Brown v. Owen Steel Co., Inc., 2215
Decision Date | 18 May 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 2215,2215 |
Citation | 450 S.E.2d 57,316 S.C. 278 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | David BROWN, Employee, Appellant, v. OWEN STEEL COMPANY, INC., Employer, and Employers Insurance of Wausau, Carrier, Respondents. |
James E. Chaffin, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.
Ernest G. Lawhorne and Andrew F. Lindemann, Columbia, for respondents.
In this workers compensation case, the employer, Owen Steel Co., Inc. and the carrier, Employers Insurance of Wausau, sought permission to cease payment of temporary disability benefits to the appellant, David Brown, who sustained a compensable back injury February 16, 1990. The Full Commission, affirming the single commissioner, found Brown had reached maximum medical improvement January 31, 1992, and awarded a thirty-five percent permanent partial disability to the back under the scheduled member Section 42-9-30 of the South Carolina Code. S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-30 (1976). The circuit court affirmed. Brown appeals, arguing he should have been permitted to seek benefits under § 42-9-20 instead of under § 42-9-30. We affirm.
In rejecting Brown's position that he should be permitted to elect the code section under which he seeks to recover benefits, the Commission and the circuit court both held that if a specific member included in the schedule set forth in § 42-9-30 is implicated, the award must be made pursuant to § 42-9-30. Although we consider the Commission and the circuit court to have misstated the law, we nonetheless agree with the result, and affirm. See Rule 220(c), SCACR ( ).
In Fields v. Owens Corning Fiberglas, 301 S.C. 554, 555, 393 S.E.2d 172, 173 (1990), the Supreme Court stated:
Under our Worker's Compensation Act, a claimant may proceed under § 42-9-10 or § 42-9-20 to prove a general disability; alternatively, he or she may proceed under § 42-9-30 to prove a loss, or loss of use of, a member, organ, or part of the body for which specific awards are listed in the statute. It is well-settled that an award under the general disability statutes must be predicated upon a showing of a loss of earning capacity, whereas an award under the scheduled loss statute does not require such a showing. (citation omitted) The commission may award compensation to a claimant under the scheduled loss statute rather than the general disability statutes so long as there is substantial evidence to support such an award. (emphasis added).
See also Green v. City of Columbia, --- S.C. ----, 427 S.E.2d 685 n. 2 (Ct.App.1993) ( ); Lyles v. Quantum Chemical Co., --- S.C. ----, 434 S.E.2d 292 (Ct.App.1993) ( ); Bixby v. City of Charleston, 300 S.C. 390, 388 S.E.2d 258 (Ct.App.1989) ( ).
The policy behind allowing a claimant to proceed under the general disability § 42-9-10 and § 42-9-20 allows for a claimant whose injury, while falling under the scheduled member section, nevertheless affects other parts of the body and warrants providing the claimant with the opportunity to establish a disability greater than the presumptive disability provided for under the scheduled member section. See A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 58.21 (1992). When, however, a scheduled loss is not accompanied by additional complications affecting another part of the body, the scheduled recovery is exclusive. See Singleton v. Young Lumber Co., 236 S.C. 454, 471, 114 S.E.2d 837, 845 (1960) (); see also Moss v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 245 S.C. 127, 139 S.E.2d 532 (1964) (); accord Larson § 58.22.
Brown does not argue on appeal his back injury has affected other parts of his body or that it has contributed to an impairment beyond the scheduled member. Accordingly, Brown has shown no prejudice resulting from the commission requiring him to proceed under the scheduled member section. He can receive no greater disability rating than that presumed in the scheduled...
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