Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1917
• Citation: 92 Conn. 252,102 A. 573
• Parties: BROWN. v. NEW HAVEN TAXICAB CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

102 A. 573

92 Conn. 252

BROWN.

v. NEW HAVEN TAXICAB CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1917.

Appeal from City Court of New Haven; John R. Booth, Judge.

Action by Theodore Brown against the New Haven Taxicab Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries and for an injury to an automobile by a collision on the streets of New Haven, which were alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a servant of the defendant in driving its automobile, brought to the city court of New Haven, and tried to the jury, when, upon motion of the defendant, a verdict was directed for the defendant, which, upon motion of the plaintiff, was set aside. A bill of exceptions to the ruling of the court in directing a verdict was filed by the plaintiff, made a part of the record, and an appeal was taken by the defendant for the alleged errors in the rulings of the court in setting aside the verdict.

Prentice W. Chase, of New Haven, for appellant.

George W. Crawford, of New Haven, for appellee.

RORABACK, J. At the close of the evidence in this case the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict upon the ground that the automobile which the plaintiff alleged and claimed to own was not properly registered as required by the provisions of section 19 of the Motor Vehicle Law of 1915, the material portion of which is as follows:

"No recovery shall be had in the courts of this state, by the owner or operator, or any passenger of a motor vehicle which has not been legally registered in accordance with section two or three of this act, for injury to person or property received by reason of the operation of such motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state, unless such motor vehicle is the property of a nonresident and is within the provisions of section ten of this act."

Section 2 of this act requires that: "Every owner of one or more motor vehicles shall file annually in the office of the secretary, on a blank furnished by said secretary: (a) A statement of his name, residence, and post office address; (b) a description of each motor vehicle owned or controlled by him, including the name of the maker, the number, if any, affixed by the maker."

The court in directing a verdict stated to the jury that:

"The testimony disclosed that the Biever Motor Company had given a conditional bill of sale of this car. The legal title therefore still remained in the Biever Motor Company until the final payment was made thereunder. I therefore sustain the motion for a directed verdict, and direct you, as the legal title, as distinguished from the equitable title, was in the Biever Motor Company at the time of the accident, to return a verdict for the defendant."

In this there was error. The words of a statute are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended. By our statute words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly plain usage of language.

We know that the word "owner" is often used to designate the person having an interest in property under a special title, and it is our opinion that it was so used in the provisions of the statute relating to motor vehicles. 29 Cyc. 1549, and cases cited in the note. The word has.different meanings, and must have its proper significance in each case in view of the subject, the object, and the provisions of the statute in which it is found. A bailor may have a general and a bailee a special ownership in the subject of the bailment. 2 Hale on Bailments, 56. See, also, United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139...