary Contentions. Defendant moves for dismissal of two of these claims and for summary judgment on the rest.
Plaintiffs' claims arise in part from Defendant's alleged failure to comply with Indiana's pupil discipline statute, Ind.Code § 20-8.1-5-1 et. seq. Since removal of this case, however, the legislature has implemented a new pupil discipline statute, Ind.Code § 20-8.1-5.1-3 et seq. Normally, when the legislature amends a statute during the pendency of a case, the court applies the substantive provisions of the old statute, Ind. Dept. of Env. Management, 604 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (Ind.App.1992), and the procedural provisions of the new statute. McGill v. Muddy Fork of Silver Creek Watershed Conservancy Dist., 175 Ind.App. 48, 370 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1977). But, when "new rights are given or existing rights taken away" by procedural changes, those procedural changes are not applied to pending cases. Id.
In this case, the new pupil discipline statute replaced the former "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review with a provision that a court's examination of a school board's decision upholding an expulsion "is limited to the issue of whether the governing body acted without following the procedure required under this chapter [chapter 5.1]." Ind.Code § 20-8.1-5.1-15. This change takes away plaintiffs' rights by limiting the extent to which this Court may review Defendant's decision. Therefore, the Court applies both the substantive and procedural provisions of (the former) Ind.Code § 20-8.1-5-1 et seq. in this case.
Plaintiffs' first claim is that Defendant violated the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. ("IDEA") by failing to identify Ms. Brown as "a child in need of special services." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 7. Defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies.
When considering a rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court "must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." The court "may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). While "exhaustion is a prudential doctrine, not a jurisdictional prerequisite," Waterman v. Marquette-Alger Intermediate Sch. Dist., 739 F.Supp. 361, 366 (W.D.Mich.1990), but see Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F.Supp 296, 302 (N.D.Ill.1982), failure to exhaust administrative remedies may properly be raised in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Norris v. Board of Educ. of Greenwood Community Sch. Corp., 797 F.Supp. 1452, 1469 (S.D.Ind. 1992).
Plaintiffs argue that by exhausting their administrative remedies under Ind. Code §§ 20-8.1-5-8 to 12, the expulsion provisions of the pupil discipline statute, they exhausted their administrative remedies for purposes of the IDEA. Plaintiffs' Answer to Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Answer") at 2-3. Plaintiffs argue that this was sufficient because Defendant "determined the administrative remedy path by bringing expulsion charges against [Ms. Brown]." Plaintiffs' Answer at 2-3. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' exhaustion of their administrative remedies for purposes of the pupil discipline statute did not constitute exhaustion for purposes of the IDEA.
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bills by Bills v. Homer Consolidated School Dist. No. 33-C, 96 C 6431.
...challenges to the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional issue, see, e.g., Brown v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Lawrence Township, 945 F.Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D.Ind.1996), the Seventh Circuit recently announced that exhaustion is not a jurisdictional defense because it is ge......
-
L.M. ex rel. Mauser v. Brownsburg Community School
...exhaust administrative remedies under a rationale supported by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Brown v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Lawrence Township, 945 F.Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D.Ind. 1996); Smith v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 916 F.Supp. 872, 873 (S.D.Ind.1995); Norris v. Board of Educ.......
-
Ryan v. Ctr. Twp. Constable's Office, Case No. 1:15-cv-01387-TWP-TAB
...474, 484 (Ind. 2003). A complaint is rendered insufficient when any of these elements are absent. Brown v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Lawrence Twp., 945 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (citing Lynch v. Holy Name Church, 179 N.E.2d 754, 757(1962)). Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plainti......
-
Deasy-Leas v. Leas
...components will operate retroactively to the extent that they do not harm vested rights. See Brown v. Metropolitan School Dist. of Lawrence Twp., 945 F.Supp. 1202, 1205 (S.D.Ind.1996). Here, the legislature repealed, reenacted and amended the entire body of law concerning family matters. 1 ......