Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co.

• Citation: 93 Conn. 251,105 A. 706
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 19 February 1919
• Parties: BROWN v. NEW HAVEN TAXICAB CO.

105 A. 706

93 Conn. 251

BROWN v. NEW HAVEN TAXICAB CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 19, 1919

Appeal from City Court of New Haven.

Action by Theodore Brown against the New Haven Taxicab Company, in which defendant interposed a counterclaim. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, while plaintiff files a plea in abatement. No error. Plea in abatement overruled.

See also, 92 Conn. 252, 102 A. 573.

In action for damages from collision of two automobiles where rate of speed was very much in dispute, court did not err in not charging that the rate of speed which plaintiff was traveling being at least 15 miles an hour was prima facie negligence, no such rule having been established within the limits of the city.

Prentice W. Chase and Albert McC. Mathewson, both of New Haven, for appellant.

George W. Crawford, of New Haven, for appellee.

GAGER, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for injuries to person and property caused by the collision of two automobiles at the intersection of Chapel and High streets, in New Haven. The plaintiff claimed the collision was caused by the negligent driving of the defendant's automobile. The defendant denied negligence, claimed contributory negligence by the plaintiff, and counterclaimed for damages to his automobile due to plaintiff's negligence. The plaintiff recovered a verdict, which the court refused to set aside and the case comes to this court upon defendant's appeal claiming error by the trial court in the refusal to set aside the verdict, and sundry errors in the charge to the jury.

There was no error in refusing to set aside the verdict. It appears that the intersection of these two streets constitutes rather a blind corner. The plaintiff was driving on Chapel street, approaching the intersection from the west. The defendant was driving on High street, approaching the intersection from the south. The plaintiff's speed was put by different witnesses at from 12 to 25 miles per hour, and the defendant's speed at from 6 to 25 miles per hour. The relative speeds of the plaintiff and defendant, and their reasonableness under the circumstances, became vital issues in the case. There were irreconcilable differences in the testimony as to the actual rates of speed, and their reasonableness under the circumstances, and also the conduct of the drivers, and these were open questions of fact for the jury to determine. Under proper instructions the jury did determine them in favor of the plaintiff, and a careful reading of the testimony shows that the jury might reasonably have come to the conclusion it did.

The defendant complains of certain portions of the charge to the jury. It is assigned for error that the court charged as follows, to wit:

" The defendant's servant knew, or ought to have known, that Chapel street was a much traveled highway, and that the probable condition of traffic on said street required a person driving thereon from a street such as High street to be unusually careful, and to operate his automobile at such a rate of speed, and to have the same under such control, that he could seasonably stop the same and avoid collision with other vehicles or pedestrians traveling on said highway."

The defendant's objection to this is not the assumption of fact that Chapel street was much traveled as compared with High street, but that, in requiring of the traveler on High street to be " unusually careful" with reference to speed and operation, it imposed on the defendant approaching on High street a greater degree of care than the statutes prescribed; that it required of the defendant more care than was required of the plaintiff, both parties approaching the same intersection. Did the expression " unusually careful" stand alone, it might be the subject of criticism. But taking the statutes which were read to the jury and the rest of the charge together, the court did not impose a burden beyond what the law required. Section 11 of chapter 231 of the Public Acts of 1915 requires speed that " is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway." Section 12: " Upon approaching an intersecting highway, *** every person operating a motor vehicle shall slow down *** when reasonable care requires." The standard of care is reasonableness, and this reasonableness is to be determined in view of the conditions. The ideal standard which the jury should apply is the care of the ordinarily prudent man under the circumstances. The degree, the quantitative extent, of the care varies with the conditions. The quality of reasonableness remains unchanged. Situations of unusual danger require unusual care. Conduct which might quite meet the standard of the ordinarily prudent man in one set of circumstances might be quite inadequate in another. This idea is emphasized in all cases of negligence. It is explicitly recognized in the words of the statute, " having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway." Under the charge of the court as a whole no more was intended, or could reasonably have been understood to have been intended, than this recognition of the effect of circumstances upon the quantity of care, if we may so express it, required in the situation before the court.

Elsewhere in its charge the court said:

" If, because of traffic conditions on Chapel street, there was more danger of accidents from collision, then the defendant's servant owed the plaintiff, and other persons traveling on Chapel street, a corresponding degree of care in driving onto Chapel street from High street."

" In dangerous situations ordinary care means great care. The greater the danger the greater the care required. The plaintiff must not only prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but he must prove that the injury was not caused, in whole or in part, by his own negligence."

" Negligence is the failure to use that degree of care with reference to the interests of another that the ordinarily prudent careful man would use under the circumstances of the case."

We do not think, taking the charge as a whole, that the jury could have been misled by the use of the language " unusually careful." It was but a way of emphasizing the element of quantitative variability introduced into the definition of negligence by " circumstances of the case."

The defendant, for another assignment of error, says that the trial court erred in not charging the jury, as requested by the defendant, that the rate of speed which the plaintiff was traveling, being at least 15 miles an hour, was prima facie negligence. The record does not show any such request. The request, if made, could not have been complied with, because it assumed as unquestioned a speed of 15...