Brown v. Office of the Comm'r of Prob.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–P–1055.,14–P–1055. |
| Citation | 87 Mass.App.Ct. 729,35 N.E.3d 1 |
| Parties | Helen BROWN v. OFFICE OF the COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Jonathan J. Margolis (Beth R. Myers with him), Boston, for the plaintiff.
Sally A. VanderWeele, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.
David A. Russcol, Boston, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: GREEN, FECTEAU, & AGNES, JJ.
This case presents the novel issue of whether a plaintiff who recovers punitive damages as part of a judgment under the provisions of G.L. c. 151B, § 9, against a subdivision of the Commonwealth may be awarded postjudgment interest on that award and on the award of attorney's fees and costs, or whether sovereign immunity bars such interest.1 The statutes relevant to the issue, including those under which the punitive damages were awarded, i.e., c. 151B, and G.L. c. 235, § 8 (interest on judgments), are silent on the matter. Neither the Appeals Court nor the Supreme Judicial Court has squarely addressed the issue in a published opinion with respect to c. 151B. In Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of Suffolk County, 465 Mass. 584, 597–598, 990 N.E.2d 1042 (2013), the Supreme Judicial Court stated, "the general rule is that ‘the Commonwealth ... is not liable for postjudgment interest in the absence of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in that regard,’ " and "entities entitled to sovereign immunity are not liable for interest under G.L. c. 235, § 8, absent an unequivocal statutory waiver," citing Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Center, 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670 N.E.2d 166 (1996). Thus, we must discern whether this case presents an exception to the general rule.
In Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 238, 860 N.E.2d 1 (2007) (Todino ), the court generally observed that (citation and quotation omitted). The court also noted that "[t]he rules of construction governing statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are stringent." Ibid. (quotation omitted). However, it allowed that Ibid. (citations omitted). See DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1, 12–13, 848 N.E.2d 1197 (2006) (DeRoche ). Thus, the issue presented in this case reduces to whether sovereign immunity has been waived by necessary implication in regard to postjudgment interest on punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees in an award against the Commonwealth or its entities under c. 151B.
The Commonwealth contends that sovereign immunity has not been waived for this type of postjudgment interest.2 It urges that there is a substantial and practical reason that justifies treatment of the Commonwealth differently from private employers. While it recognizes that G.L. c. 151B, § 1(1) and (5), includes the Commonwealth in the statutory definition of "persons" and "employers" subject to c. 151B, and that generally the Legislature intended for the Commonwealth to be treated the same as private employers under most of the statutes and rules applicable in c. 151B proceedings, it argues that postjudgment interest on punitive damages is fundamentally different in kind from any other type of award or benefit. This is true if only because the amount of punitive damages is neither foreseeable nor readily available for payment given the system of balanced budgeting and that State departments and agencies must depend on legislative appropriation for their funding, thus requiring time to obtain funds necessary to pay such awards. Indeed, as noted in M. O'Connor Contr., Inc. v. Brockton, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 278, 285 n. 12, 809 N.E.2d 1062 (2004), Thus, the underlying reasoning for postjudgment interest on awards under c. 151B—to encourage prompt payment by employers—ought not apply to the Commonwealth.3
The plaintiff relies on DeRoche, supra at 3, 848 N.E.2d 1197, where the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a judgment of the Superior Court affirming an award entered by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) on a complaint brought under G.L. c. 151B, § 5, against a public entity. The MCAD found for the plaintiff and awarded compensatory damages but did not assess interest on the damages. Ibid. The Superior Court, in affirming the award, ordered prejudgment and postjudgment interest. See id. at 6, 848 N.E.2d 1197. The Supreme Judicial Court, noting that c. 151B, and G.L. c. 258, § 1 (), are silent on whether interest may be assessed on awards under c. 151B against the Commonwealth, held that for certain provisions of c. 151B, sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth had been waived for interest purposes "by necessary implication." Id. at 12–14, 848 N.E.2d 1197 (quotation omitted). The court reached its decision on two grounds.
First, because the Commonwealth is explicitly included as a "person" or "employer" subject to suit under c. 151B, and because the MCAD has the power to impose prejudgment interest on private employers in the c. 151B context, the "inevitable conclusion" is that the Legislature must have intended for the Commonwealth to also be subject to interest. Id. at 13, 848 N.E.2d 1197.
Second, the court reasoned, c. 151B, § 5 (), gives the MCAD broad discretion to order a full range of remedies to eradicate discrimination, therefore also supporting the conclusion that the Legislature intended to allow the MCAD to impose interest on awards entered against the Commonwealth. Id. at 13–14, 848 N.E.2d 1197. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court allowing prejudgment and postjudgment interest to be assessed against the Commonwealth. See ibid. The plaintiff here avers, relying on the same reasoning as in DeRoche, that because c. 151B explicitly puts the Commonwealth in the same class as private employers, remedies that can be imposed against a private employer can be imposed against the Commonwealth. The plaintiff contends that it is a logical extension of the reasoning in DeRoche to conclude that, because private employers are subject to postjudgment interest on those types of awards, so must the Commonwealth, by necessary implication of legislative intent.
However, there are three limitations to the reach of DeRoche, supra,
that we consider significant. First, while we recognize the court addressed postjudgment interest, id. at 19 n. 19, 848 N.E.2d 1197 (note 19 ),4 the MCAD had not raised as an issue whether postjudgment interest should be treated differently from the prejudgment interest portion of the judgment. See note 19. The case was primarily focused on prejudgment interest, see id. at 13–14, 848 N.E.2d 1197, and as such, although the court allowed postjudgment interest to stand, that portion of the judgment had not been challenged, and thus served only as a historical artifact not essential to the court's analysis. Second, the substantive award consisted only of compensatory damages; no punitive damages were awarded. Therefore, the court had no need to address whether postjudgment interest may be allowable on a punitive damages award. Third, one of the bases for the court's holding, as mentioned above, was the broad discretion the Legislature afforded to the MCAD under c. 151B, § 5, whereas the case at bar involves a Superior Court trial and jury verdict awarding punitive damages under c. 151B, § 9. While civil penalties may now be imposed by the MCAD, see G.L. c. 151B, § 5, as amended in 2003,5 such penalties are limited in amount, not as broad as penalties available after a trial, and "staircased" depending on prior violations. See G.L. c. 151B, § 5, fourth par.
Furthermore, while there is a logical thread in our cases discerning a legislative intent, either expressed or implied, to permit interest on compensatory awards so that employees do not suffer a loss in value, due to the passage of time, of their earnings awarded as damages, there is reason to interpret the case law to limit such interest to compensatory awards only. Compare, e.g., Perkins Sch. for the Blind v. Rate Setting Commn., 383 Mass. 825, 835, 423 N.E.2d 765 (1981) (); Todino, 448 Mass. at 239, 860 N.E.2d 1 () (quotation omitted), with Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 659–660, 584 N.E.2d 619 (1992) ...
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