Brown v. Office of the State Comptroller
| Decision Date | 23 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-cv-880 (SRU),3:15-cv-880 (SRU) |
| Citation | 456 F.Supp.3d 370 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Virginia BROWN, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF the STATE COMPTROLLER, et al., Defendants. |
Claire M. Howard, Todd D. Steigman, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Josephine S. Graff, Jennifer P. Bennett, Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
This is a case about a Connecticut state employee—Virginia Brown ("Brown")—who uncovered what she believed to be corruption in the Connecticut state government within the Office of the State Comptroller ("OSC") and the State Employees’ Retirement Commission ("Commission"). At this point, the remaining defendants in this case are (1) the State of Connecticut and (2) Brenda Halpin ("Halpin"), an OSC employee (collectively, the "Defendants"). Brown believes that her complaints regarding the alleged corruption she uncovered were protected speech under the First Amendment and the Connecticut Constitution, and so the Defendants’ retaliation against her—culminating in their eliminating her position and transferring her to another state agency—was illegal.
Simply put, Brown believed that certain state and municipal retirees were being significantly overpaid at an enormous cost to Connecticut's taxpayers. More specifically, Brown believed that individuals within the OSC and Commission were intentionally advocating that incorrect legal standards should be applied to certain eligibility determinations regarding state and municipal employees’ retirement benefits. Brown discovered that those OSC and Commission employees supported such overly generous policies because doing so placated politically powerful public sector unions. Although Brown initially brought her discoveries to the attention of her supervisors at the OSC, she also told Connecticut's Auditors of Public Accounts (the "Auditors"), an outside law firm that worked with the OSC, and employees in other parts of Connecticut's government.
For the following reasons, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, doc. no. 189, is denied in substantial part and granted in part .
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ().
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. , 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must present sufficient probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Colon v. Coughlin , 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci , 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991) ; see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc. , 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is "merely colorable," or is not "significantly probative," summary judgment may be granted. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
Id. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To present a "genuine" issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In such a situation, "there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. ; accord Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found. , 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment may enter. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Although a nonmovant's deposition testimony or affidavits might be self-serving, they may nonetheless support or defeat a motion for summary judgment so long as they do not merely reiterate allegations made in the complaint and, rather, contain specific facts of which the nonmovant has personal knowledge. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Slavin , 676 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D. Conn. 2009) ; Page v. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety , 185 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153 (D. Conn. 2002) ; Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc. , 473 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2007).
Brown filed the instant action in Connecticut state court on May 14, 2015. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1. The defendants1 removed the case to this court on June 9, 2015. See Notice, Doc. No. 1. On December 10, 2015, I dismissed the action but permitted Brown to file an amended complaint. See Min. Entry, Doc. No. 80. Brown's amended complaint, filed on January 15, 2016, named three defendants: the Defendants here and Linda Yelmini ("Yelmini"), a Commission trustee and the head of Connecticut's Office of Labor Relations. See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 86. All three defendants made motions to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 97 (Yelmini); Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 98 (Halpin and State of Connecticut). On September 29, 2016, I granted Yelmini's motion to dismiss but denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Order, Doc. No. 127. The Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. See Am. Notice of Appeal, Doc. No. 129. On March 15, 2018, the Second Circuit affirmed part of my ruling and dismissed the rest for lack of jurisdiction.2 See Mandate of USCA, Doc. No. 147. The case returned to me, and the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on June 10, 2019. See Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 189. On December 10, 2019, I held a hearing on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Min. Entry, Doc. No. 200.
On September 21, 2012, Brown began her employment with the OSC as a "Staff Attorney II." Defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)1 Stmnt. of Undisputed Facts ("56(a)1 Stmnt."), Doc. No. 189-2, at ¶ 5. Brown's duties included providing legal services to the OSC's Retirement Services Division ("Division") and the Commission. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8–11. The Division administers Connecticut retirement systems, including the State Employees Retirement System ("SERS") and the Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System ("CMERS"). Id. at ¶ 2. The Commission is a separate entity from the Division that is also charged with administering SERS and CMERS. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-155a(c).
When Brown was hired as a Staff Attorney II, it was contemplated that she would work as counsel for both the Division and the Commission; indeed, both Division employees and Commission members interviewed Brown. See 56(a)1 Stmnt., Doc. No. 189-2, at ¶¶ 8–10. Traditionally, the Division had provided some "legal support" to the Commission. See Halpin Depo. Tr., Ex. 2 to Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Halpin Depo."), Doc. No. 189-5, at 41:23–42:8. However, the Defendants claim that Brown's duties vis-à-vis the Commission ended just weeks into her job, in October 2012. See 56(a)1 Stmnt., Doc. No. 189-2, at ¶¶ 12–13. Yelmini explained that the Commission did not want Brown to work for them because Brown was a Staff Attorney II, which was a bargaining unit position; that status might create conflicts of interest because almost half of the Commission's members were from unions. See Yelmini Aff., Ex. 4 to Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Yelmini Aff."), Doc. No. 189-7, at ¶¶ 8–10; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-155a(a). According to Yelmini, before Brown's hiring, the Division counsel who had provided legal support to the Commission was not a Staff Attorney II. See Yelmini Aff., Doc. No. 189-7, at ¶ 9. Also before Brown's hiring, the Commission had retained Ice Miller, an outside law firm, to help it comply with state and federal tax laws. See id. at ¶ 16–17. Ice Miller continued to work with the Commission until Ice Miller resigned in September 2013. See 56(a)1 Stmnt., Doc. No. 189-2, at ¶ 55. The Commission also worked with outside counsel Rose Kallor beginning in June 2013. See Yelmini Aff., Doc. No. 189-7, at ¶ 12....
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