Brown v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company
| Citation | 18 N.W. 834,31 Minn. 553 |
| Parties | Sheldon T. Brown v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1884 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Young, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.
Order affirmed.
Merrick & Merrick, for appellant.
J. D Springer, for respondent.
OPINION
While plaintiff was running a regular passenger train upon defendant's railroad as a locomotive engineer, his engine (without apparent fault on his part) ran into some box cars standing upon the main track at Winthrop station, and he was injured. The main track was that to which plaintiff's train was entitled. The freight cars had been placed there by persons not in defendant's employ, for their own convenience, and without other authority than the assent of the station agent. They were placed there about 3 P. M., and the collision occurred at 7:35 P. M., so that they had then been there more than four hours. The train was due at the station at 7:27. The plaintiff put in evidence a rule of the company as follows:
There was no evidence of any other rule or regulation, express or implied, as to the management of the tracks at or about the station, or as to the duties of a station agent. But we agree with the plaintiff's counsel that, in the absence of controlling evidence to the contrary, an ordinary railway station agent is to be taken as having general charge of the tracks at and about his station. This is a reasonable presumption of fact, founded upon the ordinary course of business, the common understanding of the public, and the nature and necessities of the case. Of course, the station agent is always subject to the control of his superiors, and his general charge may be limited by rules and regulations; as, in this instance, by the prohibition to place cars upon the main track to load or unload without permission from the train-master, or by the assignment of some portion of what would ordinarily be his duties to some other person. The presumption spoken of appears to be assumed by the rule put in evidence.
As a consequence of these views it is clear that, upon the facts before stated, it was the duty of the station agent, as respects the plaintiff, to see to it that the main track was unobstructed and ready for his train, and that, in suffering it to be obstructed as it was, the agent was guilty of negligence through which plaintiff was injured. As respects the defendant, this negligence of the station agent is the only negligence of which plaintiff can or does complain. In this state of facts the trial court dismissed the action, being of opinion that the station agent was plaintiff's fellow-servant, and that, therefore, (no charge of incompetence being made against him,) plaintiff cannot recover for the injuries resulting from his negligence. It remains to consider whether this opinion is correct.
Prima facie the plaintiff and the station agent were fellow-servants, for they were acting together under one master in carrying out a common object. Gilman v. Eastern R. Co., 10 Allen 233. They were engaged in the same common employment, under the same general control. Cooley on Torts, 544, and cases cited. They were subject to the same general control, coupled with an engagement in the same common pursuit. Wood on Master and Servant, §§ 426, 435, and cases cited. McGowan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 61 Mo. 528; Thompson on Negligence, p. 1037, § 38. Is there anything to except the station agent from this prima facie relationship of fellow-servant to the plaintiff? He would be excepted only if he stood in the place of the master as a vice-principal, or, as it is sometimes expressed, as the master's alter ego. Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N.Y. 5. But one employed becomes a vice-principal as respects another only when he is intrusted with the performance of some absolute and personal duty of the master himself, such as the providing of proper instrumentalities with which the service required of an employe is to be performed, or the general management and control of the master's business, or of some branch of it. Drymala v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 40, 1 N.W. 255, and cases cited; Wood on Master & Servant, §§ 390, 438; Mullan v. Philadelphia, etc., Co., 78 Pa. 25; Malone v. Hathaway, supra. In such cases the negligence of the vice-principal is the negligence of the master. Drymala v. Thompson, supra; Fay v. Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 231, 15 N.W. 241; Cooley on Torts, 560, 563; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N.Y. 517; Quincy M. Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34, 3 N.W. 240; Booth v. B. & A. R. Co., 73 N.Y. 38. But the general management or control of the master's business, or some branch thereof, does not include the case of one simply charged with special duties performing them under the direction of the master, or under the control of superior officers. Malone v. Hathaway, supra.
Applying the rule that, the facts being undisputed, the relation of the station master to the plaintiff is a question of law (Marshall v. Schricker, 63 Mo. 308,) in our opinion the station...
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