Brown El v. Oparaugo

• Decision Date: 10 June 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 19-3804 (CKK)
• Parties: LISA BROWN EL, Plaintiff, v. DENNIS OPARAUGO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

LISA BROWN EL, Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS OPARAUGO, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-3804 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

June 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Dennis Oparaugo's motion for judgment on the pleadings and Lisa Brown El's motions to compel and for sanctions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Oparaugo's motions and denies all others.^[1]

1

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Lisa Brown El initiated this civil action on December 23, 2019, when she filed her original complaint (ECF No. 1, “Compl.”). The complaint listed five plaintiffs, but only Brown El signed the complaint and submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). On January 28, 2020, the Court issued an Order (ECF No. 3) that, within 30 days, the remaining four plaintiffs either submit applications to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the $402 filing fee in full. If the other four plaintiffs were minors, the Order directed Brown El either to demonstrate that she was acting as the minors' next friend or to submit an amended complaint dismissing the other four as party plaintiffs.

The case remained open for more than one year with no activity until April 21, 2021, when Brown El responded to the January 28, 2020, Order. In a “Revised Complaint” (ECF No. 5), Brown El explained that she was “removing all family members previously named in this action.” She submitted another “Revised Complaint” (ECF No. 4) on April 28, 2021, listing herself as the sole plaintiff.

On May 11, 2021, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order (ECF No. 6) dismissing Bruce K. Brown II, Jewel L. Brown, C.O. Gordon and A.M. Gordon as party plaintiffs, declaring the original complaint (ECF No. 1) the operative pleading, and granting Brown El's application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk of Court issued a summons on May 14, 2021 (ECF No. 7), and according to the return of service (ECF No. 9), defendant (hereinafter “Oparaugo”) was served on May 24, 2021.

2

Oparaugo, then proceeding pro se, prepared a response to the complaint, dated June 2, 2021, and sent it to the Court by certified mail on June 4, 2021. See Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (ECF No. 28) ¶ 5; see id., Ex. A (ECF No. 28-1). The Court treated the response as Oparaugo's answer, and on June 30, 2021, granted leave to file it. See Answer (ECF No. 11) at 1. Counsel entered an appearance (ECF No. 13) for Oparaugo on August 13, 2021, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 21) on September 24, 2021. Brown El (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) timely filed her opposition (ECF No. 23, “Pl.'s Opp'n”) on October 25, 2021, and Oparaugo filed a reply (ECF No. 25) on November 1, 2021.

B. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations and Legal Claims

Plaintiff rented a house from Oparaugo at 3737 Horner Place, S.E., Washington, DC. See Compl. at 1 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF); Pl.'s Answers to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 23, “Pl.'s Opp'n”), Ex. 1 (ECF No. 23-1, Real Estate Lease). According to Plaintiff, in May 2018, “a deluge of bricks, mortar and other portions of the chimney came crashing down on the rear deck” of the house. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff further alleged that Oparaugo “fail[ed] to maintain the property in a safe . . . manner, ” id., and, among other defects, alleged that improper water drainage resulted in damage to the interior walls, ceilings and floors, see Pl.'s Opp'n at 2 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF); see also id., Ex. 2 (ECF No. 23-1 at 6-7, Inspection Checklist).

Plaintiff brings an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim, Compl. at 1, alleges Oparaugo's “negligence was deliberate and preventable, ” id. at 2, and accuses Oparaugo of fraud, id. at 1; see generally Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 5 (ECF No. 23-1 at 15-16, Pl.'s Decl.) (page numbers designated by CM/ECF). As a result, Plaintiff alleges, she sustained

3

non-physical injuries, see Compl. at 1 (alleging Plaintiff's family “was traumatized and their lives were threatened”); Pl.'s Decl. at 15 (stating that falling chimney rendered Plaintiff “close to death”), 16 (alleging Plaintiff “went into a severe depression” and experienced “anger and hopelessness” prompting her to “see[] a therapist to work through these intense emotions”), for which she demands “thirty million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, ” Compl. at 2.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Oparaugo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

1. Legal Standard

“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Such motion is “functionally equivalent to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges, 339 F.Supp.2d 26, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[T]he standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is essentially the same as that for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Rollins, 703 F.3d at 130 (concluding that that Iqbal and Twombly apply to Rule 12(c) motions). In other words, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

4

alleged.” Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).

“The moving party must demonstrate [his] entitlement to judgment in [his] favor, even though the ‘court evaluating the 12(c) motion will accept as true the allegations in the opponent's pleadings, and as false all controverted assertions of the movant.'” Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 933 F.3d 751, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1249 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (collecting cases), abrogated on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may not “rely on facts outside of the pleadings, must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations.” Brown v. District of Columbia, 249 F.Supp.3d 439, 442 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Maniaci v. Georgetown Univ., 510 F.Supp.2d 50, 59 (D.D.C. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant[], which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Williams v. District of Columbia, 9 A.3d 484, 493-94 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Futrell v. Dep't of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 808 (D.C. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An IIED claim survives a motion to dismiss if a plaintiff alleges “conduct that was ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

5

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'” Id. (quoting Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991)); see Ferenc v. World Child, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 56, 59 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076, (D.C. 1980)), aff'd, 172 F.3d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “The requirement of outrageousness is not an easy one to meet.” Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C. 1994) (citing Bown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1079 (D.C. 1992)). “Liability will not be imposed for mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. 1998)...